Multi-Stakeholder Coordination

This module identifies a range of approaches to civil-military-police coordination. It explores how coordination relates to local ownership and the use of multi-stakeholder processes. Both technical and conceptual, the module aims to identify different types of coordination forums to increase local ownership in security.

**Lesson 9: Approaches to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination** identifies a range of approaches to civil-military-police coordination.

**Lesson 10: Local Ownership and Community Engagement** identifies ways of broadening and deepening local ownership.

**Lesson 11: Organising Multi-Stakeholder Processes** provides detailed guidance in developing a multi-stakeholder process to improve coordination and local ownership.
Lesson 9
Approaches to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

- Identify at least three sectors where civil-military-police coordination may be relevant
- Identify at least three reasons why coordination is necessary
- Identify at least three similarities and distinctions between civil society and security forces
- Recognise the differences between coexistence, coordination, and cooperation
- Recognise the types of information security forces can share with civil society and vice versa
- Identify at least three different types of civil-military-police coordination forums
- Identify at least three steps to prepare for civil-military-police coordination

This lesson provides civilian, military and police leaders with guidance about how they can coordinate to better support human security. It describes the purpose of coordination, different forms of coordination, and necessary steps to support civil-military-police coordination.

1. **Multi-stakeholder coordination is necessary.**

   No one group can achieve human security on their own. Individuals and groups affected by insecurity have a “stake” in human security and are “stakeholders.” Different stakeholders need to coordinate with each other through joint processes that enable them to work together. Civil society, civilian government, military and police are key stakeholders that need to coordinate to support human security. Coordination improves coherence and effectiveness. Multi-stakeholder coordination is necessary for several reasons.

   - No single organisation can address all the complex tasks of supporting peace and human security in a complex environment. Many different types of organisations (including military, police, and civil society) are necessary to address diverse challenges.

   - All stakeholders working in the same complex environment need a basic awareness of who else is working in the same space in order to do the following:
     - Avoid duplication of effort or unintentional harm to other groups
Communicate with each other on shared goals
Use resources more efficiently
Enable other stakeholders to add value
Achieve better outcomes through timely action
Identify appropriate complementary roles for different stakeholders

2. **Military, police and civil society are increasingly working in the same complex environments to address the same challenges.**

This Handbook covers many of the challenges that require diverse stakeholders to work together. These include:

- Conflict assessment
- Civilian assistance
  - Humanitarian assistance (such as emergency food, water, and housing)
  - Development assistance (such as building schools and health clinics)
  - Governance (such as supporting rule of law and participatory decision making)
  - Healthcare
  - Education
  - Water management
- Demining and mining action
- Election monitoring
- Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR)
- Security and justice sector reform (SSR and JSSR)
- Dialogue, negotiation, and mediation between groups to promote reconciliation

3. **Coordination avoids potential unintended impacts**

At minimum, better coordination could prevent unintended consequences harmful to other stakeholders’ interests.

- De-conflict activities to ensure that each group’s goals and activities do not undermine other groups. For example, if a military is building a school in a community using military personnel, this may undermine a civilian organisation’s efforts to do community-based development with community volunteers and local ownership of school-building and other activities.
- Determine how to maintain a distinction between civilians and combatants, and preserve the autonomy and independence necessary for all stakeholders. This is necessary since in some contexts, non-state armed groups may view civilian organisations as soft targets, easier to attack than security forces. If civilians are cooperating with military or police, they may be seen as symbolic extensions of the security sector and may be wrongly perceived as legitimate targets.

4. **Coordination builds on common ground.**

Civilian government and civil society organisations are both similar to and distinct from military and police forces. Recognising differences as well as shared interests and principles can help all groups working in the same space to improve awareness of each other. Individuals working within civilian organisations, military or police may be motivated by a similar desire for service to others, make personal sacrifices, take risks, and share a sense of professionalism and commitment. The illustration below includes some of the common characteristics of people who work in complex environments.

5. **Recognising differences is important to coordination.**

There are significant internal differences between different types of military or police forces in different cities and countries. There are also vast differences on how civilians in government work and how different civil society organisations work. Yet there are broad general differences between civilian and security sector organisations that are worth mentioning, as they pose challenges to coordination. They have different terminology, different missions and distinct organisational cultures, strategic narratives, and operational requirements.
Cooperation is a term referring to stakeholders with overlapping but distinct missions identifying specific objectives where they can assist each other. For example, after the earthquake in Haiti, stakeholders cooperated in emergency humanitarian assistance. “Cooperation” represents civilian organisations and security forces actively working together to achieve shared goals. Cooperation is more likely in peace-time. In peaceful contexts, civil society may coordinate with military and police to improve their human security efforts.

Coordination is a term meaning basic communication to share information and avoid duplication or conflict with other stakeholders. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) coordinates the work of humanitarian NGOs and military forces in disaster relief and complex emergencies. The term “coordination” is used as an umbrella term for any type of communication exchange between security forces and all types of civilian agencies (UN, governmental and CSOs). Coordination is more likely where security forces’ mandate includes support for humanitarian assistance or to work with civilians to support broader human security goals. The political context and the mission of security forces impact the level of civil-military-police interaction.

Coexistence is a term that means operating in the same space without interfering in the other stakeholder’s activities and with minimal communication. For example, in Iraq, most NGOs took a stance of coexistence with foreign military forces because any perceived relationship seemed to correlate with the levels of violence against their staff and beneficiaries. “Coexistence” is at one end of the spectrum representing civilian organisations and security forces interacting at the most minimal level. Coexistence is more likely where security forces take sides in an armed conflict and are primarily engaged in enemy-centric approaches to security, with little emphasis on protection of civilians or other population-centric approaches. In the worst-case scenario, civil society groups, particularly humanitarian agencies, may curtail their presence if it is impossible for them to access affected populations without risking the security for their staff and communities in need.

There may also be other motivations or constraints that influence civil-military-police interaction. Some military forces reward military leaders for their achievements in civil-military coordination and cooperation. While coordination may allow agencies to achieve the overall mission, it may decrease the recognition of individual contributions made by distinct agencies. Competition among agencies for funding creates disincentives for coordination with others. Organisations want to be able to take credit for successes, and coordination may be seen as decreasing their ownership of success. Agencies are funded by their measurable programme outputs (short-term) and not for their programme impacts (long-term). Yet impacts are naturally a result of the sum of many agencies working together, thus making a causal effect impossible to determine precisely.\textsuperscript{34}

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Termination</th>
<th>Civilian terminology on civilian activities</th>
<th>Military and/or police terminology on security activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational Culture</td>
<td>Less structured, less formal</td>
<td>More structured, more formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment &amp; Planning</td>
<td>Participatory research with local communities; shared analysis</td>
<td>Often classified intelligence and internal analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals and Objectives</td>
<td>Human security</td>
<td>National security with less emphasis on human security for citizens or civilians in other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theories of Change/Strategic Narrative</td>
<td>Based mostly on social science</td>
<td>Based mostly on military science, though increasing interest in the “human aspects of operational environments”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Requirements for Coordination</td>
<td>Independence, Empowerment, Distinction, Freedom, Access (see Lesson 7)</td>
<td>Coordination should be comprehensive and integrated (see definitions below)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Figure 19: Differences between Civilians and the Security Forces
7. Civil-Military-Police Information Sharing

Sharing information is the most minimal form of coordination, as detailed in the next lesson. From a human security point of view, the purpose of information sharing between security forces and civil society (both individual civilians and civil society organisations) should always and only be to support human security. All stakeholders should share information to support efforts aimed at the protection of civilians and civilian assistance.

Civil society may look to military or police forces to share information about basic area security to help determine their programming. However, on the military side, the internal organisational clearance to provide information to civil society is a challenge. Many CSOs attempt to be transparent about their programmes but prefer not to share all the information about their programmes, particularly information that may be used for intelligence gathering or targeting attacks.

Civilians outside of government should never be asked to share information that would enable others to identify and kill a target or that would make civilians themselves more of a target for armed groups. Armed groups frequently accuse NGOs of collecting intelligence, and the increase in political attacks against NGOs may be related to the assumptions that they exchange information about the locations of non-state armed groups with military and police. For this reason, many civil society groups are resistant to all forms of information sharing and coordination as a basic matter of their staff security and the safety of their beneficiaries. For example, many NGOs balance their commitment to transparency and accountability to local populations with the principle that they should never share information that may endanger human lives or compromise their impartiality and neutrality.

