Module 5

Comparing Approaches to Security

Lesson 15: **Human Security and National Security** compares and contrasts these two overarching paradigms.

Lesson 16: **Approaches to Violence** compares and contrasts war, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, stabilisation, countering violent extremism and conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Lesson 17: **Approaches to Policing and Justice** describes new approaches to policing and justice based on the idea of community policing, problem-solving policing and restorative justice.

Lesson 18: **Approaches to Security Sector Reform (SSR)** describes some of the fundamental differences in how different countries go about developing and improving the security sector.

Lesson 19: **Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR)** describes some of the fundamental components of programmes that address the challenges of ex-combatants.

This Module compares and contrasts different approaches to security. Coordination on approaches security is difficult. There are fundamental tensions between different approaches to security. Understanding different points of view is essential to enable all stakeholders to appreciate the different theories of change that underlie the strategic narrative in each approach.

Lesson 15
Human Security & National Security

Learning Objectives:
- Distinguish between the characteristics of national security and human security
- Identify components of three broad elements of comprehensive human security
- Identify principles of human security

This lesson provides a description and definition of national interests, national security and human security. This lesson compares and contrasts human security and national security. Civil society-military-police coordination on national security is often challenging because of different perceptions and analysis of the causes of conflict. Civil society-military-police coordination on human security is possible when all stakeholders share an analysis of security threats and participate in constructing solutions to improve human security.

1. Contrasting National Security & Human Security

Many states are moving toward a human security approach. While national security and human security approaches sometimes overlap, they are often not the same. In some countries, there is very little attention to human security and an exclusive commitment to national security with an emphasis on elite economic or geopolitical interests. In these cases, there is a tension between civil society's interest in human security and state's national

Figure 38: National Security Overlaps with Human Security

security interests. A dialogue between security policymakers, security forces, and civil society can help identify common ground in national security and human security perspectives and also appreciate the areas where their approaches are different. This can allow cooperation in overlapping areas while appreciating the need for independence in areas that do not overlap.

The chart below contrasts national security and human security.

	National Security---**Human Security**	
Goal	Focus on state interests	Focus on safety of individuals and communities
Actors	Primarily military and police	Many different stakeholders, including civilian government agencies, military, police and civil society
Analysis	Focus on specific individuals and groups as threats	Focus on wider political, economic, social structures that give rise to violence

An example illustrates the two approaches. An armed opposition movement is threatening to throw over a government, which is widely known to endanger civilian lives through violations of human rights. A national security strategy may understand the underlying security challenge as the state lacking a monopoly of force. As a consequence, the national security actor may ask the international community for more weapons and to provide training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to security forces. In contrast, a human security strategy will understand the challenge as the state lacking public legitimacy. A human security strategy might therefore focus on empowering civil society to hold their government to account for the grievances that drive support for insurgents.

2. Human Security

Human security refers to the security of individuals and communities. Individuals and communities measure their human security in different ways, depending on their context. Threats to human security include violence caused by both state and non-state armed groups, poverty, economic inequality, discrimination, environmental degradation and health and other factors that undermine individual and community wellbeing. Comprehensive human security includes three components: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. To address these problems, human security emphasises the need for "whole of society" efforts including security forces but also government, civil society, business, academic, religious, media and other stakeholders.

3. National Security and National Interests

National security refers to security of the national interests of the state. States define their national interests in different ways. In most states, these include one or more of the following:

- Protection of territory
- Protection of citizens
- A legal order
- Economic interests
- Geopolitical interests based on how they view and relate to other countries
- Ideological values such as democracy, human rights, peace, religious values protection of civilians in other countries, or ideas such as racial segregation

For many states, protection of territory and citizens takes priority over other interests. Some governments identify national interests in dialogue with their own citizens. Other governments reflect the interests of elite groups rather than citizens, tending to ignore the interests of minority groups. The less the gap between government's and civil society's identification of national interests, the more likely civil society-military-police coordination to pursue national interests is possible.

Different countries base their national security strategies on different theories of change about what will protect their interests. When devising their national security strategy, one, several or all of these theories of change may influence countries. These different strategies rely on different theories of change (ToC) or "strategic narratives" as described in Lesson 14.

A "**theory of change**" (ToC) is a statement – a **strategic narrative** - about how to address a particular challenge. Every organisation has an implicit or explicit theory of change that articulates how some type of strategy or intervention will address the challenges they identify.

- A "cooperative security" approach is based on a TOC assumption that countries that cooperate militarily are stronger than those that rely only on their own state's military capability.
- A "balance of power" approach is based on the belief that states should maintain a military capability equal to other countries, to neither pose a threat to other states nor be an easy target for other states.
- A "force dominance" ToC approach is based on the belief that a state must have superior military force to other states in order to achieve its interests.
- An "all elements of national power" ToC is based on the belief that diplomatic, economic, information, and military force are each forms of power useful for achieving national interests.
- A "conflict prevention and peacebuilding" ToC is based on the belief that threats to human security can be prevented by addressing root causes driving violence and instability.[64]

4. The emergence of a human security concept

A number of international trends gave birth to the concept of human security. At the end of the cold war, the UN approach to human security emerged to articulate the need to focus on threats to individuals and communities and not just states. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote that "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."[65] The UN's Millennial Development Goals set out expectations that some of the sources of human insecurity – such as poverty, lack of education and healthcare – could be addressed through concerted effort. The mass atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica brought attention to the lack of political will to respond to mass violence against civilians. The concept of human security began as a strategic narrative that to link human development, human dignity, state-society relations, governance, and peace and security issues. The human security agenda began to highlight several principles:

- The protection of individuals and communities is critical to national and global security.
- Many security threats, such as government corruption, cheap access to weapons, religiously motivated violence, and climate change, do not have military solutions.
- The security of individual and communities depends on political, economic and social factors and not just military approaches.

There are various approaches to human security. Some approaches emphasise immediate threats and an operational approach to the protection of civilians (Module 8 details Civil-Military-Police Coordination on the Protection of Civilians). The UN approach to human security is broader, representing a more comprehensive approach to interdependent threats that endanger humans.

5. UN Approach to Human Security

The UN's Human Security Unit defines human security as "protecting fundamental freedoms—freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."[66] Comprehensive human security includes three components: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity.

Figure 39: Components of Human Security

The UN Human Security Unit emphasises that human security requires both *protection* of civilians and *empowerment* of civil society. Neither of these can be dealt with in isolation as they are mutually reinforcing. Protection refers to national and international norms, processes and institutions that shield people from critical and pervasive threats and that address insecurities in ways that are systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalised, preventive not reactive. The concept of "protection of civilians" has tended to emphasise a "top-down" approach, with states having the primary responsibility. The concept of "empowerment" emphasises people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms. It implies a "bottom-up" approach and it enables people to develop their potential and their resilience to difficult conditions. People who are empowered can become full participants in decision-making processes and demand respect for their dignity when it is violated. An empowered civil society complements government programmes to advance human

security as well as holds governments to account for responsive governance. Civil society can mobilise for the security of others by taking actions such as, publicising food shortages early, preventing famines or protesting human rights violations.

The UN Human Security Unit defines five principles of human security.

a. Human security is *people-centred,* focusing on the safety and protection of individuals, communities, and their global environment. A human security approach empowers local people to assess vulnerabilities and threats and then identify and take part in strategies to build security rather than imposing outside definitions. Strategies to achieve human security are successful in as much as they protect the quantity and quality of life.
b. Human security is *comprehensive.* In practice, human security strategies range from a limited operational "freedom from fear" to a more encompassing structural approach including "freedom from want" and "freedom to live in dignity."
c. Human security is *multi-sectoral,* addressing a range of interdependent global and local threats, insecurities and vulnerabilities in security, development and human rights.
d. Human security is *context-specific.* Local dimensions of global threats are unique and require context-specific assessment and planning.
e. Human security is *prevention-oriented.* Conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies aim for sustainable solutions to address

6. A European Union Approach to Human Security

The 2003 Barcelona Report on European Security Capabilities identified human security as the most appropriate conceptual framework for the EU security strategy to augment each EU member's national security policies. This human security approach draws on and expands existing EU capacities in crisis management, civil-military cooperation, conflict prevention and reconstruction. The Madrid Report of the EU's Human Security Study Group identified six principles of a human security approach[67]:

The Primacy of Human Rights: The first principle is to ensure respect for human rights: to secure the safety, dignity and welfare of individuals and the communities in which they live. Respect for human rights is the main challenge—not military victory or the temporary suppression of violence. This implies that civilian and military initiatives should prioritise the protection of civilians over the defeat of an enemy.

Legitimate Political Authority: A legitimate authority is trusted by the population and is responsible for law and order and respect of human rights. This principle means that any outside intervention must strive to create a legitimate political authority provided by a state, an international body or a local authority (a town or region).

A *Bottom-Up Approach:* Intensive consultation with local people is required, not only to 'win hearts and minds' and in order to gain better understanding of their needs, but to also enable vulnerable communities to create the conditions for peace and stability themselves. This means involving civil society, women and young people, and not only political leaders or those who wield guns. Outsiders cannot deliver human security; they can only help.

*Effective Multilateralism***:** This relates to legitimacy and entails a commitment toward the international law, alongside other international and regional agencies, individual states and non-state actors. Effective multilateralism is one of the factors that distinguish a human security approach from neo-imperialism. It also means a better division of tasks and greater coherence, solving problems through rules and cooperation, and creating common policies and norms.

An Integrated Regional Approach: There is a tendency to focus on particular countries when dealing with crisis. Yet insecurity spills over borders through refugees, transnational criminal networks and so on. Regional dialogues and action in neighbouring countries should be systematically integrated into policies.

Clear and Transparent Strategic Direction: When the European Union intervenes externally; it must do so with clear legal authorisation, transparent mandates, and a coherent overall strategy. Where European security units are deployed there should be close linkage between policy makers and those on the ground, with former having ultimate control over operations. Civilians should lead all EU external engagements.

7. Human security sectors

A comprehensive approach to human security includes a variety of sectors.

- *Physical security* is often referred to as "citizen security" or "community security"
- *Economic security* refers to the need for people to have opportunities to earn and access a basic income. Research links high unemployment with crime and violence.
- *Food security* refers to people having physical and economic access to basic food. Research suggests the distribution of food and lack of income to purchase food are the core problems.
- *Health security* refers to a minimum access to health services, clean water and other basic necessities to prevent infectious diseases and lifestyle-related chronic diseases.
- *Environmental security* refers to threats from climate change such as drought, storms, floods, rising sea waters, and pollution that harm the health of humans and other life.

8. Citizen Security

Other groups use the term "citizen security." For example, the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report on *Conflict, Security, and Development* (WDR) emphasises "citizen security" as efforts that assist people to prevent and recover from violence. Citizen security requires that all members of a society experience both freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence in their homes, workplaces and interactions with the state and society. The WDR calls for a paradigm shift in the development community's work in fragile and conflict-affected settings. It argues that fragility and violence stem from the combination of exposure to economic, political or security stresses, and weak institutional capability for coping with these stresses. Where states, markets and institutions fail to provide basic social, justice and economic opportunities to citizens, and where they are unable to manage the resulting tensions, conflict and instability can escalate. Successful transitions out of violence require legitimate and effective institutions to provide 'citizen security,' 'justice' and 'jobs'.

9. Democratic Security

The concept of "democratic security" reflects the idea that governments should consult with and listen to the security interests of its own citizens. Democratic security also relates to how foreign governments listen to the interests of civilians in other countries to define how foreign military forces relate to civilians. Democratic security requires an open, public debate and dialogue on national priorities, strategies to achieve those interests, and determining the roles, authorities and budgets of government agencies in pursuing those strategies.

