

7. HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS ON GOVERNMENT CIVIL-SOCIETY COLLABORATION

Don Hubert⁸⁰

The contributions of civil society organizations to the advancement of international peace and security have been growing in prominence, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Systematic collaboration between governments and civil society organizations has been the hallmark of a series of campaigns designed to aid in the prevention and resolution of violence conflict, and to reduce their human costs. The incorporation of civil society voices in virtually all dimensions of these processes is a central feature in what has been labelled a ‘new diplomacy’.⁸¹

This essay explores the respective roles among governments, international organizations and civil society organizations in global public policy development. These thematic cross-cutting efforts contribute to what has become known as *systemic prevention* or “measures to address global risk of conflict that transcend particular states.”⁸² Lessons will be drawn from six prominent campaigns: the banning of landmines, child soldiers, and conflict diamonds, the creation of the International Criminal Court, international action on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and the promotion of an international ‘responsibility to protect’.

The objective here is not to assess the broad range of factors that contribute to a successful campaign⁸³. Rather it is to explore the respective roles and contributions of governments and civil society organizations, with a particular emphasis on patterns of collaboration between the two. A comparative analysis of these six initiatives suggests that there are four main sites for potential government, civil society collaboration: formulating the campaign message, mobilizing political will, negotiating international agreements and monitoring implementation.

7.1 Campaign messaging

Among the most important choices made by campaigners are the discourse within which they choose to ‘frame’ their issue, and the nature of the policy

remedies that they choose to advocate. These decisions are normally made in the very early stages of a new campaign, long before formal inter-governmental negotiations begin. And in many ways these choices determine both the scale of the campaigns potential impact as well as the prospects for success. Evidence from recent campaigns points to the powerful combination of framing issues within a humanitarian discourse (enhancing physical safety for people and their communities) and proposing stringent new standards, even where they are certain to be opposed by at least a small number of states.

Role of the humanitarian discourse

While each of the six campaigns examined here focused on a humanitarian objective-reducing the human costs of war-a humanitarian *discourse* has not always dominated, or even been widely accepted. Only the international effort to halt the use of child soldiers was, from the outset, couched exclusively and explicitly humanitarian terms. In the case of conflict diamonds, the frame of reference has remained fairly stable following two mutually reinforcing tracks, one with an emphasis on the human consequences of diamond-fuelled civil wars and another on the ongoing economic viability of both the diamond industry and the countries and employees who depend on it.

80 Don Hubert is Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. For nearly a decade, Hubert led policy development on Canada’s human security agenda at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs. His publications include *The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy*; *The Responsibility to Protect: Supplementary Volume of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* with Thomas Weiss; and *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, with Rob McRae.

81 Rob McRae and Don Hubert eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace*, McGill Queens University Press, 2000; and Andrew Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur, *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy*, United Nations University Press, 2002.

82 Progress Report on the Prevention of Conflict, Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/60/891 (18 July 2006).

83 For detail analyses of these factors, see Don Hubert, *The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy*, Occasional Paper #42, The Humanitarianism and War Project, Watson Institute, Brown University, 2001; and Don Hubert, *Lessons from Campaigns: Innovations in Humanitarian Advocacy*, in Paul van Tongeren et al. (eds.), *People Building Peace II* (Lynne Rienner, 2005) p.558-566.

7. HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS ON GOVERNMENT CIVIL-SOCIETY COLLABORATION

In the other four cases, competition between different framing ‘discourses’ has been a central component of the campaigning process. The crucial turning point for the campaign to ban landmines was shifting the discourse from disarmament (focused on the weapon, concerned with military utility, dominated by conservative governmental negotiators) to humanitarianism (focused on victims, concerned with the human impact, and engaging human rights and humanitarian experts). Similarly, the ICC was first promoted in the early 1990s as a response to narco-traffickers ultimately succeeded by focusing on the gravest violations of international humanitarian and human rights law: genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Issue framing has been central to work on the proliferation of small arms beginning with a focus on crime control, moving towards a arms control agenda and now finally becoming more explicitly oriented towards the human costs of the availability and misuse of these weapons⁸⁴. Similarly, the essence of the “responsibility to protect” was a shift in discourse away from an emphasis on the right of outside powers to intervene and towards the responsibilities of both states and the broader international community to protect civilians facing atrocities.