The most basic forms of information sharing between civilians, military, and police relate to the following issues:

- **Security information:** Information that may affect the security of civilians and/or aid workers should be shared with appropriate entities.
- **Locations of aid workers and facilities:** Information on the location of humanitarian staff and facilities that are operating where there is a military presence.
- **Civil society activities:** Information on civil society activities, especially humanitarian plans, routes, timing of convoys and airlifts in order to coordinate planned operations and avoid accidental military strikes in an area where civil society organisations are operating.
- **Mine-action activities:** Information relevant to mine action.
- **Population movements:** Information on major movements of civilians.
- **Military Civilian Assistance:** Information on relief efforts undertaken by the military.
- **Post-strike information:** Information on military strike locations and explosive munitions used during military campaigns to assist the prioritisation and planning of humanitarian assistance and mine-action activities.

8. Five Areas for Coordination of Human Security

In addition to basic information sharing, there are five main areas for civil-military-coordination for human security. The next lesson details these five areas that form a “Coordination Wheel.”

- Joint capacity building
- Jointly identify human security challenges:
- Jointly designing human security strategies
- Jointly implement human security strategies
- Jointly monitor and evaluate impact

Ideally civil society and the security coordinate with each other in each of these activities. The coordination wheel of activities produces a vision for what local ownership looks like at its most robust.


The chart below maps varied levels of relationship between diverse types of stakeholders. Coordination mechanisms will vary depending on the type of civilians and the type of military involved.
The following table illustrates a more complex matrix of relationships

- Within an agency or ‘intra-agency’ such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) peacekeepers coordinating with DPKO civil affairs staff,
- At a ‘whole of government’ level such as a government’s military coordinating with its development agencies
- Between agencies such as DPKO peacekeepers coordinating with UN Development Programme (UNDP) or the European Union relating to NATO
- At the external-internal level such as DPKO peacekeepers coordinating with a country’s National Development Plan or a foreign military coordinating with a local NGO.

In general, the levels of consistency and coherence are greater in the darker shaded areas. There is more conflict between the goals of different stakeholders in the lighter shaded areas, as relationships become competitive.37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Intra-Agency</th>
<th>Whole of Government</th>
<th>Inter-State or International</th>
<th>External-Internal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder are united, under one command</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders are integrated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders cooperate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholders Coordinate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder Coexist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder Compete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 21: Adapted from the Comprehensive Approach Matrix that compares levels of coherence and types of relationships (see citation de Coning and Friis, 2011).

10. UN, NATO, and Government Approaches to Coordination
The UN, NATO, and some governments use the following terminology to refer to their civil-military-police coordination goals and approaches.

- **Unity of Command** is a term describing a single commanding authority who makes decisions that others implement.

- **Unity of Effort** is a term referring to multiple organisations working toward the same objective, but under different command or decisionmaking structures. Ideally, military forces would like to have a “unity of effort” with civilian organisations that are not under their command.

- **Integration** is a term referring to stakeholders conducting joint assessment, planning, and monitoring and evaluation with each other, while implementing the actual programme activities separately. The UN has taken several steps toward civil-military integration, including the establishment of the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) and an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), an Integrated Assessment and Planning Policy (IAP) and an IAP *Handbook* to ensure coherency in the UN system and relevant external partners.

- **Comprehensive Approach** refers to the coordination between different stakeholders. There are different interpretations of the concept of the “comprehensive approach.” Some interpret it to mean that civilian and the security sector are brought together under one command structure. Others understand the “comprehensive approach” as a set of communication and coordination mechanisms on more neutral ground, without a command and control structure and allowing civilians to maintain an independent status.

11. Military-based Coordination Structures
The UN, NATO and intervening states use different terminology for their civil-military coordination structures. These terms refer to military-based coordination structures that attempt to coordinate with civilian agencies (UN, governmental, and civil society organisations).
• **Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)** is a NATO concept for efforts to foster coordination and cooperation between military and civilians.

• **Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)** is a military concept. It is defined in different ways by different countries and organisations. For example:
  
  o **NATO CIMIC** refers to the coordination and cooperation, in support of a mission, between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental civilian groups).

  o **UN CIMIC** refers to the interface between the military component of a UN peace operation and the political, humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and rule-of-law components of the mission, as well as many other external partners in the larger peacebuilding system.

Some countries like the US establish **Civil-Military Operation Centers (CMOC)** for coordinating civil-military operations in an area of operations. The CMOC usually serves as a meeting place for military and non-military entities involved in governance, stabilisation, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction activities or for interaction between the entities involved in these activities and the civilian population.

12. **Civil Society Approaches to Coordination**

Many civil society organisations (CSOs) oppose or distance themselves from civil-military integration, the comprehensive approach or CIMIC. Some CSOs believe these approaches are contradictory to the Geneva Conventions’ call for a clear distinction between civilians and combatants. They argue the “technical” focus on joint planning and operations is a conceptual jump over the fundamental differences in goals and values held by different military and civilian agencies.

Yet civil society shares the conviction that coordination and communication mechanisms are essential when there are diverse stakeholders working in the same environment. Acceptable terminology and mechanisms for coordination include the following:

• **Humanitarian civil-military coordination** is more established and institutionalised than any other form of civil-military-police coordination. The UN defines humanitarian civil-military coordination as “the essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimise inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals.” UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCOORD) establishes coordination centres to achieve strictly humanitarian goals.\(^{38}\) Module 5 on Coordination on Civilian Assistance provides more details on this topic.

• **Whole of Society** refers to the need for diverse stakeholders at all levels of society to work together, as no one stakeholder can solve all of the problems in a complex environment and all must contribute according to their roles and responsibilities.

• **Multi-Stakeholder Coordination** is a term to describe meetings or mechanisms that facilitate dialogue between diverse groups.

• **Coordination by Sector** describes how organisations working on the same “sector” (such as Rule of Law, Gender, or Reconciliation) can coordinate their work.

• **Infrastructures for Peace** refers to agreements and platforms developed between governments, security forces, and civil society to coordinate their efforts to prevent, manage and transform violent conflict. With the support of the UN, civil society has helped to create “infrastructures for peace,” also known as “National Peace Councils” in Kenya, Ghana and elsewhere. These written agreements between government, security forces, and civil society outline the specific roles and responsibilities and coordination mechanisms.

The next lesson goes into more detail about the link between these coordination structures and the broader concept of local ownership and civilian oversight. Each of these terms refers to a similar principle that “local” people who are affected by security challenges need to be involved. Governments, security forces and civil society can coordinate their efforts to engage local communities. Or these groups can
create forums to broaden and deepen local “ownership” in security strategies and “oversight” of the security sector.

13. Local Perspectives on Civil-Military Coordination

Most civil-military-police coordination takes place among international NGOs with international security forces. National governments, security forces and donors often assume there is “no local capacity.” In reality, there are often local civil society groups that work to prevent conflict and support human security. In particular, there is a false assumption that local civil society lacks capacity to address security issues. There are local civil society organisations in every context. Over the last thirty years, civil society groups have built their capacity in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In many countries, there are more people in civil society with advanced graduate degrees and years of experience using mediation and reconciliation skills than there are in government. Local civil society’s expertise in human security is a critical asset.

In most situations, only a portion of civil society personnel belongs to NGOs who wear logos on their vehicles or clothing. Security forces will only be able to identify those with logos, or those whom they meet in coordination forums. While military forces and international humanitarian organisations may establish some sort of communication platform for information sharing, smaller organisations or informal local humanitarian responders may be left out of the coordination forums.

Local civil society emphasises the need to first and foremost coordinate among internal stakeholders – the national government, national security forces and local civil society. These groups may be in conflict over how to prioritise security challenges or interests. Most countries lack forums for national dialogue or coordination to identify shared goals.

Even if information is shared, military forces can never assume they have all the information on civil society. Small, local CSOs may not know how to contact military forces and inform them about their presence. Coordination mechanisms between national and international military forces and local civil society group are largely absent. External interveners often do not have an adequate stakeholder map or skill set to understand how to identify diverse local voices inside and outside of the national government.