> Civil society groups in Guatemala worked with the security sector to find ways of "democratic security" as part of the UN peace plan. Civil society argued that if the country was moving from a dictatorship to a democracy and if security was a "public good" – then civil society should be involved in defining the role and focus of the security sector to improve protection of civilians.
>
> Read more about the move toward "Democratic Security" in Guatemala in *Local Ownership in Security*, the companion report to this *Handbook*.

REVIEW

This lesson defined concepts and strategies related to national security and human security. The distinction between national security and human security is important for this *Handbook.* A shared human security approach makes cooperation between military, police, civilian government, and civil society possible. Where there is a big gap between a national security approach and a human security approach, civil-military-police cooperation and even coordination becomes both more difficult and more critical, as it leads to greater tension and conflict between the state and society.

Citations

[64] See the following resources for understanding peacebuilding as national security strategy:
- Christopher Holshek and Melanie Greenberg, "Toward a New Strategy of Peace" in *Socio-Cultural Analysis with the Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Intelligence Paradigm*, Dr. Charles Ehlschlaeger Editor,
- Volker C. Franke Robert H. Dorff Editors, *Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy*, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 2013).
- *Understand to Prevent: The military contribution to the prevention of violent conflict*, (Multinational Capability Development Campaign, 2015).

[65] *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan,* UN doc. A/59/2005, (New York, New York: United Nations, 2005), 55.

[66] *Human Security in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Human Security Concept and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security,* (New York, New York: Human Security Unit, undated).

[67] *A European Way of Security: The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group*, (Madrid, Spain: Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy, 2008).

Lesson 15   Learning Exercises

Anchor   *10 minutes*

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- If you have $500 million dollars to improve security in your own country, where would you invest this money? What organisation or programme would you most like to see improved?

Add   *20 minutes*

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply   *25 minutes*

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast a national security and human security approach. Facilitators provide each scenario stakeholder team with ten items (a coin, a stick, or a piece of candy) that each represents $500 million dollars and ten small sheets of paper.

Ask the group to create a security budget for their scenario in twenty minutes. How would the group invest funds to address the security threats in this environment? Each group should identify how they would allocate their budget. For example, how much would they give to police, military, to agriculture, education, employment generation or diplomatic activities? Use the items and the paper to label and illustrate how the group decides to divide up the security budget for the country.

Allow each team to display their budgets for other teams on their table. Allow time for participants to walk around the room to see how other teams allocated their budgets.

Debrief in the large group. What was challenging in the small group discussions? What was surprising in the exercise? What did you learn from other groups?

Away   *5 minutes*

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

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
Lesson 16
Approaches to Security

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
- Distinguish between different types of violent threats
- Identify how different analytical approaches to understanding violence lead to different choices of how to address violence.
- Identify and compare the analysis and theories of change of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, countering violent extremism, peacekeeping, stabilisation and conflict prevention/peacebuilding approaches to violent threats

There are many approaches to violence. This lesson describes the rationale or "strategic narrative" underlying different approaches. This can help civilians understand military and police approaches to security and it can help military, police and civilian political leaders understand conflict prevention and peacebuilding options advocated by civil society to support human security.

1. **Terminology**
   - *International and interstate violence* occurs as states wage war against each other. This type of violence is increasingly rare in today's world. The majority of violent conflicts today are between states and non-state actors. The terminology for this violence is controversial. What looks like "terrorism" to one group may seem like a justified use of military force to another group.

   - An *armed rebellion* against a state usually entails the use of *guerrilla* warfare and a significant military asymmetry between the state and the armed opposition groups. Civil society tends to use the more neutral term of "armed rebellion." States tend to call these movements "insurgencies."

   - *Terrorism* is a tactic. Terrorism can be used by non-state armed groups or by states themselves. Terrorism has four characteristics: (1) the threat or use of violence; (2) a political objective used to justify violence; (3) the intention to spread fear by dramatic violent acts; (4) the intentional targeting of civilians. All groups may refer people that use terrorism as "terrorists." But the definition of this term is

subjective. Some would view the actions of a repressive state or state violence and call that state a "terrorist." Others only use the term terrorist to refer to non-state armed groups.

- *Violent Extremism* is a term that refers to the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals. The term also refer to a contagious, global movement.

Terminology for referring to the groups in conflict is also relative. Different stakeholders use different terms. Military forces use the language of "enemy" and "adversary" to identify those groups that threaten the security or interests of the state. Police may use the language of "criminals." Civil society rarely uses these terms: for them, and those involved in peace operations, the enemy is the conflict itself. Human rights groups may refer to state and non-state armed groups as "perpetrators" if they use violence against civilians. Other civil society groups use the term "stakeholders" to recognise that all groups that use violence have a set of motivations or a "stake" in some issue.

Military Term	Police Term	Human Rights Term	Civil Society Term
Enemy or Adversary	Criminal	Perpetrator	Stakeholder

Civil society is often equally critical of state and non-state groups that use violence and intentionally or unintentionally kill civilians in their attempts to kill their "enemies." But calling a group an "enemy" makes it difficult to solve problems through diplomacy or negotiation. Two countries may be in conflict or even using armed force to threaten each other on one issue while collaborating and working together to address a shared problem. The term "enemy" becomes problematic when shifting dynamics create a situation where a group labelled as an enemy becomes an ally to fight against another enemy.

2. Different Conflict Assessment, Theories of Change, and Approaches to Civilians

This lesson compares and contrasts different approaches to violence according to their analysis, their theories of change, and their approach to civilians. Module 4 introduced the concepts of conflict assessment. Different analysis of the causes and dynamics of conflict and violence lead to different theories of change, and this in turn leads to different approaches to security. The diagram below illustrates the three main categories for comparison of different approaches to security. Different approaches to security – including counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, conflict prevention and peacebuilding are first described, and then they are compared and contrasted according to their different analysis, theory of change and approach to civilians.


Analysis
- Different stakeholders analyze conflict in distinct ways, leading to different analyses of what is causing conflict and violence. Different stakeholders use different "conflict assessments" – including different research methodologies and different data sets - of what is driving and mitigating conflict.

Theory of Change
- A 'theory of change' (TOC) is a strategic narrative about to address a security challenge. Every effort to improve security has either an implicit or explicit theory of change. Different stakeholders base their interventions on different theories of change.

Approach to Civilians
- Different stakeholders take different approaches to civilians. Some approaches to security are "population centric" and prioritize protection of civilians. Other approaches to security are "enemy centric" and priorities deterring, detaining, or destroying others.

Figure 40: Categories for Comparing Approaches to Security

3. Counterterrorism

There is no common or agreed upon definition of counterterrorism. Each organisation and country defines counterterrorism somewhat differently. In general, counterterrorism strategies aim to prevent and respond to violent acts by non-state armed groups that threaten national interests.

The table below provides a strategic narrative to explain the rationale behind counterterrorism. In counterterrorism, the causes of terrorism stem from specific individuals or groups that use violence to attack state interests. There is often a second analysis that terrorism takes place where there is a lack of state capacity to maintain a monopoly of force.

	Analysis	Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Counter-terrorism (CT)	Terrorism is a caused by specific individuals or groups that use violence to attack state interests. Terrorism results from a lack of state capacity to maintain a monopoly of force.	Prevent and stop terrorism through these efforts: • *Deter, destroy, and detain individuals and groups that use terror* • *Increase the state's capacity* to prepare, prevent, protect, and respond to terrorism, including *train and equip* state security forces in other countries • *Pacify and prevent civil society* from supporting terrorist groups

Figure 41: Counterterrorism Strategic Narrative

The analysis of the causes of terrorism often frames the motivations of these groups as "evil." Counterterrorism rarely refers to structural root causes or drivers of violence. The assumption is that the best way to prevent and respond to this type of violence is to deter, destroy or detain specific individuals or groups that are seen as threats. Counterterrorism is "threats-based" and is usually enemy-centric. States use "enemy targeting" through drone strikes to deter, destroy and isolate groups that use terror. Counterterrorism can also include pre-emptive attacks including capturing, killing, or disabling suspected terrorists before they can mount an attack.

Governments may also take a range of preventive measures to prepare for terrorism. This can include "hardening targets" by putting out barriers to obstruct attacks and developing security protocols in order to protect building, installations or other infrastructure against a possible attack. A "national response plan" outlines the roles for different government agencies and lays out a command and control hierarchy for use in the midst of a crisis. Police, fire, and emergency medical response organisations ready themselves through training and roleplaying to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. The military, police, and intelligence agencies may form special tactical units that prepare to handle a terrorist attack. Some countries emphasise law enforcement and "intelligence-led policing;" using criminal justice system to address terrorism.

4. Counterinsurgency

Like counterterrorism, there is no shared definition of counterinsurgency. In general, counterinsurgency balances enemy centric and population centric approaches, meaning there are both efforts to "deter, destroy, detain" insurgent groups as well as efforts to listen to, understand, protect, and win the support of local populations.

In counterinsurgency, the causes of violence stem from two factors: groups that use violence to attack state interests and a tension between the state-society relationship requiring a need for the state to "win the hearts and minds" of the population. COIN assumes that insurgency threatens fragile states and cause instability. COIN holds to an analysis that insurgents capitalise on societal problems, such as gaps in governance. When governments lack capacity to govern, non-state armed groups can recruit new members from the discontented local population. Counter-insurgency attempts to close the gaps by filling in for key governance activities to marginalise insurgents politically, socially, and economically.

There is overlap between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency (COIN) has a long history. Early attempts at counterinsurgency used violent repression against civilian populations and looked similar to counterterrorism. Today, most counterinsurgency also emphasises non-military efforts. While counterterrorism draws mostly on intelligence, police and military forces, counterinsurgency involves a wider range of civilian efforts "to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes by improving the state-society relationship.

	Analysis	Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians

Counter-insurgency (COIN)	Non-state armed groups use violence to attack state interests.
	
	Insurgency is caused by a problem in the state-society relationship requiring a need for the state to "win the hearts and minds" of the population.
		Defeat and contain insurgents through these efforts:
		• *Destroy, isolate, and undermine insurgents and their narratives*
		• *Win over the hearts and minds of the population* to deny popular support for the insurgency, including
		    ○ *Limiting civilian casualties* resulting from COIN attacks while protecting civilians from insurgent attacks
		    ○ *Increasing government legitimacy* via governance and development efforts

Figure 42: Counterinsurgency Strategic Narrative

There is also tension between security personnel who advocate counterterrorism with those who advocate counterinsurgency. Counterterrorism is sometimes posed as the approach that is "tough" and "ruthless" with the enemy while counterinsurgency is seen as more complex and using a mix of hard power (violent force) and soft power (diplomacy and development) to address the underlying structural conditions. Counterinsurgency can include house-to-house searches to locate insurgents or forced relocation of local populations in an attempt to "drain the swamp" or the communities who may be intentionally or unintentionally hosting insurgents. Counterinsurgency may attempt to win over the hearts and minds of the population through civilian assistance projects. This type of effort aims to both helps to bring legitimacy to the government while undermining the insurgents' relationship with local populations. Counterinsurgency often includes propaganda and psychological operations that attempt to undermine the mind-set of the insurgents and local populations who may support them.