Clear objectives

A second common element among successful campaigns is the early articulation of clear, far-reaching policy objectives. Such objectives are often dismissed in the first instance as unachievable. To be sure, their formulation is a clear rejection of traditional, lowest-common-denominator approaches, as they highly unlikely to be adopted by consensus among all states. Although bold policy proscriptions may lack universal acceptance, they often generate political momentum by inspiring people to believe that something can actually be done in addressing seemingly insurmountable obstacles.

The first two of the cases examined here – a comprehensive ban on the manufacture, transfer and use of mines, and the creation of an International Criminal Court with potential jurisdiction over heads of state – are obvious examples of this approach. Comparable, far-

reaching objectives characterized three other campaigns: a complete ban on the recruitment and deployment of child soldiers under the age of eighteen; a global scheme requiring country-of-origin certification for the global trade in rough diamonds; and establishing a political and legal framework for international intervention, including the potential use of military force, to halt genocide and crimes against humanity.

The exception among the six campaigns analyzed here is the international effort to address the proliferation and misuse of small arms. In this case, conscious decisions were taken to adopt a multi-dimensional strategy that sought to achieve incremental progress across a broader range of priorities. Only in recent years, nearly a decade after the issue of small arms proliferation was placed on the international agenda, has attention begun to coalesced around a prominent bold objective: the prohibition on the transfer of weapons to be used in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.

International campaigns: parallels and differences

Strong parallels then exist across these six campaigns in both issue framing and policy proscription. In each case, both civil society organizations and governments have played important roles in establishing core campaign messages. There are, however, important differences in the relative contributions between these two sets of actors. Conventional wisdom would suggest that civil society organizations, being closer to the human costs and less constrained by political pressures, would take a leading role in establishing core campaign messages. And this is clearly the case in three of the campaigns examined here: landmines, child soldiers, and conflict diamonds.

In two cases, the International Criminal Court and the small arms, the role of civil society organizations was less prominent in the early stages. On the ICC, a like-minded group of governments made an early

⁸⁴ See for example: *Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control*, Amnesty International/Oxfam International, 2003; and *Putting People First: Human Security Perspectives on Small Arms Availability and Misuse*, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003.

7. HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS ON GOVERNMENT CIVIL-SOCIETY COLLABORATION

commitment to hold international negotiations on the creation of an international court. The extraordinary contribution of the NGO coalition was in pressuring this group of states to adopt substantive principles to ensure an “independent and effective” court. On small arms, early choices on frames of reference and policy objectives were made by governments with little input from civil society groups⁸⁵. More recently, a distinct civil society role can be seen in reframing this debate around the need for an Arms Trade Treaty.

The leading role of governments, and other independent actors, in framing issues and articulating new policy agendas is particularly clearer in the case of the responsibility to protect. Here, the essential idea emerged from a Canadian-sponsored international commission. While the hand of civil society is clear in many of the raw materials drawn on by the Commission – prioritizing human rights in conflict situations and moving from a culture of reaction to prevention – the contribution of these organizations to the specific process through which the debate was reframed was minimal⁸⁶.

The framing of issues at the articulation of policy agendas depend ultimately on the generation of ideas. While it is possible to trace back the respective roles of both civil society organizations and governments in this process, it is worth noting as well the prominent role of individuals as well. The foundational concept underlying the responsibility to protect – the notion of sovereignty as responsibility – came from Francis Deng, UN Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons. The seminal framing for international efforts on children and armed conflict came in a landmark study in 1996 by Graça Machel, an expert appointed by Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali. And the early articulation of the conflict diamond problem came not only from NGO reports but also from a UN process led by Robert Fowler, Chair of the Angola Sanctions Panel at the Security Council.