External interveners are usually accountable to their home offices headquartered in their country of origin without direct accountability to local populations or local governments. Furthermore, external interveners often wrongly assume they know what is best for local people and base their assistance programmes on theories of change learned in other countries. External assistance may even “undermine or destroy the capacity that exists in a society and replace it with a weak and dysfunctional new capacity.”

External interveners are often oblivious to local perceptions of their legitimacy or presence in the country. While outsiders tend to see themselves as benevolent or even making sacrifices to help local populations, insiders are often suspicious of the motivations of these interveners operating in their country, assuming they are working on behalf of foreign national interests and intelligence gathering rather than truly assisting and respecting the local context.

Coordinating external military and civilian actors with those inside of the host country is difficult for several reasons. In integrated UN missions and whole of government interventions, civilians and military may also be so busy coordinating with themselves that they may exclude others and overlook internal stakeholders. Emphasis on external cohesion among foreign agencies may undermine coherence with internal stakeholders, including the national government, national security forces. Local civil society is often the last on the list of coordination priorities. Yet in reality, they may be the most important stakeholders for building sustainable human security.

14. Ad-Hoc Coordination

In the absence of adequate formal mechanisms, civil-military-police coordination may happen informally through ad hoc meetings at restaurants or other sites. Where there is no coordinating body, groups may coordinate informally when working in the same area as individual people build relationships in informal settings. In some situations, military, police and civilian actors meet informally driven by the personality of their leaders and individual relationship building and trust building.
Informal coordination is better than no coordination. However, ad hoc coordination can leave out important stakeholders. Although it may be impossible to include all stakeholder groups in any type of coordination meetings, a stronger effort should be made to find out who else is working in the same complex environment.

During military operations in armed hostilities, it can be dangerous for any type of civilians to meet with military personnel. Sometimes a meetinghouse is set up outside of a military perimeter. But often civil society staff are not able to safely travel to a neutral location or no neutral location exists. Given the security risks that in-person meetings with military staff may pose to CSOs, phone or email are often the most effective means of communication. In some contexts where civilian actors may want to avoid direct communication with security forces altogether, the use of social media could also be an unofficial way to share information, as a proxy platform without direct contact among the participants. Any of these more indirect mechanisms will enable civilian actors to maintain independence.

15. Preparatory Coordination Tasks
Effective coordination requires preparation. Here is a list of key tasks that all stakeholders should undertake before entering their first common meeting:

Before a Crisis:
- Create organisational incentives for coordination
  - Mandate the requirement for staff to write an “After Action Report” on coordination meetings
  - Create promotion and reward mechanisms that recognise the value of civil-military-police coordination
- Involve diverse types of civilians in the planning and design of civil-military-police joint training and joint exercises to address stereotypes, learn terminology, meet people who will be in a shared operational environment, and learn about each other’s organisational culture, goals, etc.
- Military forces should receive guidance on how to communicate with civilian organisations and civilians without endangering their safety or access to beneficiaries and the need for talking to other components of the mission or civilian actors outside the mission.

During a Crisis
- Identify other organisations working in the same environment by mapping all stakeholders, especially local civil society organisations
- Identify existing coordination structures and find points of contact, including phone numbers and emails to initiate communication.
- Military, police and civilian organisations should have a basic understanding of their own and the other’s roles and responsibilities in the current conflict environment and be able to identify liaison points to contact each other.
- CSOs should identify appropriate and complementary roles for the military.

REVIEW
This lesson identifies different approaches to coordination. Civilians, military and police share some characteristics but also are distinct in important ways. This lesson identifies the reasons why coordination is essential when different stakeholders are working in the same complex environment on similar tasks to support human security.

Citations
35 This section is adapted from the UN Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies, (New York: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008), 24.
36 De Coning and Friis, 254.
37 De Coning and Friis, 254
Lesson 9  Learning Exercises

Anchor  10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to these questions:

- Have you ever coordinated with someone from another organisation to respond to a crisis?
- What was the most difficult part of coordinating?
- What was the most successful benefit of coordinating?

Add  20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply  25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify challenges and opportunities for coordinating with other stakeholders in a complex environment. In each of the scenarios, one of the international aid groups that has stayed after the earthquake is targeted by one of the militia groups. The military group kills three of their female local staff and their compound in an urban area receives a bomb threat. The militia group announces on the radio that they will keep targeting any aid group that works with the government. Each group has thirty minutes to develop an initial response to this news and to negotiate with other stakeholders to develop a coordination plan. Groups may continue to discuss internally their own plan, or work with other stakeholders to reach a joint plan. Then, each stakeholder team or group of teams is allowed two minutes to outline their plan and/or to oppose the plans of other groups. Debrief with open questions about the challenges and trade-offs in this role-play.

Away  5 minutes

In a large group, participants can discuss this question:

What will I take away from this lesson on the security sector that might impact the way I do my work in the future?
Lesson 10
Local Ownership & Community Engagement

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

- Define the concept of local ownership
- Identify at least three reasons why local ownership is important to human security
- Distinguish civilian government oversight from civil society oversight of security
- Distinguish between superficial local ownership and ownership that is both broad and deep
- Identify the distinction between joint analysis of security challenges, joint planning and implementation of security strategies, and joint oversight of the security sector

This lesson is a guide for civilian, military and police leaders to determine the meaning of local ownership of security. The lesson identifies the arguments supporting local ownership and describes the difference between superficial ownership and local ownership that is both ‘broad’ and ‘deep.’

1. **Meaningful local ownership asks critical questions**
The International Network on Conflict and Fragility’s review of donor support to justice and security concluded that, “ownership’ is often conflated with ‘buy-in’. Structures are meant to enhance local buy-in to donor-conceived and -led activities, not to enable local actors to take the lead in programming decisions.” Often this approach just causes further division within civil society.
Meaningful local ownership asks critical questions listed in the figure below and requires the participation of civil society in assessing human security challenges, planning human security strategies, implement human security programmes, and monitoring and evaluating the security sector.

**Figure 22: Local Ownership Questions**

### 2. Successful multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) can bring a number of benefits

The idea or theory of change, behind multi-stakeholder processes is that groups with different positions, mandates and backgrounds can go further working together than in isolation.

- Broader range of expertise and perspectives improves assessment by drawing different viewpoints.
- More complex assessment leads to more comprehensive and sustainable strategy to address security challenges.
- Greater understanding of different stakeholders’ capacities, roles and limitations contributes to better coordination.
- Help organisations pool and share resources, including skills, funding, staff time, and logistical or administrative resources.
- Conducive to public outreach and awareness raising at different levels
- Building trust among diverse stakeholders, and enable relationships that can outlast the process itself.

### 3. The Logic of Local Ownership in the Security Sector

Every government makes decisions about how much power local civil society will have to participate in the security sector. Elite-captured governments usually have little incentive to expand local ownership, as this would lead them to lose control and possibly their elite status. But citizen-oriented governments see increasing local ownership and community engagement as important aspects of their national security plans.

Although some donor governments recognise the necessity of local ownership and push for greater democratic governance, most foreign donors and interveners have a tendency to ignore it. Nearly every international assistance framework - at the UN, World Bank, OECD, and the recent Busan Principles of International Assistance and the New Deal for Fragile States - mandates the principle of “local ownership.” But in reality, the political and economic interests of donor countries easily hijack the concept of “local ownership.”

Local ownership of security needs a makeover. The implementation of local ownership needs to deepen and broaden to engage whole populations. But first, national governments and international donors need to recognise the clear strategic value of local ownership:

**Time and Speed Implications**

Donor governments who focus on train and equip programmes to meet the urgent security threats or to support fragile peace agreements often argue that that this is the fastest way to remedy security challenges. While it is true that local ownership takes time to construct, it is ultimately the faster route. Train and equip programmes will ultimately fail or cause even more violence, unless they are accompanied by programmes aimed at preventing human rights abuses by security forces. To build legitimate state-society relationships with local ownership in security, “you have to go slow to go fast.” There is no end-run around authentic local ownership.

**Security Implications**
Local ownership improves state-society relationships. A public that perceives the security sector protects human security is more likely to view their government as legitimate. Legitimate, citizen-oriented states face fewer threats from non-state armed groups. Local perceptions of security and justice may be very different than those of national elites or foreigners. In countries where non-state groups fulfill up to 80% of the security and justice roles in society, tribal, traditional, religious and other citizen-based groups must be engaged in order to achieve human security for all.

