|
|
|
|
By Manuel Hassassian and Edward (Edy) Kaufman*
We would like to share our thoughts on the relevance of Israeli-Palestinian case to work conducted worldwide from coexistence to peace-building and reconciliation. While ours is a particular case -and we often think that our conflicts present unique features when explaining the difficulties in resolving them- we should be also aware that it shares similarities and differences with other ethnopolitical disputes. In fact it belongs with many others to the category of protracted communal conflicts, the prevailing category of violent disputes in the post-Cold War period. From this perspective, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict perhaps shares less attributes with the Syrian/Israeli border dispute (over territorial claims on the sparsely populated Golan Heights) than with other identity-driven confrontations in former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Sri Lanka or Indonesia.
We will centre our comments on the last decade of joint work conducted on the part of non-governmental organizations, academics, and other professional groups interested in a historic compromise based on the search for common ground. Our wish is to present a critical introspect, although it may be difficult to retain objectivity when we are both so centrally involved in the process itself. In the next pages we would like to present a brief background followed by a diagnosis of the obstacles, as well as the achievements, of the groups presented in the book in different sectors. The article concludes with some prescriptive comments applicable to others.
Framing the Issue
After over a century of discord, marked both by intermittent acts of violence and officially declared wars (about one a decade), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has eventually resulted in a lengthy peace process. The current process was inaugurated at Madrid in October 1991 as a regional enterprise and took shape as a bilateral understanding through the ‘Oslo channel’, which was endorsed by both sides in the famous signing of the resultant accords on the White House lawn in September 1993.
Israel’s first agreement with Egypt in 1978 failed to lead to a subsequent reconciliation with its other Arab neighbours, leaving the core dispute with the Palestinians active for another two decades. The 1988 recognition by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of a ‘two-state solution’ did not meet with the approval of the then Likud government in Israel, and it was only in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War that negotiations were able to progress. The process launched in Madrid that same year came at first to a diplomatic impasse in Washington, but this was followed by a complex, but effective, track two process in Oslo.
The rise to power of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s hard-line government in 1996 slowed down the implementation of the interim agreements and totally disrupted the timetable established for completing an agreement of final status issues (including borders and security, Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees and other issues such as management of water resources). The parties were expected to reach an agreement on these important issues by 1999, but by now it seems that the situation will remain an open challenge at the dawn of the 21st century.
We would like to focus on the interaction of Arabs and Jews across the Green Line that has separated the ‘small’ Israel from the territories of the West Bank and Gaza that were occupied in the June 1967/Six Days War. These areas have seen only partial re-deployment in areas now under the control of the Palestinian National authority, while the rest of the occupied lands remain under shared rule but total Israeli military control. The larger part of the West Bank and a smaller portion of Gaza are still in Israeli hands and this territory includes not less than 130 new Jewish settlements.
This delimitation of scope is important since within the ‘small’ Israel there has been a longer history of rapprochement between Jews (80% of the population) and Arabs (20%), efforts often described as a drive towards ‘coexistence’. This last term is not popular amongst Palestinians, and to a lesser extent amongst Israelis, who are involved in ‘peace-building’ as a complement to the efforts at ‘peacemaking’ among their leaders. The issue at stake is found within the former term, since a Palestinian state has not yet come into existence and any efforts towards any other solution are considered to be insufficient for eventually ensuring a ‘real peace’ that can cement the post-negotiation stage of ‘reconciliation’. Hence, ‘coexistence’ across the yet undefined borders is often perceived as a false ‘normalization.’ The term for this in Arabic (tatbyeh) connotes unilateral acceptance of the Jewish state without first securing the full recognition of the individual and collective rights of the Palestinian people.
Meanwhile, the Jewish side achieved its political independence fifty years ago and has since worked to secure it through military superiority over coalitions of Arab states, and surely over the Palestinians. It has also worked to consolidate its presence in the Middle East through peace accords with Egypt (the most important and strongest Arab country) and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (with which Israel shares its longest current border). The State of Israel has also developed a vibrant economy stimulated by generous foreign aid and consolidated democratic institutions.
