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Europe’s Trip-Wire
Throughout most of the nineties, Mr. Max van der Stoel has ploughed with sustained vigour through the minorities minefield that is Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nearly once a week, unmindful of the vagaries of the weather, undaunted by scepticism and even mistrust, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities has moved from Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, into Albania, through Romania and Macedonia, listening with care to the various sides, asking questions, making suggestions, offering assistance.
The High Commissioner’s office, established in 1992 by the CSCE, precursor to the OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe - is akin to a trip-wire. His job is to alert the OSCE before tensions develop into fullblown crises. So the former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has worked out of the Hague with an 11-person staff since January 1993, functions as an Early Warning and Conflict Prevention mechanism for the international community. Or, in the appropriate official jargon, he’s ‘an instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage’.
Ethnic conflict is recognised as one of the main sources of large-scale violence in today’s Europe. Minority issues simmer or have exploded in many OSCE participating states - Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgysztan, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine.
There is no general agreement on what constitutes a (national) minority, either in the OSCE or elsewhere. Van der Stoel himself is not definitive. ‘The existence of a minority is a question of fact and not of definition,’ he says, quoting the Copenhagen Document of 1990: ‘To belong to a national minority is a matter of a person’s individual choice.’
He adds: ‘I know a minority when I see one. First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics, which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity.’
Europe has no shortage of such groups. And the High Commissioner has accumulated a considerable portfolio based on interventions in a wide range of disputes between them and their governments.
His approach - conducting on-site missions, using preventive diplomacy at early stages of tensions, encouraging dialogue, and ensuring confidence and co-operation among parties - is possible because the position of High Commissioner is a comparatively independent one, the holder being free to decide when to intervene in a crisis, and the degree of such intervention.
Van der Stoel goes beyond the minorities’ general complaints and the majorities’ general justifications. His focus is on down-to-earth facts - the dull details that make all the difference. This approach is used as much in Albania (Greek minority concentrated in the southern region) as well as Croatia (displaced persons and refugees belonging to national minorities). It is used in the Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia where a great number of the population was not recognised as normal citizens when the countries regained their independence in 1991. If Russians have to pass an exam on Estonian or Latvian language, Van der Stoel wants to know, what sorts of questions are asked? (Extremely difficult ones.) If the governments insists on the non-Estonian residents being able to speak the language fluently, does it offer courses? If it takes so long to attend to a request for citizenship, why is that?
Intervening on behalf of ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia, who want to return home, he argues with care about definitions. Should they be called ‘internal migrants’ or ‘displaced persons’? Then Van der Stoel reminds the government of Croatia of its pledge ‘to create conditions for the voluntary, safe, dignified and speedy return of all displaced persons and refugees, regardless of their nationality and ethnic origin’. The Croatian constitution is also invoked. Article 15 states inter alia that ‘Members of all nations and minorities have equal rights in the Republic of Croatia’.
That is the diplomat’s hallmark - patience, reminding governments of their obligations to the rule of law, and holding them to their commitments.
When a row developed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over the use of the Albanian flag by people of Albanian origin, he adopted a similar approach. (Twenty-three percent of the population of Macedonia is of Albanian origin.) Two people had died during disturbances related to the continued raising of the Albanian flags next to the flag of the Macedonia over two town halls run by Albanian mayors. After a visit (one of many to this country) and discussions, Van der Stoel urged ‘all nationalities within the State to strive to find solutions for inter-ethnic problems by rejecting ethnic hatred and intolerance and by seeking constructive and continuous dialogue, with equal rights for all ethnic groups as the guiding principle.’
Intervening on behalf of the Slovak minority in Hungary, Van der
Stoel focuses on the need for direct representation of the various
national minorities in Hungary in the Hungarian parliament. And
he takes a dim view of plans to cancel regional radio programmes
in the Slovak language - lasting 90 minutes a day - on days that
the Hungarian Parliament is in session, and replacing these reports
with broadcasts of parliamentary debates.
Van der Stoel in Vukovar, Croatia. Photo Rob Hof
Ukraine’s Crimean Tartars view themselves as indigenous peoples. After hearing there case, Van der Stoel suggests a legal framework within which this could be considered. While acknowledging that Ukraine is under no international obligation in this regard, the High Commissioner points to the general assumption that ‘the right of persons belonging to national minorities as laid down in various international instruments also accrue to indigenous peoples.’
And he invokes Article 11 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which lays down some important principles regarding both indigenous peoples and national minorities by stating that the state will assist in the development of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.
So while the job of High Commissioner on National Minorities is framed by a set of good intentions reinforced by an exalted mandate, in reality its success has to be measured in terms of actual practice.
Van der Stoel himself says about his work: ‘You should not expect miracles from this sort of work. You have to arm yourself against disappointments and against what you perceive as perfectly unreasonable criticism. I think I have to realize that I have achieved something when a situation does not destabilize any further or when a small step towards a solution is being made.’