Since most insurgent groups have inferior military training and weapons, the goal of the insurgency is not to defeat a state-based military force. Instead, insurgents attempt to inflict small but regular casualties that aim to slowly demoralise the military and their civilian supporters. Counterinsurgency experts assert that political, social, and economic programmes are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of the conflict and undermining the insurgency. Counterinsurgency guidance warns about the unintended impacts of the use of violence against insurgents.

> Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal. In contrast, using force precisely and discriminately strengthens the rule of law that needs to be established (FM 3-24: 1-27).[68]

This creates a tension, as the military is asked to achieve a mission without relying on the use of force, which is the military's primary capability. Stabilisation developed from these tensions implicit in counterinsurgency.

5. Countering Violent Extremism

Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a relatively new concept. It is defined in a variety of ways. Many countries are beginning CVE programmes as a new approach to security. In countering violent extremism, the causes of violent extremism are seen as individual choices of individuals or groups to join others to use violence to achieve political and/or religious goals.

Most frequently, CVE programmes aim to support local communities to resist recruitment into terrorist organisations and assume civil society has an important role in preventing recruitment into groups that use violence. CVE programs use a theory of change that emphasises addressing the "pull" and "push" factors encouraging individuals and groups to commit acts of violent extremism.

	Analysis	Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Countering Violent Extremism	Individuals and groups use violence to achieve political and/or religious goals	Improve human security through these efforts. • *Address the "Pull" factors* that pull individuals to join extremist groups. These include creating jobs, developing positive narratives or "counter-narratives" and supporting the voices of religious moderation • *Address the "Push" factors* that push individuals to join extremist groups. These include addressing political, economic, and social disenfranchisement, government corruption, and addressing economic hardships, such as climate-change induced droughts

Figure 43: CVE Strategic Narrative

Stabilisation

There is no agreed upon definition of stabilisation, and different countries implement a stabilisation approach in distinct ways. Stabilisation draws on an analysis that security requires supporting the capacity of a government that is unable or unwilling to provide services to the population or is not viewed as legitimate by the public. Key examples of stabilisation approaches to security include Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. Stabilisation approaches to security are often foreign-led with emphasis on externally defined concepts of law and order. States decide to deploy a stabilisation force and accompanying civilian programme to another country when their own national interests are at stake.

	Analysis	Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Stabilisation	Non-state armed groups attack and destabilise states. Violence is caused by a problem in the state-society relationship requiring a need to build state capacity.	Improve human security through these efforts. • *State-building* to improve state capacity for security, rule of law, sustainable economy, good governance, social well-being • *Whole of government approach* to coordinate civilian government agencies and the military.

Figure 44: Stabilisation Strategic Narrative

In stabilisation, the causes of conflict and violence stem from non-state armed groups that attack states and a problem in the state-society relationship requiring a need to build state capacity. Stabilisation emphasises a "state building" to improve state capacity for security, rule of law, sustainable economies, good governance, and social well-being. Security sector reform, addressed in Lesson 18, is often part of a stabilisation mission to improve state capacity. Stabilisation also emphasises the use of a "whole of government" approach that coordinates government civilians and military forces. Some stabilisation missions explicitly took on the human security paradigm, as it created a strategic narrative for linking military, police, and civilian approaches to security. The basic idea of stabilisation is that foreign capacity and leadership will transition to local "host nation" leadership. Stabilisation literature tends to emphasise the need for "local ownership" though there is little evidence of successful practice in this area.

Some states seem to view stabilisation missions as an addition to their counterinsurgency or counterterrorism approaches. These states tend to devote significantly greater resources for military forces than civilian capacities. Other states lead stabilisation with greater emphasis on civilian capacity. The stabilisation approach to security has brought new attention to the challenges of civil-military-police coordination. However, as outlined in Lesson 9 on Approaches to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination, states using a stabilisation approach tend to focus more attention to coordinating internally than with external stakeholders.

6. Peacekeeping and Peace Operations

The UN and regional organisations like the African Union use peacekeeping and peace operations as their primary approach to security. UN Peacekeeping is traditionally guided by three basic principles: consent

of the parties; impartiality; and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Unlike military forces from just one country, peacekeeping forces bring added legitimacy as they represent a consensus between multiple countries that are willing to share the financial burden of peacekeeping and are able to sustain peacekeeping and police forces in an on-going multidimensional mission.

Since the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, which happened despite the presence of peacekeeping troops, there has been a tendency to make the mandates of peacekeeping missions more robust and comprehensive, sometimes including the use of offensive force. The 2015 UN High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (aka the HIPPO Report) identified four areas of focus and principles for future peace operations. These include the following:

Primacy of politics: Political solutions are necessary to achieve sustainable peace and human security. Military and technical engagements are note sufficient to achieve security.

Responsive operations: A full spectrum of responses and approaches to security should be tailored to each, specific context. The term "peace operations" reflects this idea.

Stronger partnerships: No one stakeholder can achieve security on their own. Coordination among diverse stakeholders are necessary.

Field-focused and people-centred: Local ownership is necessary and protection of civilians is critical to the success of all approaches to security.

In peacekeeping and peace operations, the causes of conflict and violence stem from political conflicts that often result from problems in the state-society relationship. Peacekeeping and peace operations emphasise a full spectrum of options for responding these challenges, with a special emphasis on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

	Analysis	Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Peace Operations	Violence results from political conflicts.	Improve human security through these efforts. • *Peacekeeping* to offer protection of civilians and to provide time for a political solution to the conflict • *Conflict prevention and peacebuilding* to develop political, economic, and structural solutions to the conflict • *Whole of society partnerships* to coordinate stakeholders to support human security

Figure 45: Peace Operations Strategic Narrative

7. Local Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
Local conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches to security are distinct from and pre-date the more recent attention to large-scale peace operations. Due to perceived failure or slowness of state-based institutions to prevent violence, universities, religious organisations, NGOs and other civil society organisations developed new approaches to negotiation, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation. Local conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts began in the 1980s in parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America in places where the state itself was perpetrating atrocities.[69] Civil society accumulated an impressive track record of helping to end wars in countries like South Africa, Liberia, and Guatemala leading to functional states with new democratic constitutions. Elsewhere, civil society prevented outbreaks of violence at the subnational level through careful Track II diplomacy and mediation and developed their own strategies for the protection of civilians in the midst of armed conflict.

Conflict prevention refers to activities that take place before violence begins and that aim to stop violence from breaking out. Once significant violence begins, managing and transforming conflict becomes more difficult.[70] Conflict prevention is a component of the larger field of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding refers to a range of activities at any stage of conflict to prevent, mitigate, or transform conflict.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding have three components:

- *Address the immediate drivers of violence* (e.g. operational efforts such as preventive and crisis diplomacy, intergroup dialogue, media strategies, economic sanctions, observer missions or rapid response forces).
- *Transform the structural root causes of violence* (e.g. economic and political reforms, developing infrastructures to support peace and manage conflict, justice and security sector reform and development.)
- *Support mitigating factors that foster resilient responses to conflict* (e.g. supporting voices of moderate religious actors, women, youth, and other civil society actors) and recognise that cycles of violence can cause widespread societal trauma that decrease a community's resilience.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding make a distinction between direct violence and structural violence.

- <u>Direct violence</u> refers to physical harm committed by one person or group against another. <u>Structural violence</u> refers to the disabilities, disparities, and even deaths that result from systems, institutions, or policies that foster economic, social, political, educational and other disparities between groups. These disparities create grievances. Insurgents exploit these grievances to gain public support.

- Several of the approaches to security covered in this lesson acknowledge that the behaviour of states impacts levels of violence. International and interstate violence occurs when the economic, political, or security policies of one country challenge the interests of other countries.

Human security is the goal of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Unlike other approaches to security, local conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts take a long-term approach. Local people take the initiative to respond to security challenges where they live. There is no "exit strategy" since local people will continue working to improve human security are not confined by mandates or project timelines.

Peacebuilding asserts that the relationship between levels of state structural violence and terrorist or insurgent groups is often cyclical. Non-state armed groups often thrive where they are seen as an alternative to government corruption and repression. Non-state armed groups typically develop within states that have two characteristics:

- States that are elite-captured are more prone to corruption, discriminate against certain groups, and are less citizen-oriented.

- States that do not observe human rights, particularly those that use military or police force to repress political dissent.

	Analysis	Theory of Change and Approach to Civilians
Local conflict prevention and peacebuilding	Violence results from a cycle state that are elite-captured and do not observe human rights, and non-state armed groups that challenge the state.	Improve human security through these efforts. • *Improve governance by building a citizen-oriented state and improving the state-society relationship* • *Empower civil society to partner with the state and hold the state to account* • *Use dialogue, negotiation, and mediation* to develop political, economic, and structural solutions to the conflict and to improve relationships between social groups • *Whole of society partnerships* to coordinate stakeholders to support human security

Figure 46: Local Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategic Narrative

8. Comparing the Analysis and Theories of Change

Analysis of the causes of conflict influences the strategies for addressing violence. Some approaches to security use violence to deter, destroy or defend against an adversary. A reliance primarily on the use of military and police force assumes that individuals and groups that use violence "only understand the language of violence." They use the metaphor of "fighting fire with fire." Individuals and groups that use violence are themselves seen as the problem and response must thus target and eliminate them.

Some approaches to security take a wider view of security challenges. The "lenses" they use to view the conflict not only include the individuals and groups that use violence but also the wider context where these groups are able to recruit and mobilise others. Non-state armed groups are seen as the "smoke" or symptoms and not the "fire" or root causes of the problems. State characteristics such as specific international or national security, political and economic policies that exclude or repress certain groups push individuals and groups away from using political methods to address their grievances and make it more likely these groups will use violent methods. Global trends such as economic hardship, climate change shocks, availability of weapons, and religious rifts are also seen as root causes contributing to conflict. Instead of "fighting fire with fire" these other approaches advocate "fighting fire with water" or a combination of "fighting fire with both water and fire."

While counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, CVE, stabilisation, and peacekeeping focus on operational and tactical approaches to disable immediate threats, conflict prevention and peacebuilding – both in peace operations and local initiatives - focus on changing the broader context. Advocates of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approaches view the underlying problem as the state's lack of a monopoly of force. Advocates of stabilisation view the problem as the lack of state capacity to provide for society. Advocates of conflict prevention and peacebuilding perceive the underlying problem as the state's lack of legitimacy and poor state-society relations.

9. Comparing the State-Society Relationship

Lesson 5 outlined the history of relationships between state security forces and society. In many countries, the state has historically viewed civil society as a threat or as passive wards of state security strategies. The spectrum of approaches to security in this lesson also relate to the state-society relationships.

Most of the approaches to security acknowledge a growing need to put more emphasis on protection of civilians and empowering civil society. Leaders in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping are shifting both training and doctrine to focus on protection of civilians. New approaches to stabilisation, CVE, conflict prevention and peacebuilding approaches are placing more emphasis on *empowering and supporting civil society* to support human security. This *Handbook* is a result of the new attention to the roles of civil society and the need to improve coordination between security forces and civil society in any of these approaches to security.

Counterterrorism approaches often use the term *"pacification"* to describe their efforts to keep civil society from supporting non-state armed groups. Current counterterrorism laws and policies often intentionally "pacify" or unintentionally have the effect of preventing civil society from its efforts to address humanitarian needs, protect civilians, and use conflict prevention and peacebuilding methods. In many countries, it is illegal for civil society to offer negotiation training to non-state armed groups or to use mediation between state and non-state armed groups to achieve a political solution to conflicts. Given that most peace agreements come about because of civil society-led mediation efforts, counterterrorism legislation inhibits potential political solutions.