What makes this conflict even more difficult to resolve is the fact that the people of both nations have historically claimed the full possession of the entire land of Greater Israel or Palestine, and that throughout history there have been few moments of convergence of objectives between their respective leaderships. Yet, from within the context of these constraints, there has been a growing recognition by each party of the rights of the other to self-determination and support of the Oslo peace process has reached a high of 75% in both societies. Still, only a small segment of this population actively strives towards the fulfilment of this goal either separately or together with their counterparts.
At the other end of the spectrum we find a militant extremist minority often driven by ‘divine inspiration’ to commit acts opposed not only to the particularities of the Oslo Peace Process, but to any reconciliation. This contingent perceives the conflict in terms of a zero-sum game and claims that its side (these sorts exist on both sides of the conflict) has absolute rights and that there is no room for compromise. Their use of various acts of violence and terror, as well as civil disobedience, provides them with a relative advantage as compared with the mostly reactive and law-abiding protesters from the ‘peace camp’. The Israeli silent majority seems to have been more affected by the zealots’ opposition to the peace process than by the support it receives from pragmatics and moderates.
Obstacles and Opportunities
To what extent can we establish the success or failure of such endeavours made in support of peace? No clear methodology has been found yet. One could argue that the situation could always have been worse. For instance, the conflict is now considered to be of a ‘low intensity level’ compared with its past stages or the current situation with similar conflicts elsewhere around the globe. It could be argued that without the sustained efforts of NGOs on both sides there would not have been a sense of hope for the resolution of the conflict; that without peace demonstrations and human rights monitors, the suffering of the Palestinian side would have been greater.
At the same time, it is quite depressing to realize that only a small fragment of the population of both societies has been involved in peace-building activities, and that the fragility of such undertakings have often declined as a result of terror by committed fundamentalist extremists from both sides. Even the most insignificant minorities when driven by ‘God’s will’ can effectively disrupt the peace process. A serious impediment to face-to-face contacts results from the closures of the Palestinian areas that often follow incidents of terror. Still, there is a need to recognize the presence not only of physical barriers, but also of psychological barriers that are no less difficult to overcome while neither side is still unable to display significant levels of reciprocal compassion.
The facts on the ground have placed Israel in the position of relative strength, generating an asymmetric relationship with the Palestinians that makes joint efforts towards peace-building more difficult. The Palestinians will not assent to claims of a ‘lasting’ peace before the Israeli power and the international community both recognize some basic aspects of ‘justice’. Thus we find the first gap between the goals of the Israeli side -with a noticeable and at times very active ‘peace movement’ -Peace Now in its best moments could gather more than 200,000 in Tel Aviv- and a much smaller constituency led by a significant number of skeleton NGOs that make up the ‘human rights community.’
| ‘Extremist groups using violence, civil disobedience, and insubordination on both sides have bypassed the cumulative impact of the many activists involved in ‘people-to-people’ activities, despite the fact that the former group constitutes a smaller portion of activists.’ |
One the one hand, for many Israelis the search for a ‘lasting peace’ is an act of enlightened self-interest. On the other hand, many Israelis find it difficult to express solidarity with the demands to refrain from human rights violations of the ‘other’ when this means identifying with members of a nation from which a small minority of the population is still perpetuating horrendous acts of terror towards them.
After the June 1967 war, the first Palestinian NGOs were established to prevent human rights violations and, during the Intifada, they grew into a self-reliant driving force working in the absence of an elected authority. After the Oslo accords, more NGOs were established to raise awareness among the public on women’s rights, democracy, and transparency. Only lately, several NGOs were established in support of the Peace Process. What makes the relationship between the two parties more difficult is that among the Palestinians there has been a widespread disillusionment with their Jewish counterparts who have not made their struggle for peace a top priority in their lives. The occasional participation in a demonstration or signing of a petition falls significantly below their level of expectation. Indeed, few Israelis have joined those involved as paid staff or volunteer board members of human rights NGOs. Yet, it is important to recall that those few are strongly committed Israeli activists that have been fighting against administrative detention, housing demolition, the use of ‘moderate physical pressure’ (that amounts to torture) in interrogations, and other violations.
