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By Peter Gastrow*
The tumultuous political transition that occurred in South Africa during the 1990s, variously described as the South African ‘miracle’, the ‘negotiated revolution’, or the peaceful change from apartheid to democracy, is a success story that should never be taken for granted. The determined actions and sacrifices of many individuals and organisations, as well as national and international developments, shaped this process. There was nothing inevitable about it - in fact at various stages of this process the prospects of peaceful progress or civil war were balanced on a knife-edge.
When, in February 1990, Nelson Mandela was released from 27 years in prison, and liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) were unbanned, South Africa had just gone through a debilitating year of political violence. With 1,403 people killed, 1989 had been the worst year of political violence in modern South African history. A political and strategic deadlock between the Apartheid State and the anti-apartheid forces had developed. The release of Mandela fuelled expectations of constitutional negotiations that would lead South Africa out of its political cul-de-sac. It was assumed that political violence would abate and that peace was at last within reach.
This optimism was largely misplaced. Violence did not abate. Fierce clashes between ANC supporters and supporters of the largely Zulu based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) took place. In many instances, the security forces were playing a sinister role of fuelling such conflicts. In fact 1990, the year that many thought would be the precursor to liberation, democracy and stability, became a year of unprecedented political strife and killings. 3,699 people were killed through political violence, a 163 percent increase over 1989. Hopes for a peaceful change dimmed as the increased political violence prevented constitutional negotiations from commencing. It became clear that if South Africa was to break out of the growing spiral of violence and polarisation, political leaders would have to manage the coming transition more effectively, and rules of conduct would have to be agreed upon in order to minimise the political violence and intolerance.
In the face of these developments, an embarrassed South African political leadership began realising that they were incapable of stemming the violence on their own. Bilateral meetings between Nelson Mandela, then deputy president of the ANC, and Chief Minister Buthelezi, leader of the IFP, took place. One day after Mandela and Buthelezi had announced a ‘watershed agreement effectively outlawing violence, intimidation and political intolerance among their followers’ a fierce battle between more than 2,000 supporters of the ANC and the IFP took place in the province of Natal. At least 8 people were killed, 60 injured, and about 56 houses burned to the ground. The calls for peace by political leaders had no effect.
President de Klerk and his ruling National Party were embarrassed by their apparent inability to contain the violence that weakened their negotiating power. Growing allegations of ‘third force’ involvement and of the active participation and fuelling of the violence by de Klerk’s security forces were strongly denied by him.
The impression therefore gained ground that violence was out of control and that neither South Africa’s political leadership or De Klerk’s security forces were able to address it effectively. Interventions from national role players other than the government and political leaders seemed to present the only hope to stem the worsening political violence and instability.
The church was the institution that first attempted a national intervention at the beginning of 1991. This was one year after the release of Mandela. The South African Council of Churches (SACC), an umbrella body for many churches, including the Methodist and Anglican Churches, called for an urgent national meeting of all leaders of strife-torn communities. The SACC, which had over many years been a strong critic of apartheid, did not represent Afrikaner churches and was distrusted by some of the political opponents of the ANC, including Chief Minister Buthelezi of the IFP. It was therefore not surprising that Buthelezi was sceptical about an SACC sponsored meeting. This was one of the main reasons why it never got off the ground.
South Africa’s business community, primarily white, was also experiencing anxious times. The initial optimism that the release of Mandela would lead to political stability and the lifting of international economic sanctions, and therefore an economic upswing, had proved to be groundless. One interest group within the business community, namely the Consultative Business Movement (CBM), decided to take up the challenge. It was a voluntary organisation of senior and more progressive South African business leaders who acknowledged and supported the need for fundamental transformation in the country. In a low-key manner, the Consultative Business Movement met with the ANC, the South African Communist Party, Chief Minister Buthelezi and the Central Executive Committee of the IFP, a delegation of cabinet ministers from the National Party and with the leaders of the largest labour federation in the country, the Congress of South African Trade Unions. At all these meetings, the violence in the country was discussed. Nothing concrete emerged, but the CBM had placed itself on the map as an organisation with a potential facilitating role.
| ‘A peaceful political transition was pursued through a multi-track approach involving all sectors of South African society as well as the international community.’ |
Whilst political violence was escalating to alarming levels, President de Klerk organised a ‘Peace Summit’ to which he invited all political groupings in the country. Some of the major political forces, for example, the ANC, declined to participate. They saw him as part of the problem of violence and not as the one who could provide a solution. His inability to deal with the violence through his government’s security forces highlighted his impotence. It had become clear that without the involvement of the ANC, his Summit would not achieve much.
The frustration and helplessness being experienced by South Africans in general contributed to a gloomy future scenario of ongoing violence, growing instability and even prospects of a low intensity civil war. Commentators, both locally and abroad, predicted a bloody future. All efforts at bringing political violence under control had failed: the political leaders had been unsuccessful in stamping their authority on their followers. The churches were not trusted by all. De Klerk himself and his government had no credibility among the majority of black South Africans and big business was too close to the government to be trusted by the ANC.