7.2 Mobilizing political will

A review of these six cases suggests that effective civil society advocacy is a necessary but not sufficient

condition of effective international campaigns. In the wake of high profile initiatives, success is often attributed to NGO efforts, as was the case with the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Jody Williams and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. In many of these cases, the significance of NGO advocacy is undeniable. At their best, these coalitions heighten issue awareness by exploiting extensive existing networks, sensitize policy makers through national level lobbying, and promote a coherent international policy agenda. The role of these coalitions was particularly prominent in the campaigns on landmines, the International Criminal Court, child soldiers and conflict diamonds⁸⁷.

Nevertheless there are three important dimensions to the mobilization of political will that are often overlooked: the gains in credibility that come from formal endorsement through international organizations; the political momentum derived from progress in particular situations or by individual states; and the importance of coalitions of like-minded governments in translating abstract policy objectives into effective policy development processes.

Credibility

A major challenge for many campaigns is to demonstrate continued momentum after the campaign message has been articulated but before formal intergovernmental negotiations begin. The issue here is largely one of demonstrating legitimacy. However solid the claims made by civil society organizations, there will always be those within government who will seek to dismiss them. During this phase, important

85 Regional and global conventions to address the criminal trafficking of firearms were negotiated with minimal NGO involvement, while parameters for arms control efforts were initially established by diplomats in a report to the UN General Assembly in 1997. See Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, A/52/298 of 27 August 1997.

86 Here, longstanding concerns over the use of military force in the belief that it inevitably does more harm than good and diverts attention away from under-resourced preventive measures significantly limited civil society's influence.

87 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Coalition for an International Criminal Court, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and a looser coalition of conflict diamonds including Global Witness, Partnership African Canada, Amnesty International, and a European network known as Fatal Transactions.

contributions come from two very different sources: clear endorsement from international organizations and practical application by states in limited contexts.

Endorsement

Whether fair or not, there is no doubt that governments are more likely to respond to evidence and policy proscription emanating from international organizations than from NGOs. The message may be the same, the evidence may even be the same, but official ‘letter head’ matters to governments. A range of United Nations agencies and in many cases the Secretary General himself, lent substantial, early credibility to international campaigns on landmines, the ICC and child soldiers. On Responsibility to Protect, Kofi Annan was one of the very few early proponents. In several of these cases a distinct contribution was also made by the International Committee of the Red Cross. In spite of their preference for behind-the-scenes diplomacy, public advocacy by the Red Cross provided an important bridge between NGO demands and acceptance by progressive states on banning landmines and child soldiers and for creating the International Criminal Court.

Another source of momentum is the practical application of the proposed standards in specific contexts. On landmines, important momentum was gained when the United States unilaterally banned exports beginning in 1993 and again later when Belgium banned all anti-personnel mines in 1995. An important stepping stone on the ICC was the creation of ad hoc tribunals for the former-Yugoslavia and Rwanda which further demonstrated the need for a permanent international court. In other cases, early governmental action focused on advancing diplomatic processes as was the case with France calling for an initial review conference on landmines, Sweden providing leadership in promoting negotiations on optional protocol on child soldiers, and Canada promoting the findings of the ‘responsibility to protect’ report.

Coalitions

A final and often decisive step in mobilizing political will revolves around the formation of like-minded coalitions of governments. However, good the

campaign, success or failure in the final stages of the process depends on the ability of progressive governments to coordinate the process leading to the final negotiations. On the landmines and the ICC, strong like-minded groups effectively managed the diplomatic process to the degree that the substantive outcomes of the agreements were in many ways predetermined. The intergovernmental spark on conflict diamonds came from African diamond producing countries, though a lack of clarity on the essential elements of the proposed certification scheme resulted in cumbersome negotiations.

In two other cases, the lack of a committed group of like minded countries was a significant barrier to diplomatic progress. The campaign for a complete ban on the recruitment and use of child soldiers under the age of eighteen failed to achieve its full objectives largely due to a lack of a committed governmental coalition. Similarly, in spite of efforts by Norway in the late 1990s, progressive governments have yet to coalesce around a clear agenda to address the proliferation and misuse of small arms.