We detect a certain level of tension around these issues. It has been difficult to generate an atmosphere of cooperation when the asymmetry on the ground is so clear. The practical limitations on the freedom of movement and the effect of humiliation by Israeli security forces combine to generate a mood amongst Palestinians that is adverse to voluntary participation in cooperative endeavours with Israeli partners. Furthermore, the unequal number of Israelis (five million Jews and one million non-Jews) and Palestinians (two and a quarter million), the gaps in the educational, technological, and socio-economic levels, and years of consolidation as a democratic entity - all of these factors increase the disparities. One of the consequences is that we often find more Israelis seeking Palestinian partnership than vice versa - a problematic situation when planning activities based on equality which also means numeric parity.
Lastly, we need to recall that in the not remote past, and for a long period of time, the Palestinian leadership first and then the Israeli leadership later forbade any contacts amongst our peoples - although there has been direct contact since 1967. Palestinian dialogue pioneers have been killed by extremist groups and -no doubt a more moderate level of limitation- Israeli peaceniks have been jailed, or politically ostracized, for talking to PLO representatives. While academic and intellectual projects and encounters have been developed since the Intifada (the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza that started in November 1987), most of the dialogue and cooperation programs started after 1993 through the support of ‘People-to-People’ initiatives of friendly governments, with Norway in the lead.
This structural weakness in ‘peace-building’ has marked the cooperation within this area, where people of goodwill tend to act separately, or at best in short-term projects of bilateral cooperation between NGOs, and even less so among professionals under the umbrella of public institutions such as universities. The official Palestinian policy is still to reject such ‘normalization’ in the face of existing inequalities. Yet, there have been not a few NGOs ready for cooperation and some of them have even utilized such contacts in their defense of Palestinian rights, both in relation to the Israeli and Palestinian authorities.
 |
| The enthusiasm for cooperation has decreased with the decline and eventual halt of the Peace Process. Photo Odid Antman. |
Another concern lies in the ability to understand the culture and tradition of the ‘other’- from how to share the grief when facing acts of terror and violence to the differences in group dynamics in the conduction of meetings. Though many Palestinians know Hebrew, few Israelis understand Arabic, and as a result most of the peacebuidling activities are conducted among those who speak English, thus omitting the real grassroots people, who are often more emotionally antagonistic to each other. Furthermore, there are only a handful of joint Israeli-Palestinian NGOs, and most of these are more radical than liberal in their political orientation, and therefore unattractive to the majority of activists on either side.
This marks a major difference from the Arab-Jewish coexistence activity within Israel, where the tendency has been prevailingly to work together in common institutions. In peace-building across the divide, the majority of interactions are conducted by separate Israeli and Palestinian NGOs acting together for a specific period of time. While this mode may more appropriate for what eventually is heading into two distinct but intertwined states, there is still a long way to go for each side to reach out to other similar organizations in its own civil society. For instance, the possibility for a joint Israeli/Palestinian peace education project that would have a multiplying effort in involving or getting interested other NGOs in each side interested in education.
Paradoxically, even if progress in coexistence work can be noticed, we cannot expect a high level of success for Arab/Jewish cooperation efforts in Israel without reaching an effective peace-building among Israelis and Palestinians. The remaining level of conflict in the latter relation makes it impossible to reach the attainment of equal rights in the first. This is not meant to belittle the importance of a pluralistic commitment to work simultaneously in seeking the fulfilment of both goals. Rather it is intended to simply stress the need to prioritize and understand that real reconciliation will not occur unless we put more energy in producing changes of leadership conducive not only to the reactivation but also towards the ‘humanization’ of the Peace Process. Implicit in this is the necessity to fight simultaneously both for the respect of human rights and conflict resolution.