**Long-term Political Stability Implications**
If outsiders take down a government and attempt to rebuild it themselves, local groups may never have the incentive or the time to build coalitions among themselves. This can hamper the emergence of stable and functional governance in the long run. Without outside intervention, insiders have greater incentive to build broad coalitions between social groups to improve state-society relations. This coalition building among local groups that negotiate with each other to identify common ground proposals and platforms is essential to sustainable security.

**Sustainability Implications**
If insiders are not committed to changing the security sector, national elites or international donors may just be wasting their time and effort attempting to force such changes. More research could help to determine the conditions that warrant outside funding. Donors might be able to provide needed funding in ways that foster local accountability and do less to discourage local ownership.

**Gender Implications**
Local ownership is especially important to ensure that security threats to both women and men are taken into consideration in all efforts to improve security. Security needs to be *gender sensitive* to ensure all men, women, girls and boys have equal access to justice and security, including their protection from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). The security sector needs to be *gender inclusive* to involve all genders in planning and implementing security strategies. The security sector also needs to be *gender accountable* so that all genders participate in overseeing the security sector.

4. **Broadening Local Ownership**
Local ownership should be broad, including as many stakeholders as possible. In order to broaden local ownership, diverse stakeholders must participate in policy-making and programming in the security sector. Involving just a handful of local elite men in a consultation cannot yield an accurate picture of the interests or needs of all social groups in society. True local ownership includes mechanisms to engage every individual in society, from children to elders, males and females, working in every sector of society, with different levels of education, religious beliefs, economic status, and with diverse gender, ethnic, racial and linguistic identities. Meaningful local ownership is not only about whom to engage but also about how to engage, i.e. which oversight or engagement mechanism to use to create meaningful and sustainable ties with local communities. Oversight and engagement mechanisms can be institutions or activities that provide citizens the ability to contribute, influence and control security sector policies and programming.

5. **Civilian Government Ownership**
The traditional mechanism to increase local ownership in the security sector is the civilian government. The government's executive branch and representative bodies such as parliament or congress hold effective oversight functions. They administer and control the security sectors authorities, mandates and budget to ensure that all security sector policies and programmes represent and satisfy the needs of citizens. However, civilian government oversight is not always able to guarantee the human security of all citizens. If a parliament is made up mostly of men, it is not surprising that violence against women is not a priority for them. If a congress is made up primarily of one racial group, it is not surprising that the civilian government does not take action to ensure diversity within police departments or to stop police violence when the police belong to one racial group and the community belongs to another. Even in states with democratic electoral systems, an elite-captured government may make security decisions based exclusively on its own political and economic interests, such as making profits through weapons manufacturing.

All states should provide additional participatory mechanisms that offer opportunities for civil society and the wider public to have an input into security sector policies and programmes. These mechanisms enable the full participation of all
sectors of society in security sector policies and programmes. They enable women, who represent half of every community and nation, to be included and apply their distinct skillsets and perspectives on human security, but also other gender groups such as LGBTI individuals or men who can be marginalised due to their belonging to a particular ethnic, racial, religious, social, or age group.

Figure 23 illustrates the two types of local ownership in security sector policies and programmes: civilian government, consisting of the executive branch of the government and the parliament or congress in an elected representative system of government, and civil society, which also includes the media.

6. Civil Society Ownership
Local ownership must be expanded horizontally to include broader segments of civil society, as illustrated in Figure 24 below. This requires moving from international NGO (INGO) and elite local participation toward processes that involve large numbers of diverse segments of society. INGOS must map local capacity and recognise the principle of “Local First.” They should provide entry to local civil society in order to widen public involvement in dialogue on security priorities and strategies. Women and men of different ages, regions, languages, religions, and ethnicities as a diverse set of representatives of distinct civil society groups should all participate in security sector policy-making and programming.

Sometimes, international NGOs (INGOs) act as intermediaries between the security sector and local civil society. They provide support structures such as forums and dialogues and capacity building to strengthen the ability of civil society to oversee security sector policies and programs. In some cases, INGOS engage and hand over functions to national “modern” civil society organisations, which in turn draw in “traditional” civil society organisation such as tribal leaders. But this chain of engagement does not always proceed without tensions. INGOS may be effective in applying models and lessons they have learned elsewhere, as is evident in the work of international peacebuilding NGOs including Saferworld, International Alert, Conciliation Resources, Search for Common Ground, and Partners for Democratic Change. But some accuse other INGOS of holding onto neo-colonial attitudes toward local civil society, underestimating their capacities and tending to speak for local people. Local civil society sometimes critiques INGOS for taking over the role and funding for local civil society. International NGOs and elite local civil society representatives should not be gatekeepers, but instead step back and open doors to more diverse individuals and groups that truly represent aspects of society.

Figure 24: Broadening Local Ownership

7. Deepening Local Ownership
While it is important to broaden local ownership by including more diverse segments of local civil society, it is also important to deepen local ownership, so that civil society engagement evolves from isolated, project-based efforts toward platforms for joint implementation and joint institutional oversight. There are a great variety of institutions and activities that enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programs. Not all of them are effective in creating sustainable relationships between civil society and security forces. To strengthen their ties, civil society and security forces need to build long-term relationships and trust. They need to come together, discuss their respective interests and find joint solutions that optimise their respective outcomes.
8. Coordination Wheel for Human Security
Civil society and the security sector can coordinate in five areas.

Joint capacity building: Joint training, coaching and support can build relationships and develop a common set of skills, concepts and processes for working together to support human security.

Jointly assess human security challenges: Joint conflict assessment can include jointly designing research questions and data collection methods and jointly analysing data to identify factors driving conflict and supporting peace. Module 4 describes coordination on conflict assessment.

Jointly plan human security strategies: Jointly determining appropriate programs and strategies to support human security, and determine relevant theories of change. This can include coordination to plan civilian assistance, protection of civilians, and conflict assessment and peacebuilding efforts. Lesson 15 describes the challenges and methods of joint planning to support human security.

Jointly implement human security strategies: Jointly implement a project together, such as increasing the gender sensitivity of police, developing a civilian harm mitigation plan, or addressing trauma in local communities. Modules 5-8 describe civil-military-police coordination in approaches to security, conflict prevention, civilian assistance, and protection of civilians.

Jointly monitor and evaluate security sector performance in oversight mechanisms: Joint institutional oversight mechanism to identify the baselines, benchmarks and indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the security sector and discussing the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of security strategies. Module 10 describes civil-military-police coordination to assess security governance, accountability and performance.

9. Levels of Local Ownership
Exact measurements of the vertical “degrees” of local ownership are difficult. However, some forms of coordination and local ownership seem to be more robust than others. Levels of local ownership relate to at least two factors: the number of joint activities that civil society and the security sector perform together, and the level of civil society empowerment within those activities.

For example, sharing information with civil society or setting up a dialogue to listen to civil society indicates less local ownership than setting up joint implementation of human security programming with civil society or institutionalising a joint oversight mechanism. A community policing dialogue where the police just listen to citizen complaints is less robust than a community policing programme that involves local neighbourhood watch committees where citizens work with the police to manage community conflicts. And a permanent citizen-oversight committee where the community can assess threats to their human security, and

Key Factors

- Local ownership is most robust where civil society and the security sector are coordinating with each other in all five elements of the Coordination Wheel.

- Local ownership is most robust where civil society is empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free.
report and take action to address incidents of civilian harm illustrates even greater local ownership. Institutionalised oversight forums that give civil society a seat at the table to monitor and evaluate the security sector indicate that the state-society relationship is seen as legitimate, democratic and citizen-oriented.

In order to deepen local ownership, it is important to increase and institutionalise the functions of civil society in relation to the security sector. Figure 26 illustrates a rough framework for deepening the levels of local ownership in the security sector. The darkest blue colour illustrates the most robust levels of local ownership, where civil society both is involved in multiple activities in the coordination wheel and where civil society holds institutionalised power to monitor and evaluate the security sector’s performance with government. Capacity building is a necessary pre-requisite to achieve any level of local ownership, which is why it stands as a separate but permanent category.