The Madrid Agenda arising from the 2005 Madrid Summit on Democracy and Terrorism emphasised the need to treat terrorism as criminal acts to be handled through existing systems of law enforcement and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law. This human rights-based approach to counterterrorism emphasises (1) taking effective measures to make impunity impossible either for acts of terrorism or for the abuse of human rights in counter-terrorism measures. (2) the incorporation of human rights laws in all anti-terrorism programmes and policies of national governments as well as international bodies."

10. Comparing the effectiveness of approaches to violence

There is little research that compares and contrasts the different approaches to security outlined in this lesson. Researchers within each approach tend to cite research that supports the effectiveness of the approach they are

currently taking. Organisations tend to see problems as being caused by factors that their organisation can fix. This is true for military, police and civil society.

The Human Security Report[71] documents that overall, violence is decreasing and the main reason is the coordinated efforts to support peacebuilding to address root causes. Yet a number of researchers document that violent extremism is on the rise, despite over a decade of investing primarily in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. More than 90% of all terrorist attacks occur in countries with gross human rights violations.[72]

The RAND Corporation, a military-affiliated think tank in the US has produced some reports that compare the effectiveness of different approaches to "How Terrorist Groups End."[73] As illustrated here, research affirms that most terrorist groups terminate via political processes and policing, not by military force or victory. More research is needed to compare and contrast the effectiveness of different approaches to security and to compare the financial costs and the intended and unintended impacts of each approach to security.


Figure 47: Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp. 2008), 19.

11. Coordination between different approaches to security

Ideally, all approaches to security would complement each other; however, these approaches can conflict with and undermine each other in practice. There are internal conflicts within and between countries about which approach to security is the best. Some civilian leaders favour a hard, military response to punish and kill their adversaries. Other civilian leaders advocate greater emphasis on addressing political conflicts and structural root causes. Likewise some military and police leaders insist there is "no military solution" or "no police solution" to problems of terrorism, criminal violence such as drug and arms trafficking, or non-state armed groups. They assert the need to develop "non-kinetic" and nonlethal approaches to address governance, economic, and social aspects driving violent conflict. Other military leaders demand a harsh military response to deter and punish those who use violence, whether other states or non-state groups.

There are also tensions between governments and civil society over which approach to security is best. Civil-military-coordination on security is essential precisely because different stakeholders hold a different analysis of the problem, use different strategies to pursue security, and take a different stance on the role of civil society. Civil-military-police dialogue and consultation is essential to improve understanding of these differences, and to identify areas of common ground where diverse stakeholders can coordinate their efforts.

REVIEW

This lesson compared and contrasted different approach to security including the different analysis each approach uses to understand the causes of violence and the different theories of change in the interventions each approach uses to attempt to prevent or stop violence.

Citation

[68] *Counterinsurgency: US Army Field Manual 3-24,* (Washington DC: US Department of the Army, 2006), 1-27.
[69] See for example the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, ACCORD in South Africa, the West African Network for Peacebuilding and various civil society peacebuilding initiatives that began in parts of Asia and Latin America in the 1980s.
[70] Michael S. Lund, "Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice," *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution.* Eds Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and I William Zartman. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009).
[71] *Human Security Report 2014*, (Vancouver, British Colombia: Human Security Research Report, 2014). See: http://www.hsrgroup.org accessed October 2015.
[72] *Global Terrorism Index 2014*, (New York, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).
[73] Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corp. 2008), 19.

Lesson 16   Learning Exercises

Anchor   *10 minutes*

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- In your experience, what is the most effective approach or strategy to improve security in your country?
- What experiences shape this belief? How do you judge whether an approach to security works or does not work?

Add   *20 minutes*

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply   *25 minutes*

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast different approaches to violence drawing on the different analyses and theories of change outlined in this lesson. Create small mixed groups of 5-6 people with one person from each scenario stakeholder team. Within each group, each person can make the case for one or more of the approaches to security they would advocate for use in the scenario. You can use your own personal opinion and/or guess what the stakeholder role you are playing would advocate.

- What are the dangers of other approaches?
- What are the benefits of the approach you advocate?

After 20 minutes of dialogue in mixed groups, the facilitator asks the entire group for their observations.

- What did you notice about the different ways people talked about the causes of violence?
- What did you notice about the different theories of change people used?

Away   *5 minutes*

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

Lesson 17
Approaches to Justice & Policing

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
- Compare and contrast different approaches to justice
- Compare and contrast different approaches to policing
- Define restorative justice, community policing and problem-solving policing

Just as there are many broad approaches to security, there are also many different approaches to policing and justice. This lesson helps civilian, military and police leaders to understand different approaches to policing and justice. This lesson emphasises community policing, problem-solving police and restorative justice approaches that allow for the most coordination between civil society and the police and justice systems.

1. Justice Sector Goals
The justice sector can accomplish a number of goals to improve human security.
1. Uphold the rule of law
2. Maintain public order
3. Improve public safety
4. Resolve conflicts in society
5. Enable a democratic process for listening to public concerns

2. Justice Sector Institutions
Governments set up three types of institutions to support a justice system: Police, Courts and Corrections or prisons
- *Police* maintain order, enforce criminal law, and provide services such as preventing crime. Police gather evidence and support criminal investigations in the criminal justice process.
- *Courts* are bodies that attempt to apply laws in order to determine justice through a discussion

between prosecutors, defence attorneys, and judges.

- *Corrections* institutions (such as prisons) and processes (such as probation) aim to punish, rehabilitate, and/or improve public safety by removing people committing crimes from the public.

3. Civil Society Roles in the Justice Sector

Civil society plays important roles in achieving the goals of the justice sector. Civil society can reinforce common values, foster social cohesion, and support self-help, self-regulation, peer pressure for good behaviour, and personal responsibility to contribute to public safety, the rule of law and public order. The public can contribute to the common good and governance, or they can focus on their own personal safety and invest in gated communities or private security guards.

4. Justice Sector Challenges

The problems within the justice sector differ from country to country.

- *Resources and Capacity:* In some places, there are too few financial and human resources supporting the justice sector. Plagued by corruption or incompetence, courts and corrections do not have enough capacity.
- *Root Causes:* Levels of crime correlate with structural problems such as income inequality, corruption, and lack of opportunities. In some places, the justice sector does not work because law enforcement processes (police, courts and corrections) cannot address the amount of crime happening. The structural problems create a level of crime that is too high for any law enforcement strategy to handle.
- *Public Support:* In some places, the justice sector does not work because it lacks public support and cooperation. Victims and communities affected by crime are left out of the justice process. Their frustration with law enforcement leads to apathy and a lack of involvement.

5. Justice sector reform

Justice sector reform aims to improve safety while maintaining democratic principles. It can include each of the following:

Integrate non-state and indigenous systems of justice with international norms and state-based justice system

Address human rights abuses and crimes against humanity through transitional justice initiatives such as truth and reconciliation processes.

Rewrite constitution and laws in accordance with international norms

Develop fair, effective and efficient criminal justice institutions

Use community-justice initiatives and restorative justice principles and processes

Implement problem-solving and community policing

Figure 48: Components of Justice Reform

Justice sector reform and wider security sector reform overlap. Police reform connect the two sectors. The security sector (including the police) is responsible for protecting the rule of law. The justice sector (including the police) is responsible for making sure that the laws themselves and the process of justice are fair. If people feel they cannot trust the justice sector to work fairly, they may use violence to pursue justice and undermine public security. Security sector reform often requires simultaneous justice sector reform to support the creation or improvement of institutions for the police, courts and prisons. Police earn public legitimacy when they enforce legitimate laws. Police that attempt to enforce laws that the public perceives as unfair or illegitimate may contribute to public support for non-state armed groups. If there are improvements in policing, but not prisons, for example, the justice system will not work. More people may be arrested for crimes, but there will be no prisons that can hold them or no possibility to provide a fair trial.

6. Law Enforcement versus Community Justice
Community justice is an element of justice sector reform that supports human security. It differs from traditional law enforcement in three ways:

- While law enforcement believes that state institutions are responsible for justice, community justice is based on the idea that civil society shares responsibility with the state for implementing justice.
- While law enforcement may repress civil society, community justice believes that civil society needs to be empowered in order to fully contribute to the justice sector.
- While traditional law enforcement relies on punishment of crimes assuming that this deters future crimes from happening, community justice takes a focus on prevention and a problem-solving approach to crime to identify patterns and address root causes to prevent crimes from happening.

7. Approaches to Crime
There are two broad approaches to how police and justice systems respond to crime.

- **Traditional law enforcement** approaches to crime focus on bad behaviours and broken laws. Individuals are assumed to make decisions to commit crimes based on personal flaws or individual corruption.

- **Community justice** and **problem-solving policing** focus on *pattern analysis*. They put a single crime in context with similar crimes to understand the larger context in which the breeches are occurring. Such an approach aims to identify the root causes that are motivating individuals or groups to commit crimes. Community justice asks <u>why</u> crime is happening and what can be done to prevent these root causes.

Community justice asserts that no one person or agency can analyse the deeper causes of crime alone. A multi-stakeholder assessment is necessary to develop a full understanding of the causes of crime. There are dozens of factors that contribute to crime, including racial segregation, home ownership, street design, educational quality and opportunities, unemployment rates, levels of economic inequality, and the size of the youth population between ages 16-24. A broad assessment and analysis of crime patterns will identify social, political and economic factors that contribute to an environment where people commit crimes.

Community justice is particularly well suited to address the problems of domestic violence, weapons-based violence, gang violence, and violent extremism since these often are related to broader public issues.

8. Restorative justice and criminal justice[74]
Restorative justice is an approach to justice based on a number of principles and ideas. The descriptions below contrast a traditional law enforcement approach with a restorative justice approach.

Traditional Law Enforcement
- Defines crime as a violation of state laws
- Leaves out the victim and community in the justice process
- Process focuses on determining the guilt of an offender, not the reasons the crime occurred.
- Goal is to punish the offender.

Restorative Justice
- Defines crime as a violation or harm to people
- Prioritises the needs of the victim and community in the justice process
- Process focuses on understanding the context of the crime and why it happened.
- Goal is to determine what actions are needed to address the crime from the perspective of the victim, including offender accountability.

Restorative justice focuses on the harms that crimes do to people, and how to repair the harms that occurred. Harm is identified by more than just a legal definition. Victims and communities are at the centre of identifying harms, which can include the loss of relationship and trust, the psychological trauma and fear resulting from crime, or physical damage or material loss in addition to the violation of laws. While criminal behaviour is condemned, the offender's role as a member of his community is emphasised.

9. Restorative Justice Practices
There are several models of restorative justice practices. They include the following:[75]

- *Victim-offender mediation:* Some victims want to directly confront offenders who harmed them. In victim-offender mediation, victims are given the opportunity to explain the harm done to them by the crime and can ask questions of offenders to better understand the rationale and context for the crime. This type of process has been critical between the often randomly targeted civilian victims of terrorist attacks and offenders who used terrorism. The experience has resulted in individuals or members of violent extremist groups taking responsibility for their crimes and apologising to victims.

- *Family group conference:* Victims, offenders and their friends and family or members of the community meet together with a facilitator, who helps the group discuss the impact of crime on them. The group negotiates a plan for repairing the damage and for the offender to take responsibility for the crime.

- *Sentencing and healing community justice circle processes:* In this process, representatives from the criminal justice system such as prosecutors and defence attorneys as well as the victim, the offender, their friends and families and community members sit together to share their thoughts on the impact of the crime and their ideas for sentencing that could adequately repair the damage to the victim and community. They also the broader context of the crime and the responsibilities that other state or community actors may have to prevent similar crimes in the future.