Although the scale of cooperation remains limited by the above mentioned obstacles, we need to stress that the diverse projects of schoolchildren, youth, artists, professional groups, women, and political movements of both sides have shown a high level of creativity. In many ways the Israeli/Palestinian laboratory is an exemplary reservoir of ideas to be emulated elsewhere. Needless to say, we also acknowledge that there is a lot to learn from peace-builders elsewhere. The numbers and qualities of joint projects have increased over time, and it is true that they have done so with the help of generous funding from abroad. In most cases, they have managed to endure the downs of the Peace Process, and that in itself can be seen as an achievement. We do not have space to systematically point out to the many success stories, some are described elsewhere in this volume, and we will confine ourselves to relate briefly to the categories analyzed in this book, with a few illustrations.
Track Two Diplomacy
While the national leadership received the international
recognition for the historic signing of the Oslo accords on the White House
lawn, these agreements would never have been produced if not for the initiative
of non-official second track diplomats. The Israelis and Palestinians who
worked through the secret channel in Oslo to produce the framework for
the current peace process stand as the most prominent example of the potential
of second track diplomacy to make real and lasting advancements in the
building of peace.
Media
While the media has perhaps the greatest potential
for reaching the masses in whose opinions the fate of the peace process
may ultimately lay, the existence of joint endeavours in this sector is
really quite limited. Elsewhere we advocate co-authored newspaper editorials
as a means for affecting public opinion. While we maintain that such work
is important it is relevant that we point out that there is no structural
cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian media. Two examples of genuine,
ongoing cooperative media projects may be cited, and commended; but it
must be stressed that by the nature of their target audiences they have
no real effect on the mass population. First is the Israeli-Palestinian
Sesame Street television program that may foster in the next generation
a culture of peace but cannot have an impact on the politics of the day.
Second are the publications of the Alternative Information Centre, a radical
left-oriented organization of Israelis and Palestinians critical of the
two leaderships and of the Oslo process, but little resonance in both societies.
Religion
Christian, Jewish, and Muslim moderates have met
in various different initiatives aimed at using religious leadership to
foster support for peace, finding more common ground than expected. The
response of those involved in such projects tends to be initially quite
positive. But in the long run little inroads have been produced on their
respective clerical establishments. No doubt, given that the main dimension
of our national conflict is now related to religion, the need to continue
to invest on this area needs to be more recognized
Education
It is possible to point out numerous joint projects
in the field of education, yet almost without exception these projects
are conducted between Israeli Arabs and Israeli Jews. As noted elsewhere,
such constructs, confined to the bounds of ‘small’ Israeli, tend to draw
attention away from the greater picture of the Israeli-Palestinian situation.
The barriers to cooperation between academic institutions imposed from
above on both sides are also existent for the large public school sectors.
On the part of the Israelis, the tremendous influence of the orthodox religious
in the educational leadership must be weighed. For the Palestinians there
is a refusal on the part of the leadership to engage in cooperative endeavours
with Israeli institutions until it is possible for schools in the West
Bank and Gaza to enjoy free exchange of students.
Women’s Issues
Women are among the most prominent individuals
working for peace and are involved in large numbers on the Israeli side.
This seems not be the case on the Palestinian side where most women leaders
seem to devote more energy in the struggle for equality and to show a tougher
stand towards normalization with their peers. Few organizations exist and
one of the most active over a sustained time has been ‘The Jerusalem Link’,
a coalition of two Israeli and Palestinian feminist peace organizations
in East and West Jerusalem, active in promoting both peace and human rights
through a two-state solution. It is often responsible for organizing protests
against housing demolitions, and other acts by officials that endanger
the progress of peace.
‘Coexistence across the yet undefined
borders is often perceived as a false normalization.’
Private Sector
Israeli and Palestinian individual businesses
have been inclined to trade and seek join ventures or deals, making this
cooperation more attractive perhaps than any other. Yet in the motivation
for their compulsion to work side by side can be found the very factor
that yields private enterprise cooperation ineffective in directly affecting
peace-building. That is, the private sector tend to be apolitical, and
businesses are inclined to foster only good will and obviously the individual
interests of the beneficiaries.
