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By Michelle Parlevliet*
Since the mid-1970s, a growing number of states have tried to come to terms with a legacy of gross human rights violations committed in their recent history, whether during military or authoritarian rule or in the course of an armed conflict. An approach which has steadily gained prominence in this respect is the investigation and recording of past atrocities by so-called truth commissions. Some twenty such commissions have operated across the world in the last fifteen years of which those in Chile, Argentina, and South Africa, have become the most widely known.1
Without much international attention, a truth
commission recently completed its work in Guatemala and investigations
continue in the southern provinces of Sri Lanka. The establishment of a
commission is being discussed in Suriname, where violations committed in
the 1980s continue to haunt society. In Indonesia, the fall of Suharto
has allowed civil society to take up the issue of confronting the past.
A commission has been proposed for Bosnia-Herzegovina, one suggested for
Northern-Ireland, and one called for in Namibia and Sierra Leone.
The recent proliferation of truthtelling bodies
warrants a closer look as their establishment generally relates to addressing
old conflicts and preventing new ones. This chapter introduces the concept
of truth commissions and some of the major issues related to their use.
It clarifies the rationale behind them, sets out their practices, and seeks
to shed light on their role in furthering reconciliation. Attention is
also paid to the challenges that truth commissions may encounter and to
factors that might affect their impact and effectiveness. Given the complexity
of the issues involved, an in-depth examination of these matters is, however,
beyond the scope of this chapter.
Background
When countries move out
of protracted periods of violence, societies and leadership alike need
to decide whether and how to deal with the widespread human rights violations
that have been committed. In considering whether to close the book on such
abuses or to investigate and hold individuals accountable, ethical and
political considerations need to be balanced: the demands of justice must
be weighed against what is politically feasible. A tension is then often
perceived to exist between the pursuit of both justice and peace, given
the precarious nature of a political transition. It is feared that the
former may jeopardize the latter when a democracy or peace agreement is
still fragile. Yet experience has shown that justice is part
of the positive contents of peace and that addressing justice-related issues
contributes to reconciliation in the long term. Consequently, accounting
for past abuses is increasingly deemed important for the development of
an enduring democracy or a lasting peace. Failure to do so may well lay
the foundation for renewed violence by reinforcing a sense of impunity
and resentment, allowing for conflicting versions of the past, and perpetuating
enemy images. Redressing past violations, on the other hand, might reassert
the rule of law, create respect for human rights, and legitimize structures
of governance, thus altering the conditions in which serious crimes occurred.
Telling the truth originally surfaced as a
way to deal with a legacy of abuses because the political circumstances
often preclude prosecuting perpetrators. 'Bringing truth to light' at least
ensured that knowledge of past crimes would be preserved. Truth is also
viewed as a direct response to human rights violations because many of
those evolve around secrecy and denial (disappearances, torture, killings
by anonymous death squads.) Public acknowledgement of the truth
is therefore as important as knowledge itself, for it counters the
atmosphere of silence and deceit that facilitates such crimes.
Internationally, a 'right to truth' is now
recognized for both societies and individuals. For the former, it is considered
essential to avoid the repetition of crimes in the future. For the latter,
it is part of an effective remedy for violations. This right is included
in a set of principles prepared for the United Nations with a view to combating
impunity (hereinafter the 'Joinet-principles.')2
Serving this right to truth, truth commissions are increasingly considered
valuable in their own right, rather than a second-best option to prosecution.
Their broad scope of inquiry, inclusive character, impact on victims, and
forward-looking nature add greatly to this appreciation.3
Forms and Activities: Variations on a Theme
Truth commissions are
remarkably flexible bodies. They appear in a wide variety of forms and
sizes and new models continue to evolve as each situation presents its
unique set of circumstances, constraints, and demands. The historical,
political, and cultural context of a country is of major influence on the
shape that a commission will take, precluding any easy categorization of
the truth commissions existing to date. Features Sponsorship Focus Quasi-judicial Reporting Follow-Up Limitations Enhancing the Prospects for Reconciliation
While the contributions of truth commissions
to reconciliation cannot be established in any precise manner, experiences
to date suggest a number of ways in which commissions can enhance the prospects
of reconciliation. These exist on social, factual, political, and moral
levels.