10. Crime prevention
Harvard psychologist James Gilligan's research on crime prevention identifies three levels of inhibitive action:[76]

- *Address the root causes of crime,* particularly economic inequality and poverty or class structures that contribute to high crime rates.
- *Address the individual needs of those who are at high-risk for committing crime* such as treating drug abuse, or healing trauma, especially in children so that they are less likely to become violent or abusers of others.
- *Work with people who have already engaged in crime*, by addressing the major individual factors that contributed to crime, including feelings of shame and humiliation, lack of skills in handling conflict without violence, or lack of education.

11. Policing Reform and Development
Policing reform relates closely to security sector reform, justice sector reform and the adoption of community justice and restorative justice principles and processes. All policing is about enforcing rules, maintaining order and providing security. But policing has evolved in different ways.

Policing began in England nearly 200 years ago with an initial attempt at crime prevention and policing with consent of the community. In France and Germany, authoritarian governments used policing for surveillance over the public, to watch for revolutionary ideas discussed at the community level. Countries that were formed during colonialism tended to develop police institutions that were designed to protect colonial leaders, not communities. Drawing on military lines of authority and discipline, some police began carrying guns and adopting a policy of "shoot first, ask questions later." In many colonial and post-

colonial contexts, police were taught to use brute force on civilians in their attempts to "pacify" communities from pressing for democratic reforms.

After colonialism, many police institutions attempted to reform and modernise police forces. In some places, police corruption was seen to be coming from civilian political leaders who used the police for their own interests. Some police institutions addressed this problem by distancing and isolating the police from corrupt political leaders. These reforms may also have distanced the police from the communities where they worked.

More recently, the concept of community policing is evolving to the relationship police have with communities. Community policing often happens in the context of wider democratic reforms and security sector reform processes. It is an important element in improving the state-society relationship. In other places, community policing responds to a growing awareness that the quality of relationships between communities and police can play a critical role in preventing crime and even terrorism.

Today even within the same country, some police departments use community policing while others are evolving toward a more militarised approach, with military-style training, weapons, and tactics. While some police work closely with the community to solve community problem, police in other places attend mostly to the security concerns of elite groups.

12. Characteristics of Good Policing
Comparative research on police units around the world finds some similar themes.[77]

- Police officers that are mature and well-educated police better than those who are young and inexperienced
- Police vetting that excludes police candidates with criminal records police better than those with a record of misdemeanours
- Police who receive training in communication skills to defuse conflict and mediation skills to manage conflict police better than those who only receive training in the use of enforcing laws
- Police officers who reflect the gender, ethnic, religion, race or identity diversity of the communities that they serve
- Police training that emphasises protection of the constitution and the protection of all civilians – including all genders

The quality of the police force in terms of the factors above is more important than the number of police. A small, highly trained and credible police force can serve a much larger population than a large group of young officers who have received little training

13. Defining Community Policing
Community policing is an approach that emphasises the relationship between the police and the communities where they serve. Instead of an "us versus them" approach where police and the communities view each other negatively, community policing brings the community and police together. Community policing is implemented in different ways, but has some common characteristics. Some community policing experts claim that police organisations that do take on community policing only include a new unit or an additional bicycle patrol rather than make any of the following organisational changes essential to community policing. Effective community policing requires a broader approach including the following activities:

- *Community relationships and partnerships:* Building relationships between police and community both individually and between police departments and community organisations.

- *Communication and Problem solving:* Setting up communication and problem-solving mechanisms to jointly identify and develop responses to community safety concerns, including the concerns of all genders in the community, including men, women, boys, girls and people with a same-sex gender identity.

- *Training to improve skills:* Improving the capacity of the police and the community to address sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and to use dialogue, negotiation and mediation to handle disputes as well as defuse angry people and tense situations.

- *Joint Programmes:* Designing joint programmes such as police-community patrols (on foot, bicycle, or car) and community outreach activities, such as gender-responsive policing to address SGBV.

- *Organisational transformation:* Building a culture of service orientation and protection of civilians; improving mechanisms for civilian government and civil society to provide oversight to the police, fostering accountability to the law and protecting the law rather than trying to get around the law

Community policing can also provide an opportunity for civil society to engage the justice system in restorative justice practices and to engage policymakers at the state level to articulate their definition and approach to human security, defining threats and strategies.

14. Goals and Theories of Change
There are several theories of change or strategic narratives to describe how community policing works.[78]

- Improving police-community relations translates into improved state-society relations
- Improving police-community relations will improve intelligence, allowing the police to prevent and decrease crime, and improve public safety, including preventing sexual and gender-based violence
- Improving police-community relations will increase police accountability and trust with communities.
- Improving police-community relations will prevent crime, eg through mentoring school children or providing advice to local businesses on improving their security
- Improving police-community relations will allow communities to take more responsibility for their own security by becoming involved in solving community problems.

15. Stakeholder Interests
In most conflict-affected countries, third country government donors fund community policing programmes. Research indicates that donors, police and government departments, and communities each hold different interests in community policing.[79] Donors tend to have the most wide-ranging goals of using community policing to improve state-society relations and accountability. Police and national and local governments tend to see community policing as a way to do their job better. Communities tend to see community policing as a way to improve their lives by improving their relationships and involvement with police and improving police accountability.

Communities	Police & Government	Donors
Improving police accountability, increasing public involvement in security, and improving police-community relations	Improving intelligence collection, reducing crime, and improving police-community relations	Improving state-society relations and police accountability

Figure 49: Stakeholder Interests in Community Policing

16. Community policing is most effective at improving relationships
Of all the goals held by diverse stakeholders, the most successful aspect of community policing is improving relationships between communities and police. In Timor-Leste, for example, The Asia Foundation found that the general public's view of the police improved from 48% in 2008 to 94% in 2014 as a result of community policing as well as other changes. In Sri Lanka, police bicycle patrols changed the way communities interacted with police.[80]

Unlike other aspects of community policing, such as institutional reforms or accountability structures, the actual physical behaviour changes of police relating directly to community members marks the most significant change. This includes walking or riding bicycles through the community that allows for face-to-face relationship building and information sharing about community problems.

17. Prevention requires community involvement.
Community policing cannot address all of the root causes of social problems such as unemployment, drug or alcohol abuse or domestic violence. These problems require community involvement. But in many cases, communities do not have information that can assist with crime prevention related to unemployment, or economic inequality. Regular communication and coordination with community

stakeholders is essential to manage public expectations so that communities understand that community policing cannot fix all community issues.

Community policing programmes begin and run in different ways. In some places, the state or police department decides to start a community policing programme. In some places, communities themselves take the initiative to do community policing and establish their own police force. And in other places, communities and police begin programmes jointly.

In some cases, communities themselves can begin a community policing initiative. A "neighbourhood watch" programme, for example, involves community members taking turns patrolling the streets. These civilian patrols help identify community safety issues, both immediate crises and longer-term concerns. In traditional societies, traditional security providers may carry out similar patrols. Community-based dispute resolution processes can help to address minor conflicts within the community.

18. Contextual factors affecting community policing practices:
Many factors determine the course of community policing.[81]

State History: The history of the state, state formation (particularly for countries that experienced colonialism) and the terms of a peace settlement or political transformation each play a significant role in shaping community policing. For example, where there is strong central state, local police departments may not have the freedom to institute new programmes.

Social Divisions: Some states have sharp social divisions between groups. In these places, the community itself may be divided. Community policing may focus on resolving tensions between groups.

Level of insecurity: In countries experiencing insurgency or terrorism or other security crises, attention to short-term threats may distract from longer-term processes of reform toward community policing. If police forces are working in areas where insurgents or terrorist groups hide among the population, police may be taught and learn to see all community members as potential threats. The lack of sufficient police trainers in some international missions has led to military forces training police in paramilitary methods rather than law enforcement. When foreign military forces conduct police training as part of a security force assistance package, the training they receive is more likely to emphasise strong use of force rather than community relations. In states with a long history of violence, both communities and police forces may be deeply traumatised. This might make it difficult for them to build trust necessary for community policing.

Local Culture: Some societies have a history of using mediation and dialogue to address social problems. Community policing in these areas is more likely to adopt dispute resolution processes. In other societies, harsh punishment is seen as a cultural norm. In these areas, community policing may look like and be accepted as "street justice." In some cultures, community policing is seen as an approach to help deal with the widespread issues of sexual and gender-based violence as well as domestic violence. In other places, these forms of violence are seen as normal and community policing does not attempt to address them.

19. Sample police department mission statement:
The following mission statements illustrate the different purposes community police units may try to achieve
- To safeguard freedom by preserving life and property; protecting the constitutional rights of individuals, maintaining order, and encouraging respect for the rule of law by the proper enforcement.
- To earn the respect of all individuals, including minority and disadvantaged persons, by maintaining a knowledgeable, responsive, well-trained, and accountable work force that conducts policing with fairness, tolerance, and equality.
- To reduce criminal activity by implementing effective crime prevention strategies, fully investigating crimes when they occur, and apprehending criminal offenders
- To identify, address and resolve the root causes of community problems and concerns in concert with citizen groups and representatives through the use of community oriented policing strategies.

REVIEW

This lesson identified different approaches to policing and justice. It defined and described restorative justice, community justice, problem solving policing and community policing. These alternative approaches to justice and policing are providing new opportunities for multi-stakeholder coordination for human security. Improving policing is essential to improving the quality of the state-society relationship.

Citations

[74] Caroline G. Nicholl. *Community Policing, Community Justice, and Restorative Justice: Exploring the Links for the Delivery of a Balanced Approach to Public Safety,* (Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 1999).

[75] See Caroline Nicholl, 1999.

[76] James Gilligan. *Preventing Violence: Prospects for Tomorrow*, (New York: Thames & Hudson, 2001).

[77] M. R. Haberfeld and Ibrahim Cerrah. *Comparative Policing: The Struggle for Democratisation, (*London: Sage Publications, 2008).

[78] Adapted from Lisa Denney. *Securing Communities: Redefining Community Policing to Achieve Results, (*London: Overseas Development Institute, March 2015).

[79] See Denney, 2015.

[80] See Denney 2015 for other examples.

[81] Adapted from Lisa Denney, 11-15.

Lesson 17   Learning Exercises

Anchor   *10 minutes*

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- What is one example of a positive interaction you have had with a police officer in your home community?
- What is one example of a negative interaction you have had with a police officer in your home community?

Add   *20 minutes*

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply   *25 minutes*

The goal of this exercise is to compare and contrast different approaches to justice and policing. In each scenario, the police have come under scrutiny for their low public approval ratings. In the scenario stakeholder teams, each group has thirty minutes to develop an initial plan for improving policing in their scenario and to negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a plan for improving policing and justice. Teams begin by formulating their own goals for justice and policing reform and/or they may choose to work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, the facilitator gives each stakeholder team or group of teams two-minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the plans of other groups.

Debrief in a large group with these questions:
- What are the biggest challenges facing those who advocate new approaches to justice and policing?
- What common ground is there between all the stakeholder teams?

Away   *5 minutes*

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

Lesson 18
Approaches to Security Sector Reform

Learning Objectives:

At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

- Distinguish security sector reform from other types of security force assistance programmes
- Identify important elements of SSR
- Identify a key indicator of SSR success
- Define SSR's relationship with related processes
- List civil society roles in SSR
- Identify characteristics of gender-sensitive SSR

This lesson provides civilians, military, and police with a common understanding of different approaches to security sector reform and development. The lesson details the different roles and responsibilities of the military, police, and civilians in government and civil society.