The success in turning this critical and depressing situation into one of hope, lay in attempts to find more creative multi-track approaches towards achieving peace. No bilaterals or single organisations had succeeded in bringing South Africa’s main political leaders together to talk peace.
The various initiatives that followed, and that contributed to the eventual peaceful political change in 1994, involved a whole range of interest groups and role players. Leaders of the South African Council of Churches and the CBM took the step of jointly exploring what role civil society could play to halt the slide towards growing polarisation of South African society. They expanded their discussions to include the leadership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions and also made contact with de Klerk’s office. In further discussions (these were all informal and low-key), key figures from the Dutch Reformed Church, such as its former moderator, were invited. The Dutch Reformed Church was regarded as an Afrikaner church with influence over the Afrikaner establishment. The church and business leaders from the SACC and CBM then met with Buthelezi as well as with President de Klerk.
What they were seeking was an understanding for the need to call a peace meeting through the joint offices of the churches and business. The initial responses by Buthelezi and de Klerk were sceptical. De Klerk stressed that the government did not need the help of facilitators because it was in direct communication with all relevant parties. He did, however give a mandate to a trusted senior figure in the Afrikaner establishment who had attended De Klerk’s failed peace summit, to meet with church and business leaders to explore the possibilities for a more representative peace meeting.
These informal discussions gathered momentum. Participants soon conceptualised the process that would have to be followed if violence was to be reduced. A meeting, referred to as a ‘think tank for peace’, to which all relevant political groups and others would be invited, was planned for 22 June 1991 in Johannesburg.
The response to the invitations was very encouraging. Never before in South Africa’s history had so many diverse political groupings agreed to meet on one platform to talk peace. During the daylong meeting, which was held in the sumptuous offices of a large business concern, Archbishop Tutu played a crucial role in steering the ship through some dangerous rapids. Behind closed doors, different perspectives of the political violence and the political intolerance were considered.
South Africans at large received the outcome with a sigh of relief. It was agreed to establish a new preparatory committee, this time consisting mainly of representatives of various political parties but chaired by a prominent non-partisan businessman. The committee decided to establish five working groups that would look at the following issues :
Group 1: Code of conduct for political parties
Group 2: Code of conduct for Security Forces
Group 3: Socio-economic development
Group 4: Implementation and monitoring
Group 5: Process, secretariat, and media
Each Working Group was to consist of three nominees from the government/National Party, three nominees from the IFP, three nominees from the ANC/South African Communist Party/Congress of South African Trade Unions alliance, one religious leader, and one business representative from the preparatory committee. September 14, 1991 was set as the target date by which the reports from the five working groups had to be completed and on which a National Peace Convention would be held to ratify and sign the agreements. South Africa’s political, church, trade union and business leaders would be invited to attend.
Whilst the political leadership backed the work of the five Working Groups, there was no let-up in the violence and killings between their supporters and the security forces on the ground. To an increasing extent, South Africans realised that, unless the planned National Peace Convention was successful, the chances of commencing constitutional negotiation were slim and so were the chances of peace and stability. The Convention therefore had to be successful. And so it was.
The National Peace Convention was a remarkable occasion. The written reports from the working groups had been collated to form what was from then on referred to as the National Peace Accord. With the exception of three white right-wing parties, the national leaders of all South Africa’s political groups attended. This had never happened before. For the first time Mandela, de Klerk, and Buthelezi were together and actually sitting next to each other. Add to that the leaders of the South African Communist Party, the Pan Africanist Congress and a number of smaller parties, and it becomes clear why the National Peace Convention represented a breakthrough for South Africa. It showed that the deep-seated differences that existed would, in future, not prevent the various parties from speaking to each other about common interests.
Leaders from various religious denominations were there. So were trade unions, the business community, the diplomatic corps, Zulu king Goodwill Zwelithini, traditional chiefs and newspaper editors. The symbolic significance of such a gathering was powerful, something that the media conveyed with full fanfare.
Witnessed by all those present, the political
leaders signed the National Peace Accord and undertook to make it work.
This was to be a daring experiment in conflict resolution on a national
scale. The Accord provided for the establishment of a network of representative
peace committees at national, regional, and local levels. Basic democratic
norms would have to be abided by, political intolerance would not be allowed,
dispute resolution mechanisms were built in, a code of conduct was provided
for both political parties and the police, and a programme of socio-economic
development was to be initiated.
The first broad outlines of the new South
Africa were established. As an evaluation mission from International Alert
concluded, ‘Its [the accord’s] significant success lies in developing a
‘peace culture’, in securing an ideological commitment from the principal
political actors to ‘political tolerance’, and in being able to establish
procedures and mechanisms for crisis management.’