Individual/Community-Based Initiatives
Given the constant tension, the animosity resulting
from individual violent acts and collective reprisals, the reduction of
the resulting hatred is a top priority in setting the atmosphere for peace-building
activities. Unfortunately, only a few initiatives have been undertaken
in this field. Dialogue groups have been in existence for a while, such
as the Rapprochement Centre in Beit Sahour. but in the long run the effect
of talk that does not lead into action has been detrimental to its continuity
as a whole. One of the most recent projects is the Parents’ Circle, a group
formed by a religious Jewish Israeli man who lost his son through an act
of Hammas terror. He refuses to join in the ranks of the families of victims
of terror organized in Israel to actively oppose the peace process on the
basis of the persistence of such acts. Instead, he has been bringing together
Israeli and Palestinian bereaved parents who have lost a member of the
family through politically motivated or military violence. They work together
to convince the leaderships on both sides that only through establishing
a genuine peace will the two peoples be able to put an end to the terror.
These observations can be put within a larger context to affirm that the lack of progress in the peace process has negatively affected democracy in Israel and the process of democratization in the Palestinian Territories. There have been many indications that the quality of life, not only in economic terms, but also in terms of basic freedoms and political/civil rights is increasingly restricted by the procrastination in the advancement of peace. This message has not been successfully communicated to large sectors of the population on both sides, and it still remains a task for those involved in coexistence and peace-building work to undertake as part of their efforts to make the connection between democracy and peace. To get out of this vicious cycle there is a need for the liberal civil society to realize that fragmented efforts need to be understood within a wider picture. On the positive side, there is a connection between democracy and peace (the popular formulation is that democracies tend not to fight wars with one another), and, on the negative side, the first of these deteriorates as a result of paralysis in securing the latter.
In retrospect, we should convey our concern that the dedicated efforts of a small but active part of both Israeli and Palestinian civil societies do not seem to have been effective in positively redressing the adverse trends in the peace process. Extremist groups using violence, civil disobedience, and insubordination on both sides have bypassed the cumulative impact of the many activists involved in ‘people-to-people’ activities. This despite the fact that the former group constitutes a smaller portion of activists. It may well have to do with the enormous impact of the use of violence, terror, and collective punishment, and the peace forces may revise again the inventory available for effective engagement in civil disobedience and other non-violent methods. The enthusiasm for cooperation has decreased with the decline and eventual halt of the Peace Process. Paradoxically, at times when peace-building is more necessary than ever, the level of motivation of the civil societies to work hand in hand is lower.
For Israeli NGOs it is necessary to fight simultaneously for the end of occupation while at the same time minimizing the day-to-day suffering of the Palestinian population. For Palestinian NGOs it is crucial to transcend their sense of frustration with the lack of ‘peace dividends’ by still showing public concern and rejection of the use of terror against Israeli civilians. During this last electoral campaign in Israel, the impact of such acts by rejectionist groups is feared; but so far no strong peace message has been coming from the Palestinian civil society as a preventive measure to project another image of the Arab hostility in the Israeli public eye.
Since there is a high level of consensus among Israelis and Palestinians around the plausibility of a ‘two-state solution,’ the main area of concern remains the fear of terror and reprisals. In this context of lack of personal security to the individuals of both sides, the advocacy of non-violence in the Palestinian struggle for independence, even if not accompanied by support to the Oslo process, could be a tremendous contribution to setting up the conditions for more positive interactions.