1. Definitions of Security Sector Reform (SSR)

The UN defines security sector reform (SSR) as "a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation of the security sector, led by national authorities, and that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples, without discrimination and with full respect of human rights and the rule of law."

The OECD defines security sector reform (SSR) as a process of "seeking to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR/D includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing."

2. SSR is Context-Specific

The security sector in every country is unique; shaped by the history, economic, political, social, religious and other aspects of the local context. In every country, the security sector is constantly developing and professionalising. SSR aims to improve the effectiveness and accountability of a security sector within a unique, context-specific process.

3. SSR Terminology and Scope

SSR involves not only reforming and developing the military and police, but also addressing the wider security sector or "system" including intelligence, justice, security policymakers, and non-state armed groups. Some refer to SSR as justice and security sector reform (JSSR) or security sector development (SSD). Regardless of the acronym, all of these efforts share common characteristics to support accountability and effectiveness.

a. Accountability: SSR aims to improve democratic governance

SSR is a process that builds and improves checks and balances on the power of the security sector, including civil oversight. Ideally, SSR includes participatory, multi-stakeholder processes that include both civilian government oversight as well as oversight by civil society, especially women, minority groups, and youth. Civilians can play significant roles in analysing security challenges, shaping security policy and strategy, implementing security strategies, and monitoring and evaluating the performance of the security sector. Democratising security forces also can mean that one political group does not control and use the security sector against political rivals. SSR requires a transformation of a security system from one that protects the safety, economic and political interests of an elite group to one that protects all citizens, male and female including minority groups. SSR requires that the rule of law apply to all, including the state security forces. SSR requires a political commitment to principles of fairness.

b. Effectiveness: SSR aims to professionalise the security sector

SSR is a process to build and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the security sector. Some SSR experts assert the need for the state to hold a monopoly of force over other armed groups in society. SSR requires attention both to accountability and effectiveness. Improvements in the weaponry or training for security forces alone are not SSR.

4. Key Indicator of Successful SSR

Security sector reform aims to improve security – both national security and human security. The success of SSR is measured, in large part, by the perceptions of civilians. Do civilians feel safer? Are they able to work, travel, and live in their homes without fear of violence?

In too many countries, citizens run from the police and military, fearing repressive violence rather than looking to security forces for protection. An indicator of successful SSR is that the public perceives security forces as "protectors" and not "predators." Figure 49 illustrates the transformation of public perceptions through an SSR process.


- Civilians distrust security forces and may view them as predators
- Security Sector Reform Process
- Civilians trust security forces as protectors of human security

Figure 50: Indicator of Security Sector Reform

5. SSR supports sustainable development, peace, and human security

SSR emerged from the recognition of the link between security and development. Violent conflict frequently damages or reverses progress in economic, social and political development. On the other

hand, citizen-oriented states that provide public services and are accountable to citizens are critical to security and stability.

Abuses by state-run security forces are often an important root cause of violent conflict such as terrorism.[82] Reformed, citizen-oriented security sectors correlate with states being more able prevent and address violence and sustain a peace settlement to end war.[83]

Increasingly, donors in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) recognise SSR for its essential role in conflict prevention and supporting sustainable peace.[84] SSR is the single most important factor in determining whether a peace settlement to end a war will last.[85]

SSR is important for achieving development goals in a variety of ways. SSR addresses the structural root causes of insecurity, creating an enabling environment for development. SSR aims to reduce corruption, abuses of power, and economic mismanagement, freeing resources to benefit development goals. SSR may reduce spending on police and military, also freeing resources to benefit development goals.

6. Local Ownership and SSR

Most reviews of SSR programmes identify local ownership as the most pivotal element in success or failure. UN Security Council resolution 2151 reiterated the centrality of national ownership for security sector reform processes, encouraging states to define "an inclusive national vision" on security sector reform, informed by the needs of their populations developed through broad national political processes inclusive of all segments of society.[86]

Many experts critical of SSR argue that foreign donors and interveners have a tendency to ignore and exclude local stakeholders from the process of analysing and designing improvements for the security system. Donor approaches to SSR are fragmented, lack coordination, and lack mechanisms for listening to local communities or communicating transparent goals or processes. Local ownership often refers to superficial attempts to choose a few token civil society leaders, causing further conflict within civil society. The term SSR implies an unequal power relationship between "reformed" external actors reforming the unreformed."[87] This stands in contrast to internal stakeholders reforming their own system. While outsiders often push SSR processes to speed up to meet the demands of fragile peace agreements or security conditions, moving more slowly but including diverse local stakeholders can actually be faster. Local ownership requires a move from external solutions and external regulation of SSR toward internally generated solutions and local voices that monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of SSR as measured by local perceptions and definitions of human security.

Donors attempting to foster local ownership and community engagement in security may not know where to begin. At the same time, civil society groups wanting to push for reforms toward a human security approach also do not know how to begin to reach out to the security sector. Lesson 10 in this *Handbook* describes local ownership and community engagement in more depth.

7. Gender-sensitive SSR

Women are often left out of peace agreements and SSR programmes. Women and men experience different types of violence. Both women and men need to be involved in peace negotiations and in planning SSR programmes so that they reflect the needs and interests of all people. Planners tend to see women as victims rather than actors. Planners often do not understand the operational benefits of including women or recognise that the success of SSR often hinges of men and women working together. SSR planners may also overlook the importance of recruiting and advancing women into prominent roles in the security sector. Research studies illustrate that women in security forces, particularly police and peacekeeping, are more likely to deescalate conflict with verbal communication skills and less likely to use excessive force.[88] They may emphasise brute strength rather than social skills, moral leadership, or the necessity of having both women and men work together serve their communities.

      a. Recruit and promote women into police and military leadership
      b. Increase women's participation in the design of SSR programmes
      c. Ensure women's equal access to justice and security, including their protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)

Security sector reform experts are producing new resources to provide guidance for gender-sensitive SSR.[89] Lesson 27 in this *Handbook* provides more information on gender mainstreaming in security.

8. Multi-Stakeholder Processes in SSR

Multi-stakeholder processes enable the transition illustrated above. Multi-stakeholder processes can earn public legitimacy and buy-in of all groups in society. National and local multi-stakeholder processes conduct joint assessments to identify security challenges, jointly plan security strategies, and jointly implement security programmes, and jointly monitor and evaluate security sector. The Coordination Wheel for Human Security illustrates the different aspects of local ownership in SSR.

Local ownership, democratic governance and civilian oversight are essential elements of the best practices in security sector reform and development. Module 10 in this *Handbook* describes a joint process of assessing security sector governance, accountability and performance. This is especially relevant to local ownership in SSR.


Figure 51: Coordination Wheel for Human Security

9. SSR-Related Tasks

A variety of processes relate closely to the success or failure of SSR, including the following:

- Diplomacy to achieve a political peace agreement
- Demilitarisation, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR)
- Small arms and weapons disarmament
- Mine action
- Elections
- Justice sector reform
- Transitional justice

10. SSR and Justice Sector Reform

Many attempts at SSR emphasise technical reforms of the military and police but ignore or give less emphasis to corresponding reforms and development of the justice sector. The justice sector includes legal frameworks, the ministry of justice, the judiciary and court system, the prosecutors, and criminal defence and legal aide.

The security sector and justice sector do not operate in isolation. If the justice sector lacks the will to apply the rule of law fairly to all people and groups or the capacity to gather evidence, prosecute and apply the rule of law, then it will not matter if the police do their job effectively. If the public does not trust the justice sector, this in turn reduces the trust in the security sector.


Figure 52: Link between Justice and Security Sectors

11. SSR, Human Rights, and Transitional Justice

SSR often takes place in countries where security forces and non-state armed groups have all committed atrocities against the local population. Recognising the historic legacy of violence against civilians and the lasting impacts of psychosocial trauma is essential. The ability of victims to hold perpetrators accountable is also essential to justice. Without acknowledging the past, it will be difficult for civilians to begin trusting security forces.

Transitional justice refers to society-wide efforts to address past human rights violations in order to do the following:

- Acknowledge the past
- End impunity and hold perpetrators accountable
- Reaffirm the rule of law and provide justice services
- Help the country heal and achieve social reconciliation

Transitional justice includes formal criminal justice processes such as International Tribunals, such Criminal Courts such as Sierra Leone's Special Court. Transitional justice can also include non-judicial processes such as Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). A communications strategy for

addressing the past and explaining the SSR process to the public is important. Local advisors from diverse sectors of society can best design an effective public communication strategy. The Knowledge Hub on Addressing Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex Environments is an important resource for addressing these issues.[90]

12.Amnesty versus Justice

Transitional justice processes sometimes offer amnesty in exchange for truth telling and accountability. Some transitional justice processes are based on the concept of "restorative justice" that highlights the victims and their needs. Restorative justice processes tend to rely less on punishment and more on other gestures such as acknowledgements, apologies and restitution to victims.

Many transitional justice advocates are opposed to amnesty, noting that it undermines the rule of law. This puts justice reform and transitional justice in conflict with SSR and DDR.

SSR and DDR (covered in the next lesson) both tend to offer amnesty to members of state and non-state security forces to entice them to participate in reform efforts aimed to bring an end to violence. Amnesty is important for two reasons:

- If combatants faced criminal charges, arrest and detainment in the DDR process, few would participate.
- If information gathered from witnesses in the vetting process for SSR were to be shared with a transitional justice programme, reprisal attacks on witnesses who spoke out against applicants for security forces could take place.

Too much or too little amnesty can impact security and justice requirements for sustainable peace. For these reasons, some experts suggest separating and carefully assessing the benefits and risks of amnesty processes related to SSR and DDR from transitional justice efforts.[91]

13. Non-state security stakeholders and SSR

SSR processes increasingly recognise the need to include non-state security and justice stakeholders. In some countries, these non-state groups fulfil up to 80% of the security and justice roles in society. It would not make sense to exclude these tribal, traditional, religious and other citizen-based groups. Local ownership of SSR is essential, as local perceptions of security and justice may be very different than foreigners' own systems or their assumptions about how security and justice systems should work.

14. Opposition to Security Sector Development & Reform

There are many groups that may oppose SSR efforts. *Political elites* may oppose SSR so that they can continue using security forces to protect political and economic interests. *Business or corporate elites* may oppose SSR because of their interest in profit from security contracts tied to security strategies that rely on weapons and arms sales, some profit from privatised prisons and criminal justice fees, or they oppose SSR because they want to prevent the transparency and accountability that would reveal illegitimate activities, such as forcibly remove civilians from areas where there are resources to extract resources for profit.