Each of these levels of local ownership should build on the prior levels of engagement. However, the table here does not necessarily illustrate a linear path to local ownership. It is possible to innovate a programme in “joint implementation” before there are dialogue processes. But the case studies in this volume illustrate that often there is first dialogue to assess human security threats and/or an initial effort in capacity building. Joint implementation and institutional oversight mechanisms are more likely to grow out of these “lighter” forms of engagement. The table here shows an approximate progression from the most superficial to the more meaningful types of engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Local Ownership</th>
<th>Information Sharing</th>
<th>Dialogue and Consultation</th>
<th>Joint Implementation</th>
<th>Joint Institutional Oversight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building</td>
<td>Government identifies human security threats to civilians</td>
<td>Governments, security forces, and civilians identify human security threats and jointly design potential human security strategies</td>
<td>Civil society and the security sector participate in joint problem-solving and programming to implement human security strategies</td>
<td>Civil society representatives have institutional capacity, and legal authority at the local, regional, and national level to participate in assessing threats, designing and implementing security strategies and monitoring impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for civil society and the security sector to support human security</td>
<td>Civil society identifies human security threats to government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 26: Levels of Local Ownership

10. Information Sharing
Information sharing is a one-way channel of communication, where one party simply receives information from the other. At a minimum, “local ownership” means governments should share basic security information with the public. It also means civil society groups share information with the government.

Governments may share information with the public or may encourage the public to share information with them. Some governments may decide to publish their policies on a specific security issue to increase transparency. Or they may encourage the public to provide information about security threats. Some governments may request information from civilians through hotline phone numbers, a complaints desk, or a web form that will allow individuals to report concerns related to security. These can be information sharing portals where citizens share information about security problems or they can be grievance...
mechanisms to report directly on the performance of a security officer. Some governments offer grievance mechanisms that simply register private complaints. Others are more transparent, enabling reporting to the public the pattern of complaints or grievances and how the government or security sector are attempting to be accountable to the public by responding to the complaints. But these one-way strategies prevent long-term relationship building and trust.

Civil society also uses information sharing channels when advocating for improvements to human security, such as submitting reports on security or policy recommendations. Civil society organisations play a “watchdog” role and serve as “an index of public contentment” with the security sector to ensure that it respects human rights and serves the public.

Until the last two decades, civil society relied mostly on these one-way information-sharing approaches that often take an adversarial stance within a “protest” paradigm described earlier in this chapter. Independent human rights commissions; indigenous people’s rights groups, women’s rights advocates, refugee advocates, and anti-nuclear advocates are some examples of the types of civil society groups and movements that exist in most countries. These groups may denounce human rights abuses by security forces publicly, push for internal complaint mechanisms such as phone hotlines, or external oversight bodies such as or Ombudsman Offices, or work to strengthen legislation to protecting victims of abuses.

Watchdog mechanisms are important because they hold the security sector accountable. If they are successful, they force police or military to change their policies or to apply punitive measures to perpetrators of abuses, which certainly contributes to human security. But these mechanisms may entail the sacrifice of long-term relationships and trust. Due to their one-way direction and adversarial nature, advocacy efforts may make it more difficult for civil society to build the necessary relationships with security stakeholders to reorient the security sector toward human security.

Civil society is moving from relying almost entirely on one-way information sharing and the “protest” method of security oversight toward civil society’s ability to work directly in relationship with the security sector on human security “proposals” that develop out of “two-way communication” settings where people meet together. This does not mean suggest neglecting accountability, but achieving accountability differently by creating meaningful and long-term institutional relationships and trust. Permanent, institutionalised civil society-security sector coordination mechanisms on as many levels and as many security issues as possible may provide the most effective guarantee for human security.

11. Dialogue and Consultation

The terms dialogue and consultation refer to a process during which civil society and the security sector jointly assess threats to human security and jointly plan how to improve human security. These forums are different from a mere information-exchange during which one party simply explains their point of view. This approach by definition includes at least a two-way exchange of information.

Successful dialogue and consultation forums - like all coordination mechanisms - require professional facilitation to foster effective cross-cultural communication. Stakeholders listen to each other's interests and perspectives. Without skilful facilitation, coordination meetings often break down as participants engage in unproductive conflict or walk out of the meeting. Communication skills and knowledge of civic responsibilities also contribute to improved outcomes.

In practice, many country’s security sectors are open to engaging in dialogue and consultations with civil society because they recognise that civil society has information and insights needed to achieve national security priorities. For example, many military forces receive training on humanitarian civil-military coordination, given the likelihood that they will need to communicate with humanitarian organisations, including civil society groups, operating in the midst of a humanitarian crisis. Civil-military coordination or cooperation (CIMIC) centres and other mechanisms to support a “comprehensive approach” that includes civil society would also fall under this category. However, few military forces receive training on interacting with local civil society or other types of CSOs that are involved in long-term development, human rights or peacebuilding efforts. This limits their possibility to engage effectively, as many security forces are not even aware that other civil society groups exist and are working to support human security. Coordination is not possible where there is not first a mapping of this local capacity.

Where national security overlaps with civil society's human security priorities, these dialogue, consultation, and coordination forums may be productive. The local ownership platforms discussed in this volume are examples of such civil-military-police coordination to support human security.

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY 97
Civil Society-Led Dialogues on the Local Level

CSO driven dialogues are forums that CSOs initiate and organise at the local level to foster exchange and understanding between security forces and civil society around a certain topic related to security.

Consultations to Define Security Policy

National Consultations are mechanisms that enable civil society to take a permanent seat at the table to defining a country’s national security agenda.

Dialogue and consultation has its limits unless it is institutionalised and accompanied by accountability mechanisms. Governments may seek to understand and review the community's point of view on an ad hoc basis only when the political climate makes it necessary. They may credit and acknowledge civil society perspectives anytime without having to commit to actually include them in their strategies and programmes.

12. Joint Implementation

A step beyond dialogue and consultation, 'joint implementation' involves civil society participating with the security sector in the development and/or the implementation of human security strategies. Civil society not only provides input but may also take on certain programmatic functions, such as participating in neighbourhood patrols. Civil society and the security sector can carry out joint implementation in a wide range of efforts in diverse sectors, including community policing, restorative justice, criminal justice reform, transitional justice, security sector reform and development, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, demining, preventing sexual and gender-based violence, mitigating civilian harm, protecting civilians, and many more sectors. It can also mean civil society plays a role in mediating with non-state armed groups.

There can be two kinds of joint implementation:

Joint Programming at the Local Level

This report provides examples of joint programming such as a community policing projects in Pakistan, in which local populations work with the police to report threats and hold perpetrators to account or DDR programmes in Mozambique, DRC, and Afghanistan, in which civil society innovated new models of joint implementation of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. The case study on private companies and community-based security in Tanzania also shows how, members of local communities, police and business representatives developed and implemented a security strategy at a mining site.

National Peace Infrastructures

National Peace Infrastructures are permanent institutionalised mechanisms that enable civil society and security sector on all levels to prevent and respond to violence.
13. **Joint Institutional Oversight**

Joint institutional oversight provides institutional mechanisms for accountability, monitoring and evaluation of the security sector including official, institutional platforms for civil society involvement. They represent a new generation of oversight mechanisms that complement the watchdog and protest functions mentioned earlier by enabling civil society and security forces to build long-term institutional relationships and trust.

Most states are still reluctant to set up permanent institutional structures to enable civil society oversight. Dialogue and coordination and joint implementation are thus second-best options that enable civil society to contribute to security sector policies and programmes and complement civilian government oversight in order to ensure local ownership in the security sector and thus human security for all citizens.

14. **Capacity Building**

Capacity building for both the security sector and civil society is necessary to enable them to reach each of these levels of local ownership. A lack of capacity can often represent a major obstacle to building an effective working relationship. When civil society representatives and security sectors are gathered in the same classroom, they may often experience the very first institutional opportunity to meet. Interactive training curricula that favour discussions and interactive exercises will enable the participants to already start building common ground and increase their understanding and appreciation for each other, before their formal joint problem-solving process starts.

15. **Criteria for Choosing Civil Society Organisations to Fund**

In some cases, civil society will initiate efforts to coordinate with governments, including police and military, on their own. In other cases, governments or other donors will look for civil society organisations to fund. This list describes some of the criteria that may help in choosing civil society organisations (CSOs) to fund in order to maximise effectiveness and minimise divisiveness.

