# Policy Brief

Local Ownership, Civil-Military-Police Coordination & Human Security

This policy brief results from a 3-year collaboration between the Alliance for Peacebuilding, the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) with funding from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. This policy brief accompanies two related publications: A "*Handbook on Human Security: A Civil Society-Military-Police Curriculum*" and "*Local Ownership in Security: Case Studies of Peacebuilding Approaches.*"

1. **Legitimate state-society relations are fundamental to human security.** Citizen-oriented states that focus on human security enjoy public legitimacy and support, and face fewer threats from non-state armed groups than do elite-captured states. Security threats such as violent extremism correlate with elite-captured states, corruption and abusive security forces. A government's public legitimacy is ultimately more important than its monopoly of force. (See Global Terrorism Index 2015)

2. **Security is a public good.** Security forces can best provide this public good and security can be locally owned when security forces coordinate with and are fully accountable to legitimate civilian political authority and civil society, including religious groups, educational institutes, traditional leaders, NGOs, women's groups, youth groups and other representatives of community interests.

3. One of the most critical indicators of legitimate state-society relations – and successful security sector reform - is that local men and women in civil society view **security forces as protectors, not predators.**

4. **Peacebuilding skills and processes are essential for multi-stakeholder coordination to improve human security.** Facilitated dialogue, negotiation, and mediation between civil society, military, police and government can significantly improve coordination and local ownership.

5. **Three conditions** enable more robust local ownership and civil-military-police coordination:
   - When **local ownership is wide**; including diverse local civil society groups
   - When **local ownership is systematic**, including diverse local civil society in five areas necessary for human security (joint civil-military-police capacity building, assessment, planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation)
   - When **local ownership is deep**, involving institutionalized mechanisms in which an empowered, independent, distinct, accepted and free civil society contributes to security in direct and on-going relationship with the security sector.

Widen inclusion in local ownership

Move beyond elite local ownership toward processes that involve large numbers of diverse segments of society. Local ownership is context specific. Always begin with mapping local capacity. The international community laments the "lack of local capacity" while often overlooking all the diverse civil society groups that already exist. International NGOs and elite local civil society representatives should not be gatekeepers. Instead of asking whether local civil society has the capacity to be engaging in security, ask whether the UN, national or foreign governments, security forces, donors, or NGOs themselves have capacity (such as skills, language ability, relationships, cultural understanding) to engage with local communities. Look for entry points to ensure that local civil society involvement includes women and men of different ages, regions, languages, religions, and ethnicities and involves a diverse set of representatives of distinct civil society groups.

National Government → International NGOs → Elite local civil society → Women & men from diverse segments of local civil society

Ensure women are involved in every step to improve gender mainstreaming in security:
- ➢ Assessments that include sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV)
- ➢ Security forces that include women
- ➢ Oversight of the security sector that includes women

Strengthen local ownership through systematic inclusion in 5 activities

Civil society and the security sector can coordinate in five areas, illustrated here in a "Coordination Wheel for Human Security."

Joint <u>capacity building</u> including training, coaching and support to both build relationships and develop a common set of skills, concepts and processes for working together to support human security.

Jointly <u>assess</u> human security challenges including designing research questions and data collection methods in order to analyse data to identify factors driving conflict and supporting peace.

Jointly <u>plan</u> human security strategies and determine relevant theories of change. This can include coordination to plan civilian assistance, protection of civilians, conflict assessment and other peacebuilding efforts.

Jointly <u>implement</u> human security strategies such as early warning and early response, increasing the gender sensitivity of police, developing a civilian harm mitigation plan, or addressing trauma in local communities.

Jointly <u>monitor and evaluate</u> security sector performance in oversight mechanisms to identify the baselines, benchmarks and indicators for monitoring and evaluation of the security sector.

Figure 2: Coordination Wheel for Human Security

Deepen local ownership through institutionalized mechanisms

Civil-military-police coordination deepens local ownership under two conditions:

➢ Institutionalized mechanisms exist for joint capacity building, information sharing, dialogue and consultation, and oversight.
➢ Relative to governmental institutions of civilian oversight and security forces, diverse groups from civil society are empowered, independent, distinct, accepted and free. Civil society contributes to security in direct and on-going relationship with the security sector.