Truth commissions can
be defined as official bodies that investigate, within a limited time-frame,
past human rights violations in order to establish a comprehensive record
of abuses that occurred in a particular country over a specific period
of time. Their mandate is generally limited to serious violations. These
are specified in detail or set out in broad terms, in which case the commission
is left to interpret which abuses to include in its investigation. The
Salvadoran Commission on the Truth, for example, was charged with
investigating "serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and
whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the
truth."4 Commissions
may investigate violations by the armed forces of the state, those committed
by the opposition, or both. Commissions are also charged with making recommendations
aimed at reparation and prevention of future abuses.
Most commissions to date
have been state bodies, set up by parliament or the head of state. In El
Salvador and Guatemala, commissions were established under auspices of
the United Nations in the context of peace agreement between government
and guerrilla forces. At times, human rights organisations or church institutions
have undertaken projects that resemble such official commissions in the
absence of any government effort.
The primary focus of truth
commissions is on victims and relatives. As a result, few restrictions
are placed on participation and much emphasis is placed upon on providing
opportunity to victims to relate their accounts. In fact, only in South
Africa did the commission receive significant information from perpetrators,
owing to its capacity to grant amnesty in exchange for disclosure about
past crimes. Activities may be conducted in public or private depending
on security considerations, the mandate of a commission, and the national
context. While increasing the transparency of a commission, publicity may
draw it into the political arena more easily.
As quasi-judicial bodies, truth commissions
do not make findings of criminal responsibility, their reports do not have
judicial effects, and their powers are limited. Two issues have been particularly
controversial: whether to name names, and whether to investigate abuses
by both governmental and oppositional forces. Traditionally, the concept
of human rights violations has been restricted to acts of the state. Critics
charge that investigating crimes committed by the state and by non-state
actors (such as armed opposition forces) equates them, thus downplaying
the gravity of the former.5
On the naming of perpetrators, many consider the truth to be incomplete
without individualizing responsibility and argue that it is the only way
to break a cycle of impunity. Others are concerned over due process protections
for those named. Generally, the terms of reference have left it to commissions
to decide whether to name names.
Truth commissions compile
comprehensive final reports which usually are widely released to the public.
These reports establish the societal and political context, explain the
historical background, indicate the overall pattern of abuses, and lay
out institutional responsibilities. Some list all cases brought to a commission's
attention, others detail some cases illustrative of general trends. Extensive
recommendations are made, outlining needed reform (such as restructuring
the police, strengthening civilian command over the military, human rights
education) and suggesting reparation measures (compensation, access to
health care and education, renaming of public spaces.) Most commissions
have made recommendations regarding the prosecution of perpetrators, irrespective
of concurrent amnesty measures.
Following the publication of a report, some
heads of state publicly accept responsibility for past wrongs and apologize
to victims.
President Aylwin of Chile, for example, made a televised apology
appealing for forgiveness and sent a copy of the report to the family of
each victim named. A commission may also set other efforts to deal with
the past in motion. In South Africa and Guatemala, a process of exhumations
and reburials has begun, going some way in addressing the grief of relatives.
The record of judicial follow-up is generally mixed. The evidence gathered
by a commission may allow for the criminal prosecution of perpetrators.
Yet in several countries, blanket amnesties were declared before a commission
came into being; elsewhere, they were promulgated after the publication
of a report. Individual perpetrators and the (former) military and political
leadership often fail to take responsibility for past crimes. Nevertheless,
in most cases society at large has acknowledged the abuses.
