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Voice of the Voiceless in Kenya
‘Ethnic identification is a sensitive, emotional issue, one that is easily manipulated. Ethnicity can become part of the transition phenomena when people do not know how to relate swiftly and correctly to rapid political change. In such times of uncertainty, it is easy to politicise ethnicity and to build a support base from it.’
(Sam Kobia, former general secretary of the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) in ‘The Quest for Democracy in Africa’, 1993)
The government’s complicity in the violence in Kenya (see Box) is both deeply troubling, in that it reflects the absence of the rule of law within the Kenyan political system, but also just slightly hopeful, to the extent that it suggests that the violence was not triggered by such fundamental differences, bitter rivalries, or deep-rooted hatred between neighbouring ethnic groups that reconciliation between the parties can never be achieved.
Estimates vary, but it is generally agreed that, beyond the dead and perhaps 30,000 wounded, more than 300,000 people have been displaced due to ethnic violence. And naturally, with this enormous displacement, economic and social displacement have followed, with families divided, health and educational infrastructure disrupted, and food shortages occurring because of crop damage and the inability of farmers to work their fields.
To address this large scale refugee problem, and to try to work for reconciliation among the rival groups, the NCCK has launched a multi-faceted program called the NCCK Peace and Reconciliation Project. Financial support for the project has been provided by the Government of the Netherlands, at the outset (1992-1993) through the Dutch Ministry for Development Co-operation, and later on, via Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA).
The NCCK, which dates back to 1908, is an umbrella organisation for Christian churches in Kenya. It has a long and consistent record of working to spur development at all levels - economic and political as well as spiritual. In campaigning for greater democracy and a more open society, and attempting to serve as the ‘voice of the voiceless’, it has clashed with the authorities on more than one occasion. The NCCK’s own investigations into the causes of the communal violence of the early nineties led to the very same conclusions as those of outside observers: the violence was politically instigated.
The Peace and Reconciliation Project was primarily an emergency relief program during its first phase, at a time when the victims of ethnic violence required assistance. But the focus has gradually shifted from relief and rehabilitation to peace and reconciliation, with concerted efforts underway to ‘prevent ethnic conflict, improve inter-ethnic relationships, reduce the suffering as a result of ethnic violence, and create awareness on issues causing conflicts.’
It was during phase II, from 1994 until 1996, that the first efforts were made to present an integrated approach in which relief and rehabilitation efforts were linked to reconciliation programs with a more social focus. Subsequently, beginning with phase III in August 1996, more extensive reconciliation programs were initiated to not only restore hope to the victims of violence and provide them with a means to earn a decent living, but also to assist them in re-integrating themselves into the communities they had fled.
The basic administrative unit of the Peace and Reconciliation
Project is an ‘Area Peace and Rehabilitation Committee’ (APRC),
which draws its membership from a cross section of local inhabitants
including representatives of local leadership, churches, NGOs,
youth, and women. In fact, the success of the program has been
premised on the active participation of the local population.
‘One cannot resolve conflicts and make peace unless the root causes
of the conflicts have been identified and dealt with. This can
only happen if the root causes can be identified by local communities
themselves within a context they are familiar with.’
These APRCs organised hundreds of Good Neighbourliness Seminars, open to elders, local opinion leaders, local politicians, educators, community workers, government workers, and members of other important groups and organisations at the local level. At these seminars, the participants could discuss the causes of the local conflicts and analyse the effects that these conflicts had on their communities, and could examine potential strategies for successfully resolving the conflicts without resorting to violence.
In those meetings held for community leaders, the leaders own roles in promoting peace and reconciliation were a focus of the discussions. Meetings held exclusively for women gave women the chance to participate in ways that wouldn’t have been possible in mixed seminars. In seminars focusing on youth, the participants were challenged to re-evaluate the values that resulted in them perceiving ‘the other’ as enemy, and encouraged not to allow others to manipulate them into acts of violence, but rather to channel their energies into more constructive activities. Intercultural sports and social activities were also encouraged.
Those seminars bringing together elders and traditional leaders were of particular importance, as traditional leaders are held in high regard and retain enormous influence in their communities. Their roles as peacemakers are crucial.
In the ethnic patchwork that is Kenya, it is sometimes convenient
to point to ethnic conflict as an inevitable element of the culture.