Joint Capacity Building Training for civil society and the security sector to support human security	**Levels of Local Ownership**	
	Information Sharing	➢ One-way communication channels for government to inform the public, and for the public to inform government on security issues.
	Dialogue and Consultation	➢ Governments, security forces, and civilians identify human security threats and jointly design potential human security strategies
	Joint Implementation	➢ Civil society and the security sector participate in joint problem-solving and programming to implement human security strategies
	Joint Institutional Oversight	➢ Civil society representatives have institutional capacity and institutionalized mechanisms in which to monitor and evaluate the security sector.

Information Sharing: In most countries, a basic level of one-way communication channels includes governments sharing information with the public via the news media, and the public uses call-in hotlines for the public to report crimes or violence, or advocacy and social movements to push for new security policies.

Dialogue and Consultation: In Lebanon, Afghanistan, Tanzania and other countries, local peacebuilding organizations mediate and facilitate dialogue between security forces and civilians to enable community leaders and police departments to work together to improve relationships and problem solve on addressing root causes of insecurity. Even in the midst of intense national conflicts, national security forces dialogue with civil society and civilian government in Guinea, Senegal, Yemen, Libya and other countries to identify shared human security goals.

Joint Implementation: In Ghana and Kenya, national and regional platforms for early warning and response coordinate civil society-based mediation teams linked to civilian government and/or security forces. This infrastructure provides clear roles, responsibilities, and communication channels for a "whole of society" response.

Joint Oversight: In the Philippines and Guatemala, local civil society participates in institutionalized forums to work with government and security forces to monitor and evaluate the security sector.

Joint Capacity Building: In dozens of countries, peacebuilding civil society organizations are providing training to security forces and community leaders to improve their skills and processes for coordination on conflict assessment, conflict prevention, negotiation, stress management, and mitigating harm to civilians and other related topics.

Two related publications:

• A civil-military-police curriculum and "Handbook on Human Security"
• A set of 40 case studies of "Local Ownership in Security" on civil-military-police coordination

February 2016

HANDBOOK ON HUMAN SECURITY
A CIVIL-MILITARY-POLICE CURRICULUM

Key Themes
Conflict Prevention & Peacebuilding
Peace Operations & Peacekeeping
Human Aspects of Military Operations
Security Sector Reform & Development
Restorative Justice & Community Policing
Civil-Military-Police Dialogue & Coordination

February 2016

LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN SECURITY
CASE STUDIES OF PEACEBUILDING APPROACHES

Key Themes
Community Engagement
Dialogue & Consultation
Civil Society Oversight
Democratic State-Society Relations
Security Sector Reform
Peacebuilding Approaches to DDR
Gender Mainstreaming

Edited by Lisa Schirch with Deborah Mancini-Griffoli

Protect Civil Society Operational Requirements in Complex Environments

Civil society must navigate between state and non-state armed groups in conflict-affected contexts. In these areas, an empowered, independent, distinct, accepted, and free civil society can collaborate with the security sector to improve human security.

Empowerment: CSOs need to have the power to influence public decisions. To acquire this power, they need to be able to organize, mobilize and inspire communities to work together; gain access to information, education and training; receive funding or invitations (voluntary or donor-mandated) to participate in public decision-making processes.

Independence: While CSOs share common goals to support human rights, CSOs need to be viewed as independent of explicit political and security interests tied to political parties or regimes. Independence enables CSOs to be accepted by all communities and armed groups that might otherwise threaten or attack them if they are viewed as a proxy for state interests. CSOs need to be able to *independently assess* the needs of local populations to identify local human security priorities rather than government or donor interests that might target specific groups to achieve specific political goals.

Distinction: CSOs depend on the distinction of unarmed civilians and armed groups encoded in International Humanitarian Law. This is to prevent attacks on the civilians they represent or on their own staff. Distinction can be achieved through clearly identifiable clothing, separate transportation, and housing of civilians and security forces in different locations.

Consent and Acceptance: CSOs depend on the consent and acceptance of local citizens and all state and non-state actors controlling the territory on which they want to operate. In order to secure consent to facilitate dialogue or mediation, CSOs negotiate with a variety of actors including governments and non-state armed groups, informal traditional governing bodies such as tribal elders or religious authorities, local authorities, or armed actors at checkpoints, airports, ports or regions.

Access and Freedom: CSOs need to be able to speak and move around freely, unhindered by legal constrictions or security threats. In many countries, counterterrorism laws are restricting civil society's ability to contribute to human security by limiting their access to communities or organizations involved in armed conflict.

Alliance for Peacebuilding

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR THE PREVENTION OF ARMED CONFLICT

KROC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE STUDIES