The past cannot be undone, but it may be possible to mitigate
its negative impact on society.
The tense political environment in which commissions
operate often place serious limitations on their activities. The balance
of power between different political and societal actors during the transitional
period determines the scope and depth of the truthtelling process. In Namibia,
the government has resisted the establishment of a truth commission to
avoid having its past behavior be scrutinized.6
The continuing dominance of the military in Guatemala ensured that the
Historical Clarification Commission could not individualize responsibility
nor provide the courts with the material it collected, despite strong pleas
from national human rights organisations.7
Challenges truth commissions may face include lack of power and/or resources,
intimidation of witnesses, and restricted access to information. The political
parameters may also impede the implementation of recommendations.
The positive impact of a truth commission in
these areas can be significant. Yet a process of reconciliation is a complex
one involving many aspects and taking place on a number of levels. A commission
will encounter challenges in furthering reconciliation, three of which
are discussed below.
Impartial?
The interpretation of principles such as 'impartiality'
and 'evenhandedness' which guide a commission in its work, often prove
divisive. 'Evenhandedness' means treating all violations fairly, but not
necessarily apportioning equal blame across the board nor refraining from
criticizing a political cause in the name of which abuses were committed.
On the contrary, a commission cannot escape making moral judgements on
the past as it makes its findings in light of human rights norms. It determines
what was wrong and who was responsible. Findings may reveal one side to
the conflict committed more abuses or was disproportionally victimized.
Thus, while a truth commission can - and must - be impartial, it cannot
be neutral. Those responsible for violations, anxious to protect
themselves against adverse findings, point to this approach as proof of
bias and argue that commissions should simply acknowledge that 'all sides
committed abuses.' The tense environment in which a truth commission operates
accelerates accusations of bias, thus intensifying the political wrangling
around the body as some seek to trumpet its findings while others denounce
them.
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| Archbishop D.M. Tutu and F.W. de Klerk (Former President of South
Africa). Photo George Hallet. |
| A truth commission can set a much longer-term of transformation in motion, especially when it is embedded in a broader program of reform. |
Reconciling the Personal?
The primary contribution of truth commissions to reconciliation is on the national level, rather than on the individual or community level. Interpersonal reconciliation would involve bringing people together - which commissions are generally unable to do given their temporary nature, the numbers of people involved, and the sheer enormity of their task of compiling a comprehensive record within a short period of time. Also, such reconciliation requires repentance and acknowledgement of the harm inflicted by those responsible. Yet only to a limited extent have truth commissions to date been able to elicit genuine remorse from perpetrators and to prompt them to own up to their acts.
Affecting the Impact of a Truth Commission
If anything, experiences to date teach us that there can be no standard model for a truth commission nor a recipe for success given the extent to which a commission is shaped by the particular national context. Nevertheless, past experiences do offer insight into the factors which might affect the impact and effectiveness of a truth commission. Of these, the political parameters during the transitional period are probably the most fundamental. They may further include the following:
The above are but a few of the factors that influence the effectiveness and impact of a truth commission. An evaluation of these may indicate whether a truthtelling process represents a genuine commitment on the part of a government to deal with the past or is merely window-dressing, being a substitute for real change or used as an instrument to relieve international pressure to address human rights issues. Other factors of influence include logistical and practical matters, international support, access to outside sources of information, the level of fear amongst witnesses, and the role of external actors in the violence. (While possibly fraught with difficulties, the investigation of the latter could be particularly important in situations like Northern-Ireland.) The relative strength of such factors and the way in which they are linked together will depend on the specific circumstances of each case.