7.3 Negotiating agreements

Direct civil society contributions

With the initiation of formal intergovernmental negotiations, the relative contributions of civil society and governments change again. Obviously governments have the lead role during this stage of the process. Nevertheless, the level of access for non-governmental organizations remains a key ingredient of negotiations that result in strong agreements with broad support.

One measure of the contribution of civil society organizations is their direct involvement in the negotiating process. Civil society organizations were active participants during the negotiations in at least two of the cases examined here: the ICBL was a formal observer with the right to intervene during the Oslo negotiations on the mine-ban treaty, and Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada both participated in the negotiating sessions leading to the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

7. HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS ON GOVERNMENT CIVIL-SOCIETY COLLABORATION

In other cases, where NGOs are formally excluded from the negotiating sessions, their representatives often participate as members of national delegations. For example, civil society representatives are commonly included in the delegations of progressive governments during UN negotiations on small arms. This form of participation was particularly significant in the Rome Statute negotiations to create the International Criminal Court. With outside support from progressive governments and independent foundations, legal experts from the NGO community were provided to key developing world delegations including Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Trinidad and Tobago. These representatives had substantial influence on the positions of the specific national delegation during the negotiations. On the basis of their substantive legal expertise, they also made important contributions to the substance of the Rome Statute itself.

Even where not directly involved in the negotiations, civil society organizations frequently have a direct bearing on the text through developing proposals to address unresolved issues and even through drafting new text that gets fed into the negotiation process by friendly delegations. Again the Rome Statute negotiations provide an excellent illustration as two specific provisions – the listing of “forced pregnancy” alongside rape and sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, and the rights of victims including their right to participate in court proceedings, provision for the payment of reparations, and the creation of a victims trust fund – are widely acknowledged to have been included only through substantive contributions and relentless pressure from civil society organizations.

Indirect civil society contributions

While numerous examples can be found of direct civil society impact on intergovernmental negotiations, the more common and generally more important contribution during negotiations are indirect – lobbying governments to forestall backtracking on previous commitments, exposing major compromises proposed behind closed doors, and pressing for substantive improvements to the text under discussion. Among the various techniques employed by NGOs, simply

enhancing transparency during the negotiations is among the most effective. During final negotiations on landmines and the International Criminal Court, NGO coalitions published daily up-dates on the state of the negotiations highlighting outstanding issues as well as the positions of prominent states. This approach is sometimes taken one step further by systematically tracking and publishing the full slate of stated government positions on controversial elements. In the case of the ICC, the coalition produced two documents in the final days of the negotiations – *The Numbers* and *The Virtual Vote* – demonstrating that more than three-quarters of states supported progressive positions on issues such as jurisdiction for war crimes in internal armed conflicts and the creation of a powerful independent prosecutor.⁸⁸ Similarly, during the World Summit negotiations in 2005, an NGO network systematically tracked government positions on core elements of the responsibility to protect. Publishing their findings shortly in advance of the final negotiations, they demonstrated growing support for the endorsement of this doctrine in the outcome document⁸⁹.

7.4 Monitoring implementation

The international agreements examined in this essay do not have intrusive compliance and verification measures. In most cases, the formal requirements are limited to annual submission by states documenting national steps taken in implementation. Examples here would include the mine ban treaty, the small arms Program of Action, and the Optional Protocol on child soldiers. While providing a basis for comparative assessment, these state-generated reports are of very uneven quality and are obviously not independent.

Civil society monitoring compliance: the Mine Ban Treaty

At the other extreme, NGOs are frequently engaged in

⁸⁸ *The Numbers: NGO Coalition Special Report on Country Positions and The Virtual Vote: NGO Coalition Special Report on Country Positions on L. 59*, NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, 1998.