This approach towards achieving peace, in which the
elite as well as ordinary communities had a role to play, and in which
labour unions, churches, business, traditional leaders, other civil society
structures as well as political parties were involved, meant that people
from across South Africa became part of a peace process with a common objective
in mind. By April 1994, when the first democratic election was held, one
national peace committee, eleven regional, and 250 local peace committees
had been established throughout the country.
Emotions at Amnesty Hearings. Photo George Hallet.
After the signing of the National Peace Accord, political leaders soon turned their attention to the next major challenge that required urgent attention, the proposed multi-party conference to negotiate a new democratic constitution for the country. Political expectations were high; something the Peace Accord was unable to address. It was not geared to transform the country from apartheid to a democracy. It was also not geared to deal with the danger presented by the multiplicity of military forces in the country. Nor was it capable of defusing the threats of sabotaging of the negotiated change by armed white right-wing groups. A number of simultaneous and multi-track approaches to deal with these threats were initiated.
By the end of 1991, the Conference for a Democratic South Africa, CODESA, had constituted itself as the multi-party forum through which constitutional negotiations would take place. The country’s political leadership participated in these often tension-ridden discussions, week after week, for many months, while their supporters were attempting to make the Peace Accord work on the ground. All the Peace Committees could achieve was to help contain political violence to levels that would otherwise have been even worse.
After a particularly brutal massacre in June 1992, in which 48 people, mainly women and children were killed, local and international outrage followed and the constitutional negotiations came to a grinding halt. After an appeal to the United Nations by Nelson Mandela, the General Assembly decided in August 1992 to deploy UN observers to South Africa. Within the next few months they were joined by monitors from the Commonwealth, the Organisation for African Unity and the European Community. In terms of the UN resolution, they attached themselves to peace committees in various parts of the country where they made a significant impact. With their distinct uniform or flags, they were seen by friend and foe as ‘the ears and eyes’ of the international community. This enabled international monitors to have a restraining impact on potentially violent situations such as huge political rallies or protest marches. Their contribution to the eventual successful political change should not be underestimated.
| ‘The successful peace process over the past ten years will always provide justification to South Africans for the belief that should national crises occur, they have it within themselves to pull together and overcome such crises.’ |
In order to assist in preparing citizens and institutions for a totally different political and social future, many civil society structures were busy facilitating contact and interaction between erstwhile enemies or with state and other institutions that faced fundamental transformation. These were crucial initiatives: communication and joint planning for the future was facilitated between the South African Defence Force and the military wing of the ANC. Afrikaner establishment figures from sports, the arts, business and the media were introduced to leading politicians and others from exile in a systematic way. Low-key contacts with white right-wing groups were established with the hope of staving off any serious attempts to derail the coming election and to secure their participation in the elections. Some non-governmental organisations focused on research and policy changes that would soon become necessary. Many other examples could be mentioned. All these efforts constituted a productive and multi-faceted approach by civil society structures towards achieving a peaceful transition from apartheid to a democracy.
During the entire pre-election period, international economic and financial sanctions remained in place and were used to apply pressure for change on de Klerk’s governing National Party and on the business community. Even sanctions played their part in the eventual successful outcome of this process.
A peaceful political transition was therefore pursued through a multi-track approach involving all sectors of South African society as well as the international community. The peace process resulting from the National Peace Accord was merely one of the tracks that brought South Africa to its first democratic election. Coming soon after the Peace Accord, CODESA was the track on which the actual new dispensation was brokered, and for almost two years, these two processes worked in tandem. Other tracks involved civil society structures, the international monitors, and informal interactions by non governmental organisations and a variety of groups.
All these initiatives went through testing times. Although deaths as a result of political violence had peaked in July 1993, shortly before the elections, in March and April 1994, a serious escalation of political violence suddenly occurred. During March alone, 552 persons had died. A state of emergency was declared in the province of KwaZulu-Natal and security forces were placed on the alert.
An inexplicable change occurred during the last week before the election was due on 26 April 1994. Violence subsided. An almost eerie absence of political violence and death during the four voting days occurred. The co-operation and goodwill that was exhibited between South Africans from across the spectrum created a new sense of national unity and optimism for the future. It had a major influence on the national mood for a year or two.
As was to be expected, however, the post election honeymoon has since lost a lot of its sparkle. Despite the miraculous transition in South Africa, enormous challenges and problems face the country. The successful peace process over the past ten years will, however, always provide justification to South Africans for the belief that should national crises occur, they have it within themselves to pull together and overcome such crises.
*Peter Gastrow has played a key role in the promotion of peace in South Africa in the past decade. As a lawyer and a Member of Parliament, he participated in the establishment of the National Peace Accord and served in a number of its structures. He chaired the Law and Order Sub-council of the transitional government prior to the 1994 elections and thereafter assumed the position of special advisor to the Minister of Safety and Security. Gastrow is presently the Cape Town Director of the Institute for Security Studies; an independent applied policy research institute that focuses on human security in Africa.
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