- **Legitimacy:** Do other CSOs and local community members view the CSO as legitimate? (National CSO networks, religious leaders and community leaders may be able to answer this question)

- **Representation:** Civil society is as diverse as the local population. There are international NGOs and local civil society organizations. There are ethnic, religious, tribal, race, geography, language, age, gender and other differences among civil society. CSOs may represent one of these groups, with most of their staff sharing some key identity. In some contexts, especially post-colonial countries, one ethnic or tribal group may hold more power than others. There may be a disproportionate number of civil society organizations representing these groups. It is important for government, military and police to ensure they work with diverse CSOs that represent diverse constituencies, including CSOs that represent women, youth, different ethnic, religious or tribal groups, and with minority groups.

- **Access:** Does the CSO have access to local communities? Do local people have relationships with the CSO and will they accept the CSO’s presence? Does the CSO have access to travel security either by gaining acceptance and consent of all armed groups?

- **Security:** CSOs primarily use an unarmed “acceptance strategy” for their security, meaning they seek acceptance of their presence from local populations and all armed groups. Local communities may...
perceive CSO legitimacy based on their independence and distinction from government. Would working with these groups compromise this form of security?

**Capacity:** There are many types of capacity: capacity in language, capacity of relationships and networks, capacity for specific skills such as negotiation or mediation, capacity in political analysis or broader context assessment, capacity for programme and financial management, and capacity in research for monitoring and evaluating programs. CSOs tend to specialise in different areas, such as humanitarian assistance, education, human rights, peace, governance, water management, etc. All CSOs have some capacity. No government unit or civil society organization has capacity in every area. Governments, military and police often look to CSOs for specific types of capacity in language, relationships, network, and analysis. A large number of local CSOs are highly skilled in programme management and monitoring and evaluation, but some are not. Identify the type of capacity you need. Do you need cultural insights, language capacity, ethnic, gender or age balance to bring new insights? Choose a CSO that provides the capacity that you are missing. Identify a consortium of CSOs who can work together and provide capacity across all the required areas.

16. **Providing Funding for Civil Society Organisations**

**Direct funding** for CSOs may be possible in some contexts. But in most politically sensitive and potential violent contexts, direct funding for CSOs may reduce their legitimacy and access. In turn, this means that direct funding may decrease the capacity of the CSO, making their work less effective.

**Donor pools** are funding mechanisms to identify appropriate civil society organisations, provide financial oversight, and oversee monitoring and evaluation of funds. Groups of organisations or countries agree to contribute money toward a fund. Donor pools may be run through an existing agency such as the UK Department for International Development’s “Conflict Prevention Pool”, through international organisations such as the World Bank’s “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund,” or through a separate organisation, such as the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF).

17. **Criteria for Civil Society to Determine Benefits and Challenges of Working with Government, Military, or Police.**

**Shared Goals:** Does the CSO share a goal with government, military or police that makes coordination or collaboration necessarily or helpful? Are all goals transparent with no hidden agenda?

**Legitimacy:** Do local communities perceive the government, military or police as a legitimate entity, having legitimate goals and using legitimate power to achieve those goals?

**Trust:** Will working with the government, military, or police organisation reduce the public trust or weaken relationships with important local stakeholders that you work with?

**Consent and Access:** Will working with government reduce the consent from other armed groups for CSO travel and access?

**Security:** Will working with government, military or police organisations bring greater security threats to the CSO staff or communities where they work?

**Funding:** Does the government, military or police tie funding to political goals? Does the CSO share these political goals? Are there possibilities of obtaining funding from other sources, that may not tied funding to political goals? Does the CSO have capacity to absorb funding and deal with added reporting and accountability requirements?

**REVIEW**

This lesson describes levels of local ownership. Local ownership must be both broad to include diverse stakeholders and deep to include diverse stakeholders in many different activities, such as conflict assessment, jointly implementing security strategies in protection of civilians, civilian assistance, or conflict prevention, and jointly monitor and evaluate security governance, accountability, and performance.
Citations


41 See the “Local First” website which outlines the principles of local ownership of development and peacebuilding. http://actlocalfirst.org (Accessed 15 October 2015).


45 Several exceptions are notable. Civil society research projects on security issues may create an opportunity for individual civil society members to build relationships with people in the security sector. Civil society has become adept at facilitating public dialogue on security issues, but often these are solely for communities themselves and have not until recently included the security sector in dialogue with civil society and communities. See Duncan Hiscock, “Research and Information” in Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organisations, editors Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert and Katrin Kinzelbach, (G Valeur, Slovak Republic: UN Development Programme, 2008), 49.
Lesson 10 Learning Exercises

Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- In the town or city where you grew up, how much “local ownership” of security is evident? Do police meet with the community? Does the community trust the police?
- What are the benefits of local ownership of security, where security is seen as a public good and security forces work closely with communities?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The goal of this exercise is to identify the possibilities of involving more people, involving them in more joint activities, and increasing the power they have to influence and contribute. Each stakeholder team can make their case for whether or not to increase local ownership. Some stakeholder teams may want to assess how they might appear to be supporting local ownership to appease the public, while actually restricting local ownership in practice. Other stakeholder teams may want to anticipate other team’s moves and develop options for local ownership that might get around this opposition or that might create entry points or opportunities for increasing local ownership over time. Each group has 15 minutes to develop an initial plan to increase local ownership. Then, teams may negotiate with each other to attempt to develop their plans. After 20 minutes of negotiations between teams, debrief the exercise.

- Was there any common ground between teams?
- What are the biggest obstacles to local ownership?
- What seem to be the most hopeful entry points or designs of activities that could improve local ownership?

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.
Lesson 11
Organising Multi-Stakeholder Processes

Learning Objectives:
At the end of the lesson, participants will be able to:

- Identify the stages of organising a multi-stakeholder process
- Identify three considerations in choosing which stakeholders to include in the process
- Identify key principles of holding a multi-stakeholder security dialogue.

This lesson provides civil society, military and police leaders with practical advice on how to design and carry out a multi-stakeholder security dialogue at the local, regional or national level. The security sector and/or civil society can use a multi-stakeholder process (MSP) to conduct a joint conflict assessment process to identify security challenges; to jointly plan and implement a programme to improve human security; or to jointly monitor and evaluate security governance, accountability and performance.

This lesson is based on a more detailed manual titled *Multi-stakeholder Processes for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* written by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). 46

1. Deciding to Use a Multi-Stakeholder Process (MSP)
This lesson outlines some key steps and phases for deliberately designing and implementing a multi-stakeholder security dialogue at the local, regional or national level. At the local level, a multi-stakeholder security dialogue could take place between police, local government, and male and female community members (making sure to include women's unique perspective and experience of safety concerns). At the regional level, military, police, regional government and regional civil society organisations, including women's organisations, might be included in a security dialogue focused on border security or a regional security issue. At the national level, a security dialogue might include all major stakeholders and identify diverse definitions and approaches to national security.
When considering these steps, it should be noted that, in reality, these steps are never linear. Even in a planned and deliberate process, participants may need to take a step back to re-strategise or redefine roles—for example, when some participants leave and new ones join. The context itself might change drastically during the course of the process, requiring participants to go back to the drawing board. The different steps presented on designing and implementing an MSP can respectively take weeks, months or years, and do not refer to a set number of meetings or events. Rather, they describe the general progression of a process that can take many shapes depending on the situation.

It is a rare luxury to have all the conducive conditions line up for a multi-stakeholder process. It can therefore be more useful to be clear on your own position, and what the parameters and non-negotiables are for your organisation. In deciding to initiate or join an MSP, bear in mind the opportunities, timing, resources, competencies and support structures available for the task ahead.

**Key questions for initiators**

- Is a multi-stakeholder approach necessary, or would other approaches such as advocacy and lobbying strategies, be less risky and equally (or possibly more) effective?
- Are there good reasons to believe stakeholders of substantial influence will join in a collective approach?
- What factors could make the process unmanageable and ultimately unproductive, and could they be mitigated?
- Is sufficient funding available to sustain the process? Do people view the funding source as biased, neutral, with/without an agenda? Will the resources still be available once the process has taken off (for example to implement planned joint activities)? If not, are there fundraising capacities or connections within the group?
- How might the MSP cause unintended negative consequences, especially with respect to conflict dynamics? How might these effects be prevented or minimised?