⁸⁹ See *State by State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect* at www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/civil_society_statements/294

independent monitoring⁹⁰. By far the most systematic of these efforts is *Landmine Monitor*. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines agreed in 1998 to create an NGO monitoring mechanism to report on implementation of and compliance with the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty⁹¹. The reports, published annually since 1999, are released in advance of the annual meeting of state's parties to the mine ban treaty. The *Monitor* now contains information on 126 countries and areas based on reports from 71 researchers in 62 countries. The report, more than 1000 pages of dense text, provides a country-by-country assessment (states parties and non-signatories) on landmine ban policy, use, production, transfer, stockpiling, mine action funding, mine clearance, mine risk education, landmine casualties, and survivor assistance. While the monitoring effort has no official status, it appears to have considerable influence among governments. Although states have contested particular allegations, the *Monitor* is well-regarded due to its high standard of research. In their own words, "For the first time in history, non-governmental organizations have come together in a coordinated, systematic and sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification."⁹²

Parallel monitoring by civil society: child soldiers and small arms

Although not produced on an annual basis, parallel monitoring efforts exist in two other cases. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldier published a *Global Report* on child recruitment policies and practices in 2001 and strives to provide updates on a three-year cycle⁹³. The 2004 edition reviewed trends and developments related to the use of child soldiers in 196 countries and territories. Publication of the next edition is planned for early 2008. In addition, a network of UK-based NGOs collaborating under the banner of Biting the Bullet, has produced three issues of the so-called *Red Book*, a systematic effort to track implementation of the UN Program of Action on Small Arms⁹⁴. Versions have been produced in advance of the biennial small arms meetings in 2003 and 2005 and the Review Conference in 2006. In the latest edition, more than one hundred researchers provided data from 180

states to provide a thematic and regional overview of the state of implementation.

Joint monitoring by governments and civil society: conflict diamonds and children and armed conflict

While independent NGO monitoring has made important contributions to promoting compliance with new international standards, there are always questions about their effectiveness in changing state behaviour. Where a high level of confidence exists between governments and the civil society mechanism, as is the case with *Landmine Monitor*, allegations of non-compliance are taken seriously. But as noted above in the section on mobilizing political will, the more credible the source of the allegations, the more likely states are to respond. It is often preferable therefore to establish formal links between NGO and intergovernmental monitoring processes. Among the cases examined here, two monitoring mechanisms stand out for the collaborative efforts between civil society and formal intergovernmental processes: the Kimberley Process peer review mechanism and the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on children and armed conflict.

On diamonds, a peer review mechanism was created within the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in late 2003. It provides for voluntary inspections of the national level implementation of all members, as well as dedicated mission in cases where there are indications of non-compliance. Consistent with the tripartite structure of the Kimberley Process including governments, industry and civil society, inspection teams are led by government and include members from all three groups. Initial NGO concerns about the

90 Michael Crowley and Andreas Persbo, The role of non-governmental organizations in the monitoring and verification of international arms control and disarmament negotiations, in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds.), *Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations*, UNIDIR, 2006.

91 See Mary Wareham, *What if no one is watching? Landmine Monitor 1999-2005*, Fafo Institute 2006.

92 *Landmine Monitor*, ICBL, 2006, p. 1.

93 *Child Soldiers: Global Report 2004*, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2004.

94 *Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action*, Biting the Bullet, 2006 (similar reports also produced in 2003 and 2005).

7. HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS ON GOVERNMENT CIVIL-SOCIETY COLLABORATION

“voluntary” nature of the scheme have largely been allayed. In the three years since the creation of the mechanism, inspection teams have gone to all but one of the participants, and a second round of visits is now underway. Furthermore, there is broad agreement that these monitoring efforts have resulted in improvements in national level implementation. In one specific case, the Republic of Congo, the review team report provided the empirical basis for expulsion from the scheme on the grounds of non-compliance.