Conclusion
Truth commissions have become very popular in the last fifteen years and their prominence is unlikely to abate in the near future. As more insight is gained in their functioning and the ways in which they may affect societies, commissions are increasingly deployed in coming to terms with a legacy of violence. Truth commissions can set a longer-term process of transformation in motion, especially when accompanied by a program of reform. They generate a process of reflection that blurs the hard edges of perceived reality, highlights the need for addressing relationships and attitudes, and forces people to contemplate the organization of society and the governing of the state. The increased level of public involvement in establishing truth commissions is valuable in this respect, signifying how dealing with the past is a collective effort. A truth commission cannot institute change alone nor can it bring about reconciliation. Yet it may create an environment in which change and peaceful coexistence become possible. The past is here to stay, but truth commissions offer a way for society to process and manage it non-destructively based upon the recognition of human dignity and integrity.
1 For an overview of truth commissions, see Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16 (1994), p. 597-655; and Daan Bronkhorst, Truth and Reconciliation. Obstacles and Opportunities for Human Rights, Amnesty International (Amsterdam, 1995.) Return to Text
2 Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Intended to Strengthen Action to Combat Impunity, U.N. Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 48th Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item 10, at 12, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18, 29 June 1996 (Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet.) Return to Text
3 Michelle Parlevliet, "Considering Truth: Dealing with a Legacy of Gross Human Rights Violations," Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1998: pp. 141-174. Return to Text
4 Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: the 12-Year War in El Salvador, UNDoc s/25500/1993: p. 11. Return to Text
5 In the classical understanding, acts of violence by non-state actors or private individuals are not violations of human rights because such rights historically arose in the relation between citizens and the state as a limit to state power. In this view, only the state can violate human rights. Applying the concept of human rights violations to acts by armed opposition forces then obscures the significance of violations by the state; it may also give undue status to non-state actors. Yet the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation decided to investigate abuses by the state and by other political actors based on the argument that a broader interpretation of the term 'human rights' had evolved in public opinion, namely that there are basic norms of humane behaviour that all political actors should respect. See Jorge Mera, "Chile: Truth and Justice under the Democratic Government," in Naomi Roht-Arriaza (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1995): pp.171-184; and David Weissbrodt, "Non-State Entities and Human Rights within the Context of the Nation-State in the 21st Century," in: Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fried van Hoof & Jacqueline Smith (eds.), The Role of the Nation-Staute in the 21st Century: Human Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy, Kluwer Law International (The Hague/Boston/London, 1998): pp. 175-195: p. 194-195. Return to Text
6 Lauren Dobell, "Review Article. Silence in Context: Truth and/or Reconciliation in Namibia," Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 1997: pp. 371-382; Peter R. Baehr, De rechten van de mens. Universaliteit in de praktijk, Boom (Amsterdam, 1998): p. 148. Return to Text
7 Richard Wilson, "Violent Truths: The Politics of Memory in Guatemala," Accord, Issue 2, 1997; and Frank LaRue, "Truth Commission Accord Fails to Address Concerns of Guatemalan Civil Society and the People's 'Right to Truth," Center for Human Rights Legal Action, 21 July 1994. Return to Text
8 Antjie Krog, in Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronald Scheffer (eds.), The Healing of a Nation?, Justice in Transition, Cape Town (1995): p. 115. Return to Text
9 See note 2. Return to Text
10 Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, "Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America," Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1995, p. 79-116: p. 103; Lawrence Weschler in Truth Commissions: a Comparative Assessment, Harvard Law School Human Rights Program, 1996: p. 63. Return to Text
11 Brandon Hamder, "Conclusion: A Truth Commission for Northern Ireland?," in Brandon Hamder (ed.), Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland and Societies in Transition, INCORE, Londonderry (1998): 79-86. Return to Text
12 Interview with Dr. A. Boraine, Vice-Chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 15 May 1998, Cape Town.
*Michelle Parlevliet is Program Manager of the Human
Rights and Conflict Management Training Program, at the Center for Conflict
Resolution, South Africa. She previuosly worked in the Prosecuter's Office
of the International Criminal Courtfor the Former Yugoslavia and as a researcher
at the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. MA Political
Science (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands); MA International Peace
Studies (University of Notre Dame, USA)
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