**Key questions for potential participants**

- How might the multi-stakeholder process meet your organisational interests and goals?
- Does the process have institutional support from your organisation?
- What will be your exit strategy—when will your organisation consider the MSP to have fulfilled its objectives and when will it be seen to be underperforming or failing and what does it mean for your participation?
- Does the process encompass the personal needs of the individuals directly involved, taking into account personal capacities, skill development, support and encouragement?
- What are the benefits of joining, as compared to an alternative outsider strategy?

2. **Initiating the Process**

   There are various options for getting an MSP started, depending on the context and opportunities at hand. The first step in initiating a process is getting a core group of committed individuals and organisations involved in considering the process design and feasibility.

   **Process champions:** CSOs can approach their respective networks to get an MSP started, and take advantage of established relationships with other key stakeholders. It helps to identify counterparts in other agencies that can champion the idea of an MSP, for example within a local UN agency or other international/multilateral organisations, a regional organisation, a government department or mechanism, and other key CSOs.

   **Initiator, convener, host:** The convener is the official face of the process, and should be seen as impartial and have enough authority in the context to convince the right parties to get involved. Where CSOs do not enjoy such a position, they can instigate the process by convincing a key agency to play this role, and can partner with them as co-initiators, supporting the process through their organisation's skills and networks. Another way of involving additional partners can be to get them to co-host meetings and to rotate the host function among different agencies, to appeal to different groups.

   **Core group:** Ideally, the core group of initiators is already multi-stakeholder in composition. CSOs and their identified counterparts should start by comparing objectives and expectations, and clarify the level of investment (time, capacities, and other resources) they are prepared to contribute, as well as discussing potential roles. A Memorandum of Understanding between the key partners can help formalise this commitment.
Facilitation resources: A skilled facilitator or facilitation team, who may or may not be the convener, is necessary to provide careful process design and guidance. Facilitation is a specific set of skills, and requires specialised training, as described in Lesson 21.

Reality check: start calculating the cost of the process and to explore whether sufficient funding, institutional resources and competencies can realistically be secured to see the process through. Make contingency plans for how to proceed should expected resources fall short. The resource considerations can also be explored through consultations with potential participants as described in the steps below.

Legitimacy: Legitimacy is usually linked to the credibility of the convener, the participants and the process itself. One of the most important ingredients in an MSP, from the moment that it is first convened and throughout, is the sense of trust that people have in the fairness of the process, and in the intentions of the conveners and participants.

3. Designing and Preparing the Process
The process design must rely on sound knowledge about the context and the various stakeholders. Self-awareness and sensitivity to conflict dynamics are also important before taking the steps of approaching process participants. Perhaps the most challenging and most important part of this phase is identifying and approaching the potential participants. This phase focuses on mapping, analysis and consultation that can gradually help build trust in the lead up to the official start of the process.

Preliminary context analysis: The initiators should have sufficient knowledge about the context to recognise possible signs or triggers of conflict. Based on this, initiators can formulate their own preliminary objectives of what they are seeking to achieve.

Stakeholder mapping: To start identifying potential participants, initiators should consider power dynamics, interests and relationships of the groups and individuals that play a role in either exacerbating or deterring the conflict. (See Lesson 1)

Criteria for selecting participant stakeholders: The context and stakeholder analysis can help define a set of criteria for selecting the participant institutions and individuals. Whether this is done in a formal process or not, documenting such criteria can strengthen the legitimacy of the process, as it may be questioned or examined by other stakeholders at any stage during the process. In politically sensitive situations, it can be prudent to involve the potential stakeholders in formulating the criteria in a phased process.

Do No Harm and self-assessment: Initiators should consider their own capacity to facilitate the intended process, and assess the possibility of the process affecting the participants or the conflict dynamics negatively.

Formulating the idea: As a basis for future internal and external communications, it can be useful to document the key points of the analyses and the preliminary purpose and objectives of the process in an accessible format, such as a summary sheet or concept note. This document should also make the initiators’ intentions and role explicit. This can form part of a process proposal that participants can validate or revise in initial meetings.

Approaching potential participants: preliminary consultations form part of the initial convening process to get a sense of whether there is sufficient interest in the MSP, any concerns potential participants have and initial process proposals. These consultations can help identify opportunities, and risks, as well as gaps in the analysis and other key stakeholders to approach. It is also a good time to discuss the scope and size of the group. All of this can provide input for a draft charter, or terms of reference.
Observing protocol: In cases where the process aims to involve high-level state or intergovernmental participation, it may be necessary to seek official endorsement in this phase of the process. The role of officials or government will vary, depending on the political dynamics and the degree to which government is enmeshed in conflict dynamics.

Administrative and practical preparations: Organisers must have dedicated people in charge of preparing the practicalities for launching the process. This can include outlining the programme, sending out invitations, securing an appropriate venue and time for the first meetings and handling all other logistics relevant to start the MSP. Note that the administrative functions and timely communications will be important and recurring tasks throughout the process, which has implications for funding/budget considerations.

4. Getting Acquainted
The first group meetings and the acquaintance phase must be considered carefully, as they can set the tone for the rest of the process. The acquaintance phase can involve a degree of disagreement and contestation about the issues at stake. This is a natural part of the process, and should be allowed to play out, where the facilitator helps to unpack the key issues and barriers present in the group to start building confidence. For this reason, it is useful for the group to agree on how to work together from the outset.

Facilitating interaction: Pay attention to practical arrangements, facilitation and space that can encourage interaction among the participants. For example, seating arrangements, icebreakers and allowing time for social spaces, learning and networking can make for more productive and open group discussions. Note that MSPs involving high-level officials from formal institutions will need to take into account official protocol, which may be a pre-condition for meeting. In this case, breaks, outings and other activities can be important to make space for relationship building.

Stating expectations: It is the role of the convener to present the anticipated intentions and purpose of the initiative in the first meeting. Introductions are made to acknowledge those present while taking note of who is not present and whose absence may affect the process. It is important that participants get the opportunity to express their expectations to start identifying commonalities or areas of contention. The role of the participants should be clear: are they there to give advice, to make recommendations, to take decisions, to reach consensus? Who is responsible for follow up? The decision making process should be explicitly agreed: are decisions made by the group, and how?

Ground Rules: Having collective agreement on how to interact and participate in the process gives a clear mandate to the facilitator to intervene when the group dynamics are not respectful or productive. This can be done in several ways (described in detail in Lesson 21), for example:

- Presenting a draft text for discussion, amendment and approval.
- Developing them as part of, or in follow up to, preparatory bilateral meetings.
- Engaging the participants in formulating ground rules from scratch in the first meetings.
- Organising a joint training session on dialogue and listening skills, where the participants can learn about each other’s ways of working, values, and constraints.

Rules of engagement and procedures: Protocol helps the participants to assess and state their level of commitment, roles and responsibilities. Involving the participants in setting out and agreeing to the proceedings is necessary to avoid or minimise misunderstandings once the process is underway. They help the facilitator to ensure a fair and appropriate process. (See Box on next page)
Accountability and transparency of MSP processes: To whom are participants accountable? How will they seek input from and report back to broader constituencies? It is important to be clear on expectations and limitations in this regard, especially where there are no formal feedback mechanisms. Stakeholders can draft an accountability map in which they are explicit to whom they are accountable and how they will communicate with their respective institutions and constituencies.

Grievance resolution mechanisms need to be in place and clear to all participants, where expectations within and outside the group are clearly agreed, and where there is a procedure that spells out how disagreements or complaints are handled in the group. It can also be useful to have an agreed procedure for dealing with inactive participants or those whose behaviour (whether in the meeting or externally) can undermine the process.

Agreement on internal and external communication and confidentiality in relation to what can or cannot be disclosed outside the meeting is key to maintaining a level of trust between the participants and in the process. Depending on the nature of the MSP, it may be useful to agree to apply the Chatham House Rule, which allows participants to disclose the content of discussions but not to attribute that content to anyone. In cases where the Chatham House Rule is not considered sufficiently strict, an event can also be held entirely off the record.

The degree of formality required ultimately depends on the culture and the stakeholders involved, and on the conditions of where and how the dialogue is conducted. Some cultures (including sub-cultures within a specific context) function more through spoken word rather than through documents. Where formal institutions are part of the process, formal charters and reports may be necessary for institutional endorsement.