On children and armed conflict, there is a close and fruitful interplay between civil society and intergovernmental monitoring: parallel NGO monitoring minimizes self-censorship in UN reporting and civil society perspectives are increasingly being integrated into formal UN reports. Formal monitoring on children and armed conflict began in 2001 when the UN Security Council requested the Secretary General to include in his regular reports a list of warring factions recruiting or using child soldiers. Initially, the Secretary General listed 23 groups in five countries, a list limited only to those conflicts which were already on the Security Council’s agenda. In response to the initial report, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers issued a ‘recommended’ list of 20 countries including prominent cases not on the Council’s agenda such as Uganda, Colombia, Sri Lanka and Burma⁹⁵. Subsequent reports from the UN have included these countries, and others, in a second annex focused on conflicts not on the agenda of the Security Council.

NGO monitoring also resulted in increased pressure to broaden the Security Council’s focus beyond child soldiers to include other grave violations such as killings, abductions and sexual violence. The Watchlist network of NGOs was founded to promote monitoring and reporting on a broader range of violations against children during in armed conflict. Through the preparation of a series of detailed country reports, Watchlist demonstrated the interconnected nature of violations against children. Together with like-minded governments, they pressured the Security Council to create a more comprehensive monitoring and reporting mechanism.⁹⁶ Under this new mechanism, reports

covering six especially egregious violations against children are prepared by United Nations agencies. Explicit provision is made in the SC Resolution for collaboration with civil society. While there has been some reluctance within UN agencies to work closely with grass-roots groups in-country, recent cases suggest that viable models for cooperation in data collection are being developed⁹⁷.

7.5 Collaboration – Different phases, different modalities

The objective of this essay has been to explore patterns of cooperation between civil society and governments in promoting international initiatives to prevent, and reduce the human costs, of violent conflict. The relative value-added of these two sets of actors varies considerably among the four phases examined above. There are clear opportunities for, and genuine benefits to, collaboration within each of them.

In general, a broad division of labour exists across the four phases examined here. Civil society organizations commonly play a more prominent role in framing the issue and identifying core campaign objectives, while governments obviously have a central role in formal negotiations. Both sets of actors play important roles in mobilizing political will and in monitoring implementation, with the best outcomes emerging where collaboration between the two is close.

Decisions made in the very early stages relating to issue framing and core policy objectives are often decisive. Here, early collaboration with governments is risky, as they invariably bring a narrow interpretation of the art of the possible. This suggests that close collaboration between civil society organizations and even progressive governments in the campaign design stage may be counter-productive. Here, an emphasis on people rather than organizations is probably warranted. In many cases,

⁹⁵ Press release: Now it’s time to come up with solutions, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 16 December 2002.

⁹⁶ See SC Resolution 1612.

⁹⁷ See, The Power of Partnership: Guiding Principles for Partnership to End Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict, Watchlist, 2006.

7. HUMANITARIAN ADVOCACY CAMPAIGNS: LESSONS ON GOVERNMENT CIVIL-SOCIETY COLLABORATION

leadership in international campaigns is limited to a few dozen committed individuals. While these people are likely to come from the ranks of civil society, organizational affiliation is not particularly significant during this early phase.

The importance of the initial framing, and the establishment of macro policy objectives, continues throughout the process. In fact, collaboration in all subsequent phases should be conditional on governmental support on key ‘non-negotiable’ principles. As a result, although ‘partnership’ is a term

frequently invoked when discussing cooperation between governments and civil society, ‘strategic collaboration’ is a more accurate characterization of the relationship⁹⁸.

Finally, while the centrality of government action is obvious during multilateral negotiations, the cases reviewed here demonstrate the credibility that flows from early engagement with international organizations, the decisive impact of like-minded groups of governments in structuring the negotiations, and the value of formal intergovernmental monitoring mechanisms. There can be no doubt that civil society organizations have become key participants in the development of global public policies to prevent and mitigate the effects of violent conflict. Where they can encourage the formation of effective governmental counterparts, the results can be truly impressive.

⁹⁸ See *Tackling the Problem of Anti-Personnel Landmines: Issues and Developments*, by David Atwood. Study on Contemporary Issues in Arms Control and Disarmament, Zurich Security Forum, October 1998.