15. "Train and Equip" Security Assistance

In practice, many Western donors under pressure to improve counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts invest primarily in improving enemy-centric security strategies, with less emphasis on protection of civilians and human security. This is more accurately called "security force assistance" as it does not reflect all of the principles of SSR/D. Research on exclusive "train and equip" programmes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and elsewhere emphasise that they can do more harm than good. Often, they may lead to situations where security forces simply use bigger weapons to repress local populations. They risk further undermine human security when they trap populations between increased violence of abusive security forces and the terror of non-state armed groups. The risk of security assistance to escalate violence is especially prevalent in nondemocratic states, where security forces lack public legitimacy and are thus at greater risk of engaging in abuses.[92]

Many donor countries take an approach to improving the performance of the security sector that emphasises training and equipping security forces. These programmes primarily provide training in weaponry, intelligence and enemy targeting, with comparatively small efforts to improve protection of civilians and human rights. Some countries refer to this as "foreign security assistance" or "foreign military financing." Evaluations of these train and equip programmes demonstrate that they can help democratic states achieve a monopoly of violence. But in nondemocratic states, train and equip programmes can have a range of negative impacts of providing weapons and training to abusive security forces that lack public legitimacy.[93]

Most SSR programmes have element of both "train and equip" and "security sector governance" as they are two ends of a spectrum of approaches for improving the security sector. While both aim to improve the security sector, their analysis of the underlying problem and intervention goals are different. The "security sector governance" approach emphasises the problem of a lack of state legitimacy. The solution then is to improve civilian government and civil society oversight of the security sector which in turn links to "a monopoly of legitimacy," protection of civilians and improved public perceptions of security forces. This approach to SSR attempts to address root causes of security threats stemming from the security sector itself. On the other end of the spectrum, the "train and equip" security force assistance programmes emphasise the central problem of the security forces lacking technical capacity to achieve a "monopoly of force." There is less emphasis on whether the public views security forces as legitimate or whether security forces understand how to protect civilians.

	Analysis	Theory of Change
Security Sector Reform	A lack of state legitimacy, a failure to protect civilians, and negative public perceptions of security **Goal: *a monopoly of legitimacy***	• *Build capacity of civilian government and civil society to oversee the security sector* • *Reform the security sector* to prioritise human security • *Training for security forces in protection of civilians and public engagement* in national security dialogues for improved security governance
Train & Equip Security Assistance	Lack of state capacity to non-state armed groups; **Goal: *a monopoly of force***	• *Training and equipping* state security forces to hold the monopoly of force against non-state armed groups

Figure 53: Comparison of SSR and Security Assistance

REVIEW

This lesson identified the purpose and scope of security sector reform to foster accountable and effective security sector. This lesson described important elements and indicators of successful SSR, such as the public's perception of security forces as "protectors" and not "predators. This lesson also described the relationship of SSR to other processes such as transitional justice, and distinguished SSR from other types of security force assistance programmes that focus on simply training and equipping security forces without improving governance and accountability.

Citations

[82] *Global Terrorism Index 2014*, (New York, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).

[83] Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil War,* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[84] Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor, ''Promoting Conflict Prevention through Security Sector Reform," (London: Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2008).

[85] Monica Duffy Toft, 2010.

[86]United Nations Security Council Resolution 2151. Adopted by the Security Council on April 2014.

[87] Timothy Donais, editor, *Local Ownership in SSR*, (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008), 5.

[88] *Monopoly of Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR*, Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic editors, (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2010), 92.

[89] See for example:
- Gender and Security Programme at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)
- Nordic Centre of Gender in Military Operations
- Institute for Inclusive Security (Megan Bastick and Tobie Whitman, *A Woman's Guide to Security Sector Reform,* (Washington, DC: Institute for Inclusive Security and Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2013).

[90] See the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed forces and the International Committee of the Red Cross web hub on Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex Environments at http://www.securityhumanrightshub.org accessed January 2016.

[91] Sean McFate, "DDR-SSR and the Monopoly of Force," in *Monopoly of Force: the nexus of DDR and SSR*, ed. Melanne A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic. (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2010), 222.

[92] Michael J. McNerney et al. *Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool, (*Washington DC: RAND Corporation 2014).

[93] Michael J. McNerney et al., 2014.

Lesson 18   Learning Exercises

Anchor   *10 minutes*

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- If you could reform the security sector in your country, what is the first thing you would do?
- What is one real-life experience led you to choose this priority for reform?

Add   *20 minutes*

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply   *25 minutes*

The goal of this exercise is to identify the components of security sector reform and democratisation of the security sector. A peace agreement has just been signed in each of the scenarios. Security Sector Reform is one of the conditions in the peace agreement. In each scenario stakeholder team, discuss the following questions for fifteen minutes:
- What will your group do to support or undermine SSR?
- What are three priorities for reform? Which institutions or parts of the security sector would you attempt to reform first?
- How will you anticipate and plan for the way other groups may attempt to undermine SSR?

In the large group, role-play an SSR meeting where representatives from each group are asked to make opening statements. Allow each group two minutes to say what steps they think are needed in order to "reform" the security sector. After each representative has given their opening statement, ask the teams to step out of their roles and debrief the exercise.
- What are the obstacles to SSR?
- What steps could some stakeholders take to ensure there is greater local ownership and civil society engagement in the SSR process?

Away   *5 minutes*

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.

Lesson 19
Approaches to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:
- Define DDR
- Identify DDR's contributions to human security
- Identify best practices of DDR
- Distinguish between different approaches to DDR
- Identify stakeholder roles in DDR
- Identify characteristics of gender-sensitive DDR

This lesson defines DDR and its relationship to security sector reform and human security. The lesson describes characteristics of successful DDR.

1. UN Definition of Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration

DDR's primary goal is to improve human security. While increasingly mandated to support peace operations during armed conflict, DDR is a process to address post-conflict security problem that arises when combatants are left without livelihoods and support networks during the vital period stretching from conflict to peace, recovery and development. DDR helps build community resilience and national capacity to assist in the reinsertion and reintegration of ex-combatants and to support communities receiving ex-combatants and working for their peaceful and sustainable reintegration. DDR includes political, social, psychosocial, military, security, humanitarian and socioeconomic dimensions.

- <u>Disarmament</u> is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from the civilian population.

- <u>Demobilisation</u> is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of "reinsertion" which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants for food, shelter, training, employment or tools.
- <u>Reinsertion</u> is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year.
- <u>Reintegration</u> is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. Often requiring long-term external assistance, reintegration is a national responsibility.

2. DDR occurs in a variety of contexts.

<u>Peace Process:</u> DDR takes place in a post-war context when there is a peace process mandating a DDR process to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate non-state armed groups alongside other recovery programmes to address the root causes of violent conflict. In this context, a peace agreement serving as a legal framework and basis is a precondition for effective DDR.

<u>Downsizing state armed forces:</u> DDR takes place when a government decides to shrink, or right size, the number of people in state armed forces.

<u>Law Enforcement:</u> DDR takes place where there is new legislation controlling weapons ownership; particularly in the midst of an ethnic conflict where loosely organised non-state armed groups are fighting with each other.

<u>Violent Extremism:</u> DDR is mandated in active conflict settings typified by asymmetric conflict of violent extremists groups, often characterised as "terrorists." In these settings preconditions for DDR such as a political agreement that would bring an end to hostilities may not be present. Termed "non-permissive" environments, efforts at preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) may take place in tandem.

3. UN Integrated DDR Standards
Most wars end through peace processes that lay out political, economic, social, and security arrangements for a country. The UN Integrated DDR Standards[94] (UN IDDRS) is the current global policy guidance on DDR outlining best practices and lessons learned to support a war to peace transition so that combatants become *stakeholders in the peace process*. The UN IDDRS Standards identify that DDR should do the following:

- Plan and coordinate DDR within the framework of the peace process
- Link DDR to broader security issues, such as the reorganisation of the armed forces and other security sector reform (SSR) issues
- Take a comprehensive approach towards disarmament, and weapons control and management
- Link DDR to the broader processes of national capacity building, reconstruction and development in order to achieve the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants

DDR works best in the context of a peace process and a signed peace settlement between groups that addresses root causes of violence.

The UN approach to DDR *prioritises a peace process that uses negotiation, mediation or facilitation of dialogue* to address key issues driving armed opposition groups. Peacebuilding approaches to DDR *prioritise grievance resolution to address root causes of violence.* Peacebuilding approaches to DDR require work to address the fundamental relationship between armed opposition groups, community leaders and local and/or national government representatives that makes them stakeholders in the peace process. Peacebuilding approaches to DDR include a large role for civil society in developing sustainable platforms and infrastructure for the social, economic and political reintegration of armed groups back into civilian communities. Reintegration processes focus on supporting the entire community that is participating in reintegration, and not just the individual ex-combatants.

DDR is unlikely to succeed without a political settlement to address the grievances of non-state armed groups and views DDR within a broader approach to post war peacebuilding – and early conflict prevention to ensure that fighting does not resume. DDR that takes place in the middle of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency or war operations tends to lack the preconditions promoted in the IDDRS. Under such conditions risks to DDR personnel, programmes and operations and violations of the 'do no harm' principle may be heightened.

The era of global violent extremism requires updating DDR approaches so that it becomes part of a wider effort at disengaging, de-radicalising, countering, and preventing violent extremism by addressing marginalization, political grievances and social cohesion.[95] The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders[96] outlines recommendations to mitigate violent extremist offenders and may be applicable for some DDR setting where this new generation of DDR is occurring. These include ensuring that prisons are not "incubators" that increase violent extremism and can be opportunities for reform or further de-radicalisation; promoting individually tailored programmes to assess the motivations and perceptions of ex-combatants; and offering opportunities for offenders to hear from victims about the impact on victim's lives.[97]

4.   DDR is not a standardised, technical, linear programme.
DDR is a dynamic process that takes place in a complex environment. Since there are often different non-state armed groups, some may begin the process before others. Some regions of the country might undergo disarmament while other regions of the country are going through reinsertion. In some contexts, non-state armed groups may first demobilise and reinsert into society, and then when they feel safe they may later disarm.

DDR works best when it is country-specific, regional and dynamic. Each country is unique, with its own complex and dynamic situation. DDR cannot be implemented in the same way in every country, or setting. Where cross-border issues are a feature of DDR efforts, programmes works best if coordinated regionally, to address the needs of combatants and armed groups that have been engaging in cross-border operations. This may be an increasingly important aspect for DDR in conflict settings where a portion of the caseload may include a new category of foreign terrorist fighter (FTF). Ideally, all relevant peacekeeping missions and border controls should harmonise their DDR programmes in a conflict-affected region while still taking into account the specific political, economic and social context of each country.

5.   DDR Sequencing
Traditionally, non-state armed groups first disarm, then demobilise, then reintegrate. In reality, this may not always be optimal.

Armed groups that demobilise may be at risk from other armed groups, including state security forces. In some cases, UN peacekeeping or state security forces prioritise the safety of disarmed groups. For example, in Colombia state security forces that had order to protect demobilised guerrillas assassinated up to 18% of the rebel group known as M19.[98] Where there are no safeguards for the security of non-state armed groups, demobilisation or even simple reinsertion or reintegration efforts may come before disarmament. In Northern Ireland, for example, "decommissioning" of weapons came only after they had established a political power-sharing agreement.[99]

DDR sequencing also requires security guarantees as a precondition; ensuring that ex-combatants who go through disarmament and demobilisation are then able to immediately enter reintegration programmes. If disarmament and demobilisation processes thousands of people each week while reintegration programmes can only absorb hundreds of people, there will likely be frustration and conflict from ex-combatants with nowhere to go.

6. Short and Long-term Approaches to Disarmament
There are short and long-term approaches to disarmament. In the short term, community-based weapons collection and control programmes; weapons destruction. In the mid to long-term, disarmament should include the (re-) establishment of domestic legal systems to control weapons possession, regulate local weapons production industries, and manage the supply and transportation of weapons by State and corporate industries that profit from weapons' sales; and securing weapons stockpiles to prevent weapons leaking into society.

The UN Integrated DDR Standards note the importance of not placing too much emphasis on short-term weapons collections, such as counting the quantity of weapons collected or numbers of ex-combatants demobilised. In past DDR processes, a gap between weapons collection and funding for reintegration meant that ex-combatants became frustrated and in some cases renewed violence.