### Developing Terms of Reference

The written terms of reference for the convening process are sometimes called a charter. The charter names the stakeholder groups and their representatives and outlines how they will work together and what they will discuss. The facilitator can create the draft in collaboration with the stakeholders during the preparatory/bilateral meetings and submit it to the group for discussion and approval. The charter can include some or all of the following components:

**Goal:**
Statement of purpose and the group’s mandate (relationship to other initiatives as relevant).

**List of Stakeholders:**
- Stakeholder groups and their representatives (can include organisational or individual representation; alternates; gender balance; geographic or thematic spread).

**Roles:**
- Roles and responsibilities for MSP participants.
- Role of the third party facilitator.
- Role and mandate of coordinator/organiser/secretariat.

**Procedures:**
- Procedure for changing or selecting new participants.
- Guidelines for communicating with the press/media.
- Observer guidelines.
- Expectations for stakeholders to communicate with and report feedback from their constituencies.
- Decision-making procedures for the dialogue and within stakeholder groups (consensus, straw polls, voting, etc.).
- Dispute/grievance resolution mechanism.
- Conflict of interest.
- Procedures for documenting meetings and process for tracking agreements.
- Moments or timeline for reviewing or adapting the charter/Terms of Reference.

**Schedule:**
- Schedule of meetings and proposed tasks.

*Adapted from:* Convening: Organizing Multiparty Stakeholder Negotiations (CDR Associates, 1998) and Protocol for Developing Multi-Stakeholder Group Terms of Reference and Internal Governance Rules and Procedures (Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity, February 2015).*
5. Agreeing To Go Forward
To be able to function together, the group eventually needs to find a degree of consensus on several levels: the purpose of the process; the problem definition; a shared vision; and a shared plan of what the group will do together. This is not likely to be achieved in one sitting, but is usually the result of a longer process and regular interactions. The sequence of the steps described may take different forms depending on what suits the group dynamics.

Framing the issue(s): By jointly defining and exploring the scope of the problem to be addressed, the group can reach a shared problem formulation. This exercise should be well prepared and can be informed by the preliminary engagement with participants.

Finding common ground for a vision: While a vision for what the group would ideally like to achieve should be inspiring and ambitious, it is useful to prepare a visioning exercise that can get as detailed as possible. Participants will have different starting points, assumptions, and institutional interests, so a vision may need to be unpacked and described in concrete terms from different perspectives to avoid different interpretations of the ideal scenario.

Action Plans: Following from the logic of a conflict assessment, planning should address key who, what, how and when questions about follow up actions the participants will take, whether individually or together.

Goals and milestones: An important part of the action plan is the formulation of what changes and achievements are expected as a result of the actions. It supports motivation and credibility of the process to have some milestones or progress indicators already spelled out from the beginning, and to include some intermediary achievements and quick wins along the way.

Costing the plan: Once there are clear ideas about follow up actions, assess resources needed to implement the plans, and agree on how they will be secured. Fundraising or pooling of resources may be necessary as part of the follow up steps; this may also be the moment to mobilise any donors or donor connections involved in the process.

---

**Sample Dialogue Questions for Exploring the Diversity of Experiences**

- How does public safety impact you personally?
- When do you feel most unsafe?
- How are you coping with insecurity?
- What is your greatest concern about security now?
- When do you feel most safe?
- How is security affecting our community?
- What changes to public safety are we seeing?
- How have security issues affected how we work together? Are there new tensions among us?
- What are the 3 main challenges that keep us from improving security?
- What values in our community can we draw on to address this problem?
- What are the causes of or history the issues?
- Do we have different understandings of the history of security challenges?

**Suggested Caucus Questions**

- What do we need to know from an opposing point of view in order to address this issue?
- How does our group benefit from and suffer from the status quo?
6. Implementing Action Plans

To achieve results beyond the individual level, a crucial part of the process is in the follow up outside the meeting room. Flexibility is needed to be able to go back to re-assert and adjust the process as it moves along and where the need to change plans arises. Internal and external communication throughout this phase is crucial, both for the sake of keeping up momentum and for the purpose of accountability and trust in the process.

Getting organised: With plans of action and definition of roles, the group considers how to work together in the follow up phase, for example by forming working groups, delegations, advisory groups, contact persons/liaisons or action-oriented task forces. The tasks can include activities to support and strengthen the platform itself, such as mobilisation of extra resources as well as public and political support. Constant or emerging issues in this phase may lead to new ways of getting things done. This stage is an opportunity to broaden the engagement in the process, by involving additional groups in the proposed actions.

Feedback loop: Make a point of scheduling regular report back sessions of participants to the group and of the group to broader constituencies. There are many ways of doing this, either using existing channels, or using media, online tools, or arranging for workshops or conferences for a broader range of participants to validate or respond to the activities of the group. Feedback loops are relevant both for the sake of accountability and in order to manage expectations. It is essential that participants have a common base of information. Provide well-organised, concise, accurate and jargon-free information.

Keeping up the momentum: The MSP is most effective when it is results-driven: when each participant begins their tasks with the end result in mind and then deliberately plans how to achieve this with milestones and set timelines that they can report back on. It is just as important that the process inspires and motivates participants to follow these actions through. Extra support, capacity building, buddy schemes or coaching may be needed for a stakeholder to achieve some results.

Adapting: New issues that emerge may require the inclusion of new stakeholders. Some participants may have dropped out causing a gap in the composition of the group. The procedures and rules of engagement may need to be reviewed to be more suitable for the group.

7. Exit strategies

A multi-stakeholder dialogue may be an on-going effort and there is not necessarily an end to such processes. Nevertheless, the time may come when the MSP will either wind down or move to the next level of institutionalisation. In this phase, the process should not simply fade out without notice, explicit agreement or exit strategy, as this can cause disillusionment that can discourage future initiatives.

Closure: The participants may reach consensus about closure for various reasons. Key outputs/objectives may have been reached, or the agreed time period for the initiative is coming to a close. Lack of resources or motivation, or external factors or risks in the context can also directly affect this decision.

Exit strategy: An exit strategy can range from gradually winding down a process, to handing it over to continuous, institutionalised mechanisms. Either way, it is important to communicate the next steps not only to participants but also to key partners, target groups and broader constituencies. It may also involve ensuring that some of the collaboration achieved and relationships built are safeguarded through some other form of engagement or contact.

Lessons learned: For future reference and broader learning, it is useful to document and share not only the outcomes of the process, but also the learning points about the process itself. Some conventional ways of doing this might include reports or presentations (workshops, conferences), but other means can include videos, interviews or blogs.

Institutionalisation: in the best-case scenario, the process evolves into permanent structures, so-called standing mechanisms for different local stakeholders. Dedicated resources allocated by local...
authorities/government, or institutional or policy frameworks underpinning the multi-stakeholder collaboration as well as capacity building exemplify this.

REVIEW
This lesson provided a detailed guide for designing a multi-stakeholder process. Civil society or the security sector can initiate a multi-stakeholder process to help communities identify security challenges through a process of conflict assessment, or to design and implement a security project together. Multi-stakeholder processes may also be used to design a forum for joint monitoring and evaluation of the security sector. Module 10 provides a conceptual framework to assess security governance, accountability and performance to use in a multi-stakeholder process.

Citations

Lesson 11 Learning Exercises

Anchor 10 minutes

Anchor the content in this lesson with an open question. Participants can share in groups of two or three people their response to this question:

- Are there places in society where military, police, government and civil society sit together to discuss security issues?
- What makes these spaces challenging? What makes them effective?

Add 20 minutes

Present the PowerPoint slides or ask participants to discuss the lesson readings in a small group.

Apply 25 minutes

The President has announced the formation of a National Security Dialogue including government, security force, and civil society representatives beginning in two months. Each of the stakeholder teams to be part of the planning team.

In scenario stakeholder teams, discuss the following questions:

- What would it take for your stakeholder team and other groups in society to consider a multi-stakeholder security dialogue legitimate, credible and accountable?
- What factors would influence your decision not to participate?
- Who are the relevant stakeholders to include in a security dialogue? Which key leaders will be important to invite first, to assure their buy-in?
- What key messages can be used to appeal to the interests of different stakeholders to take part in your security dialogue?
- What is the best location for your security dialogue to take place?

After 20 minutes of team discussion, each team shares their strategy with the other teams. The facilitator asks the entire group for their observations.

Away 5 minutes

To end the lesson, the trainer can ask participants to divide into groups of 2 or 3 people. Participants can share with each other their reflections on this lesson.