Separately, we have analyzed the limitation of the ‘people-to-people’ work mostly as positive, but introverted, activities that lack clear political objectives, and therefore remain at best a constructive tool for interactions amongst a part of civil society. Such activities indeed build trust, affect attitudes, and reduce stereotypes among the participants in hundreds of programs. Yet there are two additional elements that have not been developed. One of the two missing dimensions is a deliberate attempt to affect the attitudes of policy makers. Sporadic interactions between peace-oriented Palestinians and pro-government Israeli parliamentarians have shown that there is a powerful tool for moderating the views of some. This has not been pursued by the Israelis in ‘people-to-people’ networks. Sometimes this kind of action can be conducted diagonally from one civil society to the leadership of the other or by jointly trying to affect the leadership of both. Wide publicity about such activities can also affect public attitudes.
The second dimension precisely focuses on efforts to address public opinion and grassroots attitudes. Little has been done to utilize the mass media, such as television, radio talk shows, and daily newspapers. Again, joint appearances (if possible the Israeli/Palestinian team speaking the language of each audience), co-authored op-eds, successful coverage of ‘people-to-people’ programs, documenting emotional movements are all appropriate methods. Needless to say, the multiplying effect of a deliberate effort to stimulate a better atmosphere is one of the most powerful tools - particularly at the time of electoral campaigns. It can also contribute to the adoption of confidence building measures such as the decrease of human rights violations, and amnesties for released political prisoners.
One would hope that a realistic and charismatic leadership could radiate confidence not only to its own people but also to the other nation. If such an atmosphere would simultaneously exist on both sides, then we could bring the Peace Process to completion. Even then we would submit that a handshake is not enough, and the human fragility of such equation has been seen in the tragic assassinations of President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin. Such processes need to be accompanied by an active involvement of the peace forces at all stages of negotiation. Surely, when the time of reconciliation comes after the agreements, the public dimension of the process will require the groups and prominent individuals within civil society to play an exemplary role. What makes it more troublesome is that we do not find such statesmen available, even from one of the two governments. At this time the challenges of peace-building are formidable and the odds against the extremist forces -now backed also by one government- are not good. This has characterized the late period in our Process and only a more creative, professional, interactive and devoted peace movement on both sides can generate the dynamics that will trigger a real change of minds and hearts among their brethren.
We would like to express our gratitude to our research assistant Heather Coppley who was so instrumental in transforming our ideas into this article.
REFERENCES
Issues related to the subject of this article have been treated by both of us jointly and separately in several publications, and among them:
Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Edy Kaufman, Shukri Abed and Robert Rothstein, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993.
See articles of E. Kaufman, ‘The Effect of War and Occupation on Israeli Society’ (pages 85-134) and M. Hassassian ‘The Democratization Process in the PLO: Ideology, Structure, and Strategy’ (pages 257-285)
The Role of the Israeli and Palestinian Civil Societies in the Peace Process, M. Hassassian and E. Kaufman. In: Is Oslo Alive, M, Maoz and S. Nusseibeh (eds.). Jerusalem, The Adenauer Foundation, 1998
‘Israeli-Palestinian Co-authoring: A New Development Towards Peace?’ E. Kaufman. Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. XXII, 88, No 4, Summer 1993) pages 32-44
The Role of Palestinian NGOs in Peace Building, M. Hassassian. In: Academics and the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: Past, Present and Future Roles, E. Kaufman and M.Hassassian (forthcoming).
*Edward (Edy) Kaufman, (Ph.D. from the University of Paris -Sorbonne), Senior Researcher and Executive Director of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has been involved in human rights NGOs at the international and national level, currently chairing the Board of B’tselem, the Israel Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. He is also a Senior Researcher (and former Director) of the Center for International Development and Conflict Management of the University of Maryland-College Park and for the past five years has been team teaching a course on ‘Conflict Resolution: the Israeli/Palestinian Experiment’ concurrently with Prof. Hassassian.
*Manuel Hassassian (Ph.D. from University of Toledo, Ohio) taught Political Science at Bethlehem University, later becoming Dean of Students, Dean of Arts and is now its Executive Vice-president. He is also currently the Chair of the Palestinian Council of Higher Education. In his voluntary work he has been involved in Palestinian NGOs focusing on democracy and peace, and electoral monitoring. He received an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Reims, France.
Feedback please to
j.verhoeven@euconflict.org