7. Spectrum of "R" in DDR

There are also short and long-term approaches to reintegration. Some experts argue that typical DDR programmes include a "reinsertion" programme but not a "reintegration" programme. With little funding for reintegration, experts argue that most DDR programmes stop at "reinsertion." But often these short-term reinsertion programmes are not enough to help combatants make the transition to civilian life. Some return to join armed groups. DDR is defined as a short-term programme of no longer than 5 years. But reintegration may take 5-10 years or even a generation. It cannot be easily measured in the short term.

"R" can also stand for repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation. The "R" has different meanings in different DDR processes.

Reinsertion is a shorter-term goal that often is included in the "demobilisation" process. Reinsertion includes time-specific, short-term programmes called "transitional support allowance" or TSA to give immediate food, shelter and money to combatants so that they can survive in the short term.

Repatriation is also a more technical, time-specific effort to return ex-combatants to civilian citizenship either in their countries of origin, or in their host countries, or in third countries.

Resettlement is a short-term effort to physically move ex-combatants into civilian communities, often moving them out of the bush and into homes.

Rehabilitation refers to the physiological and mental health needs of ex-combatants who may be traumatised from both fighting, and from abuses that may have occurred during their involvement in a non-regulated non-state group. Female combatants and child soldiers are particularly likely to have suffered abuse from other combatants.

Reintegration relates more closely to longer-term economic, social, and political development, governance and peacebuilding programmes.

8. Political, Economic and Social Reintegration

There are four general types of reintegration: political, economic, psychosocial and social. Each can be "restorative" or "transformative." Restorative reintegration aims to restore the ex-combatant to his or her former political, economic or social status. Transformative reintegration aims to change or improve the political, economic, or social engagement of an ex-combatant.

- *Political reintegration* refers to ability for ex-combatants to consent to the rule of law and to participate in governance and decision-making both locally and nationally both individually and as a group of ex-combatants who may want to pursue their goals through political channels.

- *Economic reintegration* refers to the ability for ex-combatants to secure employment or livelihoods. In doing so, ex-combatants secure, financial means for self-employment, employment opportunities of the necessary means to have a livelihood to support their families.

- *Psychological reintegration* refers to addressing ex-combatant's psychosocial trauma and stress to help them adjust to civilian life.

- *Social reintegration* refers to the ability for ex-combatants to reconcile with and return to their families and communities or to find a new community that will accept them. Social reintegration relates to the concept of "social cohesion" which refers to the quality and quantity of relationships within a community, particular across the lines of conflict. Social cohesion is particularly important in processes to reintegrate former members of violent extremist groups.

9. DDR complements SSR

SSR reforms or transforms the security sector to achieve public legitimacy. DDR complements SSR by disarming, demobilising, and reintegrating non-state armed groups into civil society. DDR and SSR

processes should be coordinated. Doing so requires coordination between civilian and military actors on the ground. Neither effort may be effective if SSR happens without DDR, or DDR without SSR.

10. Civil-Military-Police Coordination is essential through all phases of DDR

DDR requires coordination between many stakeholders, including between the peacekeeping mission and external partners, including UN funds, agencies and programmes, as well as national government, military authorities, local police, and local civil society.

In general, military forces direct disarmament and demobilisation, prior to reinsertion, while civil society and civilian government agencies direct the reinsertion phase nested within demobilisation and reintegration. As such, civil society has important roles in advising and overseeing disarmament and demobilisation, including reporting on weapons caches, advocating for the reduction of weapons availability in society. In demobilization advising on the rate and flow for the controlled discharge of ex-combatants during demobilization congruent with the community of return capacity to economically, and socially absorb former fighters enhances reintegration. Likewise, peacekeeping forces, military forces and local police can play an important role in ensuring the safety of ex-combatants who are reinserted into or reintegrating with civil society.

DDR coordination can take place through various institutional mechanisms and arrangements such as civil-military-police meetings, the establishment of military liaison officers, and the integration of staff from organisations actively involved in DDR into a single DDR coordinating team. Civil–military cooperation should also take place between the armed forces involved in DDR and civil society, including through town hall meetings or community forums that allow for open communication between security forces and civil society.

There may be complementary roles for security forces and civil society in each phase of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Illustrations such as these may be useful visual aids for civil-military dialogue to jointly plan complementary roles in each stage of DDR.

> Civil society peacebuilding organisations are designing DDR programmes that use mediation and grievance resolution processes to address conflicts and tensions that arise through the DDR process.
>
> *Read more about the role of civil society peacebuilding approaches to DDR in *Local Ownership in Security*, the companion report to this *Handbook*.

Civil Society	Civil Society	Security Forces
Security Forces	Security Forces	Civil Society
Disarmament	**Demobilisation**	**Reintegration**

Figure 54: Civil society and security force roles in DDR

11. Needs and Incentives for Diverse Beneficiaries of DDR

DDR processes need to respond to the different needs of different groups. Different stakeholders may respond to different incentives.

Male and female adult combatants may have different needs and interests in participating in DDR. Senior commanders and field-level soldiers may hold different motivations for continuing to fight or to go through DDR. Commanders may want to hold political office or ask for other incentives that address their political motivations. Field-level soldiers may also have grievances against corrupt political leaders or local security forces. Members of global networks of violent extremists may have still other motivations and interests. An assessment of the grievances and interests of diverse members and levels of non-state armed groups may improve the design of DDR. As detailed later in this lesson, DDR should be gender-sensitive to identify the different experiences and needs of male and female combatants.

Women Associated with Armed and Fighting Groups (WAAFG) may have joined voluntarily or they may have been kidnapped and forced into a life involving both fighting and sexual slavery.

<u>Children</u> associated with armed forces and groups may be victims, since the recruitment of children (child soldiers) into armed forces and groups is a serious violation of human rights and is prohibited under international law. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a "child" as a human being younger than 18 years old. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups ("the Paris Principles") provide detailed guidance for those who are implementing DDR programmes. For example, it may be important to separate boys and girls from their former commanders to protect them from coercion or abuse as they transition back into civilian life. Rapid education programmes may help former child soldiers to catch up to their peer-aged classmates in regular schools.

<u>Non-combatant roles</u> that forcibly or voluntarily participated in armed groups may not be considered as "civilians," particularly in regards to including the in camps for refugees or displaced persons.

<u>Elderly ex-combatants and ex-combatants with disabilities and chronic illnesses</u> may have special needs.

<u>Dependents</u> are civilians who rely on a combatant for their livelihood. Dependants may participate in making decisions alongside the combatant. Including women in making reintegration decisions, for example, contributes to the successful transition to civilian life. Family tracing may also be necessary.

<u>Communities</u> are also key stakeholders and beneficiaries of DDR processes. Civilians who were not involved in fighting may resent the special privileges and rewards given to combatants. Civilians that suffered from violence should also benefit from DDR programmes through an inclusive, community-based approach to DDR. In particular, communities can participate in designing and delivering reintegration assistance (training, employment, health services, etc.) and these programmes can be made available to a range of war- affected populations. Communities may receive direct recovery and development assistance so that they may be better positioned to receive and support DDR processes.

12. Gender-sensitive DDR and involvement of non-combatants

DDR programmes should address the distinct needs and interests of women and girls, men and boys, and people with same-sex sexuality, including gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer or other sexual identities (LGBTQI). DDR planners tend to underestimate the number of female ex-combatants and women associated with armed and fighting groups (WAAFGs). In Liberia, for example, planners expected no more than 2,000 female ex-combatants, however; the UN DDR programme disarmed over 22,000 and may have missed 14,000 others.[100] Planning for gender-sensitive DDR programmes is essential to success.[101] The eligibility criterion for participation in DDR programmes needs to be fair to women and girls, including those serving in non-combatant roles alongside men and boys. Non-state armed groups require many non-combatant roles such as cooks, medics, porters, spies, translators, etc. They may also include sex slaves. Some of these non-combatant roles would share a gun with a full time combatant, while others may not have carried a gun at all, yet were integral to armed group strategies and tactics. In Sierra Leone's DDR programme required adult combatants to present their weapon and then disassemble and reassemble them. Women were ordered to give their weapons to men or required them to apply for DDR programmes as wives of male soldiers, leaving them ineligible for any of the DDR programmes on their own.[102]

High levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are common within many armed groups, particularly toward women, girls, boys and people who are LGBTQI. Approximately 75% of demobilised girls in Liberia reported that they were victims of sexual abuse by other combatants.[103] Gender-sensitive DDR programmes ensure that women have secure housing and are treated with respect as full human beings to best ensure their safety.

Planners often underestimate the amount of women's capacity to serve as spoilers to a fragile peace process, or as agents for peace. Even though women often compose 10-30% of non-state armed groups, their role in conflict and roles in shaping male combatant masculine identities are major considerations in the design and implementation of DDR programmes. Recognising their own interests in DDR, women are often active leaders of DDR efforts in their communities. Women's inclusion in DDR can improve the reintegration phase of DDR where women serve as moral leaders in education and healthcare, ultimately improving the sustainability of DDR programmes.
   a. Assess and plan with accurate estimates for women and girl's participation in DDR
   b. Use gender-inclusive eligibility criteria to treat male and female combatants and non-combatants in non-state armed groups fairly
   c. Enable men and women to register for DDR programmes separately

d. Create separate and secure housing and latrines for women and men
e. Prevent sexual and gender-based violence in all aspects of DDR demobilisation and reintegration by identifying risks
f. Provide maternal healthcare for women and girls who may have already experienced sexual violence
g. Plan for women's full participation in DDR training and social reintegration

13. DDR's Contributions

DDR processes cannot solve all problems in a society recovering from war. However, DDR can contribute the following:

- Reduce violence and improve relationships between armed groups
- Provide support to combatants to transition to civilian life, including disarming and taking on a new civilian identity
- Reduce the number of weapons in a society
- Create a ritualised and symbolic ending of a war

14. Unrealistic Expectations of DDR

DDR is a limited programme. It cannot do the following:

- Completely eliminate all weapons or disarm all armed individuals in society
- Solve all of a society's economic problems through the financial incentives given to ex-combatants
- Bring an end to war or a return to violence without other complementary efforts to address root causes and conflict drivers

REVIEW

DDR is a necessary component of a broader approach to human security. While DDR can occur in any country going through a process of reducing the size of its armed forces, DDR is especially necessary when dismantling non-state armed groups. While many DDR programmes focus on disarmament and demobilising soldiers, this lesson emphasised the need for greater attention to reintegration to ensure DDR is sustainable. Civil society has important roles to play in DDR, particularly in reintegration. Civil-military-police coordination to support DDR can improve the longer-term goal of human security.

Citations

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Lesson 19   Learning Exercises

Anchor   *10 minutes*

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- What is one experience in your life that shapes your opinion on whether it is possible or important to limit the number of weapons available to people in your country?

Add   *20 minutes*

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply   *25 minutes*

The goal of this exercise is to identify the components of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programs. The main militia group in each of the scenarios has agreed to disarm in the peace agreement, but only if they are given amnesty. In the scenario stakeholder teams, each group has thirty minutes to develop a response to this information that was not made public before the peace agreement was finalised. Each team can negotiate with other stakeholders to design a DDR programme that addresses your interests. Groups may continue to discuss internally their own plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each stakeholder team or group of teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the plans of other groups.

After 20 minutes of team discussion, each team shares their strategy with the other teams. The facilitator asks the entire group for their observations.
- Were there any creative solutions to address the interests of all stakeholder teams?
- What are the main trade-offs involved in DDR?

Away   *5 minutes*

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.