And that has all too frequently seemed to be the case as Kikuyus
and Kalenjins have battled and slaughtered each other over the
past decade. Kenya is, after all, a nation of more than 40 distinct
ethnic groups, where dozens of languages are spoken, with a set
of borders imposed on it by an outside colonial power, a national
government that asserts authority across those ethnic divides,
and a system of government not entirely consistent with traditional
Kenyan notions of authority or governance. And the ethnic divisions
have clearly been a major factor in determining the political
landscape of Kenya since before independence. But in fact, much
of the ethnic violence that has recently plagued Kenya and claimed
several thousand lives has its roots not in fundamental ethnic
rivalries, but rather in politics.
Inevitable Ethnic Violence?
Outside observers, from the United States government to independent
human rights organisations like Amnesty International, Article
19 and Human Rights Watch have all concluded that the serious
ethnic violence which flared up during the run-up to multi-party
elections in 1992, and again prior to the elections in December
1997, was instigated by the government and the ruling party, the
Kenyan African National Union (KANU). While it is true that these
ethnic clashes took place primarily between the original Kalenjin
inhabitants of the Rift Valley region, and other ethnic groups
who had migrated to the region and settled there (and later, in
the coastal regions as well), it is generally agreed that the
violence was motivated by a desire of the KANU leadership to assure
electoral victory by launching a campaign against members of those
ethnic communities who affiliated with the opposition, so that
they would be forced to flee or would not vote to oppose KANU
candidates.
During these seminars, some 200 Village Peace Committees were established. Peace Committee members were drawn from both the displaced persons and those who had remained in their villages, and they were responsible for a wide variety of activities: to act as arbiters between the various interest groups within the community, to initiate efforts to restore local amenities and set priorities, to serve as representatives of the local communities on the APRCs, and together with the APRCs, to function as a sort of ‘early warning system’ to detect and de-fuse ethnic tension before it erupted into violence.
Beyond the small scale seminars intended to bring people with similar social positions together, the project encouraged local officials to organise larger community meetings called ‘barazas’ to discuss issues related to peace, security, and resettlement with a broad cross-section of stakeholders within a community.
Key interest groups, such as legislators, religious leaders, and public administrators were invited to participate in specialised workshops designed to provide these individuals with information and experience that would help them to reduce ethnic tensions and overcome mistrust. For example, at workshops attended by legislators, the conflicts in Kenya were placed against the backdrop of ethnic conflicts in other African states, with an examination of the causes of these conflicts, and discussions on the ways to resolve disputes nonviolently. In considering strategies for peacemaking, it was suggested that ‘conflict transformation’ might be a better description of the process, where the essential ingredients for successful resolution demand that the parties to a conflict come to a basic understanding of the root causes of their dispute, and seek a solution that both sides view as fair, based on the premise that ‘justice is a prerequisite of peace.’
The NCCK has been publishing a monthly magazine that reports on both reconciliation efforts and incidents of violence. It has also actively distributed peace and reconciliation posters in the affected regions, many produced by schoolchildren in the local communities. To encourage an exchange of ideas among the members of the APRCs, it has sponsored exchange visits, and has sponsored similar activities for youth groups and women’s organisations. To assist the resettlement of the victims of violence, it has created a ‘Central Clashes Rehabilitation Register’ with data about land purchases, organised monthly meetings on resettlement issues, and provided material assistance to individuals and groups to help them make a new start.
At the outset, the NCCK conducted extensive interviews with a broad range of stakeholders so that it would come to a more complete understanding of the causes of conflict. And throughout the duration of the project, it has worked with these stakeholders, so that they have a sense of ownership. In evaluating the success of the project, M.E. Witte-Rang of the Dutch ecumenical development organisation OIKOS attributes much of the success of the project to this approach. ‘When people own a project,’ writes Witte-Rang, ‘they feel responsible and will defend their own activities,’ adding ‘it is a matter of principal: local people know better than anyone else the causes of the conflict and the possible solutions to end it.’ (Witte-Rang, M.E. A Way Out of the Conflict (OIKOS: Utrecht, 1998)
In its own description of its activities, the NCCK attributes much of the Peace and Reconciliation Project’s success to its ‘inclusive’ approach. ‘You cannot make peace on your own or with a few enlightened people ... all actors, no matter whether they are perceived as friend or enemy, good or bad, influential or [simply members of the] community, they all have to be involved in the process.’ And while that is no guarantee of success, it has, in the view of the NCCK, helped to reduce the level of violence in the Rift Valley, and enhanced mutual understanding among ordinary people.
Feedback please to
j.verhoeven@euconflict.org