No miracle worker, but a juggler perhaps. The varying interests and contending positions and perspectives held by minorities and political rulers of the states they occupy, must be balanced. Despite the impression conveyed by the name, this is not an Ombudsman for National Minorities, nor is Van der Stoel required to investigate individual human rights violations. This is the reason the job title is ‘on National Minorities’, rather than ‘for National Minorities’.
Apathy is a big impediment. Van der Stoel, a diplomat experienced in today’s harsh world realities, but patient and caring in his approach, is expected to cry wolf whenever a potential conflict looms. But what if no-one listens?
That was the case in Kosovo, where Van der Stoel acted until February 1998 as Personal Representative of the OSCE Presidency. In January 1999, while the international media focused on the ‘crisis’ there, Van der Stoel lamented another case of opportunity lost. ‘I do not pretend that I have the magic formula,’ he told a Dutch newspaper. ‘But probably far too little has been done. I have the feeling that the international community has begun taking action too late.’
The assumption in the framework that established the post of High Commissioner is that protecting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities will contribute towards a country’s ability to reduce the tensions that create a context for wider conflict.
The office has limited political clout, however. A fair amount of ‘indirect’ means can be used to press for recommendations, including a gentle reminder that an unfavourable report can have implications for the much-coveted relationships some of these nations seek with western nations and organisations.
‘However, the role of these means should not be overestimated,’ notes Stefan Vassilev, adviser to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. ‘The events in Kosovo showed that international diplomatic pressure and dependence on foreign aid could not always serve the “carrot and stick” role.’
Further, the High Commissioner cannot handle individual cases concerning persons belonging to national minorities. His mandate does not permit the consideration of national minority issues in situations involving organized acts of terrorism or to communicate with or acknowledge communications from any person or organization that practices or publicly condones terrorism or violence.
‘Early warning’ must be followed by early action on the part of the world community. In that way, highly tense situations can be prevented from becoming full-blown conflicts.
To Van der Stoel’s chagrin, in Kosovo such ‘early warning’ was unheeded until a point of no return was reached in that province of former Yugoslavia wrecked by fighting between secessionists and the Serbian national army.
Sometimes a softly approach is required - watching a case from the earliest stage possible, monitoring it carefully to see what changes occur. SICLOMON is the acronym used for this by the High Commissioner’s staff - ‘Situations to be closely monitored’. This is applicable when there are -still weak- signals of unfolding prerequisites for a trouble but it is too early for a full scale of international activities. Often too much international involvement could contribute to the development of the pre-conflict situation. To turn blind eyes or just wait and see is also not the proper response.
In this respect the High Commissioner can choose a ‘passive’ approach involving mere collection of data (as a follow-up to a signal obtained throughout the general routine monitoring process) through different means including sporadic contacts with some of the actors on the ground, contracts with other international organisations, and visit to a country. That can move to ‘active’ involvement, which entails visits, dialogue with the actors involved, the issuing of recommendations and taking some action.
| ‘Early warning’ must be followed by early action on the part of the world community. In that way, highly tense situations can be prevented from becoming full-blown conflicts. |
‘Inevitably, there is a “grey area” between the two categories,’ notes Vassilev. ‘There are also cases when development of a situation requires change of the High Commissioner’s involvement from passive to active or the other way round. SICLOMON are also in this grey area.’
An important element of the High Commissioner’s job is to build credibility and good working relationship with the various parties. ‘The position of a close confidant with international leverage to all sides is the best option,’ says Vassilev. ‘Demonstrated preparedness to listen to and to understand each side’s position and willingness to help each party in the process of finding mutually beneficial solutions is extremely helpful.’
The role must be carefully explained to all parties involved - the High Commissioner is not an international policeman but a facilitator or mediator. For example, normally none of the actors, is willing to make the first move in the form of inviting the other side to ‘come to talk’, which would be seen as a concession. The other side is also not willing to ‘knock at the door of the adversary’ or to ‘come by foot’ to it. Thus, establishing a mechanism or forum for dialogue through various types of round tables, consultations, seminars, and the like is of utmost importance, Vassilev suggests. An initiative by the High Commissioner, offering his auspices or hosting the event in a neutral site can sometimes be a face-saver.
Finding accord among the leaders is one thing; finding one that can be sold to the respective constituencies is another story.
‘In other words, each party has to gain from the final deal more than it would lose in the eyes of the respective supporters. Very often this requires extra efforts by the High Commissioner to organize a package of “accompanying measures” (sweeteners) to the main agreement which make it attractive to both sides,’ says Vassilev.
Sometimes reaching a partial solution is preferable to further escalation. After accord has been reached comes the hard part - implementation. In fact, ‘effective implementation of the reached agreements is the most important part of the High Commissioner’s involvement. Failure to carry the implementation through undermines not only the results of the whole process in question, but would also significantly reduce ... trust.’
The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities encourages and tries to facilitate larger and more active participation of minorities in the public and political life of the countries in which they live. He also adheres to the principle of integration vs. assimilation, in which efforts are made to overcome the fear (real or imaginary) that the majority of the population is seeking ways to assimilate a given minority, thus making it difficult to have real cooperation between them. Minorities are also encouraged to avoid self-isolation.
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